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Tolerance-Discourses in Germany 




Executive Summary  
 
The following report examines issues of intolerance, tolerance and acceptance of diversity in Germany 
with a specific focus on the challenges that religious difference poses today.  
As in many other European countries, religious practices, mainly those of Muslims, have become the 
major focus of public attention and have been debated as a major challenge to tolerance and 
acceptance in Germany. It is especially the visible aspects of religious practice, like mosque building, 
headscarves or public prayers that have caused major public debates within the last years and even 
raised the question, if there should be a limit to tolerance. The widely used exclamation “no tolerance 
for intolerance!” points to the fears of too much tolerance in the face of intolerant behaviour or norms. 
This report therefore not only examines the way, how and if minorities are tolerated or accepted in 
German society, but also at the discourses connected to this question, mainly the discourse in 
tolerance. As can be seen in the above quoted exclamation, tolerance is not only used in order to 
include groups of others, but can also be used to exclude or even to construct them as others in the first 
place. Therefore the report also looks at those excluding processes and at the role they play for the 
whole society and the self-identification of the established national majorities. 
Chapter 1 
The first chapter gives an overview of diversity challenges that have arisen in Germany over the last 
30 years, and analyses contemporary tolerance discourses and practices of (in-) tolerance, (non-) 
acceptance and (dis-) respect towards ethnic, cultural and religious differences. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the development of German national identity and describes 
how a specifically ethnic understanding of the nation has been an important factor for this 
development since the very beginning of the nation-building process. While Germany is not the only 
country to link ethnic origin to its understanding of nationality, some historians argue that this tie has 
been especially strong in Germany. Among the reasons given is the historical importance placed on 
local or regional identity over national German identity that has led to an even stronger emphasis on a 
constructed common German national identity, almost overcompensating to keep the fragmented 
territory together and build one nation. In the process, other nations were constructed as inferior in 
relation to the German one and a specifically German idea of the Volk was developed, which lays 
particular emphasis on a common bloodline of all the members of the nation. This was far more 
ideological than the concept of ethnicity, and strongly linked ideology and (perceived) biological 
factors. Together with the devaluation of other nations and ethnic groups this concept of the Volk 
ultimately led to the National Socialists’ idea of a superior German ‘race’, which had to govern all 
other ‘races’ and even extinguish other groups and nations. 
Although the National Socialist regime and its ideas have long been overcome and certain thinkers, 
like Jürgen Habermas, have argued that the only possible patriotism in Germany today could be 
patriotism towards the constitution, the idea of the Volk has not been completely jettisoned. As a 
result, German citizenship has, until recently, been closely tied to ethnic origin. 
The citizenship reform of 2000 has partially changed this and enabled immigrants and their 
descendants to become German citizens under certain circumstances.  
After outlining this historical and legal background, the chapter then gives an overview of the last 
three decades since 1980 in relation to the most prominent ethno/religious groups that entered the 
public debate in these years, among them Muslims, Jews, Roma, but also ethnic German immigrants. 
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In this time the same group of people sometimes appears under different names and labels, due to their 
changed perception in society. The Turkish immigrants are for example mainly perceived as ‘labour 
migrants’ or ‘refugees’ in the 1980s, as ‘asylum seekers’ during the 1990s, and finally mainly as 
‘Muslims’ in the years after 2001. Because the changes in perception of specific groups accompany 
changes in attitude towards them and even related political measures, this labelling has been adopted 
and discussed within this report. 
Finally the chapter relates the discourse on tolerance in Germany, the different understandings of 
tolerance, and the way in which tolerance talk is used in public debates to the concept of integration 
and how it is understood by German government policies.  
While tolerance is generally understood as the opposite of discrimination and racism, it can be 
observed in current public discourses that the concept of tolerance is also increasingly used to draw 
borders between those who are to be tolerated and those who are not, while the non-tolerance towards 
a specific group or individual is often legitimised with its own (perceived) intolerance towards others. 
Whereas ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims’ were largely perceived as the victims of intolerance during the violent 
attacks in the early 1990s, more and more, they have come to be portrayed as ‘intolerant’ themselves, 
whether towards Jews, homosexuals or liberal societies in general. By portraying – especially religious 
– Muslims in this way, they are labelled as foreigners with incompatible values and beliefs to whom 
too much tolerance would be a detrimental attitude. 
Looking at tolerance not only as a normative value but also as a political discourse that marks insiders 
and outsiders of the society allows us to observe the unequal power relations between the subjects and 
objects of (in-) tolerance. 
 
Chapter 2: 
The second chapter looks at the question of (in-) tolerance towards diversity within the specific realm 
of education. For this purpose two cases are studied in detail, that both have to do with the 
accommodation of religious diversity within the school setting. As Muslims are by far the most 
discussed minority especially in the realm of education, both cases that were chosen have to do with 
this religious minority. Apart from the individual conflicts and their possible solutions more general 
questions are discussed, as for example the role of the religious neutrality of the state, how it has to be 
understood and how it can help or hinder tolerance and acceptance of religious difference in the school 
and other public places. 
The empirical data collection consisted of 18 qualitative interviews that were carried out in early 2011. 
The research aimed at a critical discourse analysis of the two widely debated cases and to analyse 
connections of the two discourses to the larger discourse on Islam and Muslims in Germany. The data 
was also backed up by a roundtable discussion of education experts, who gave their feedback to the 
research in June 2011.  
In the first case a 16 year old Muslim boy in Berlin took legal action against his school because he was 
forbidden to perform his Muslim prayer inside the school building. In 2008 the Berlin administrative 
court decided in favour of his appeal and obligated the school to provide a possibility for the pupil to 
perform his prayer at school. The next higher court level however revised this ruling in 2010 and 
allowed the school to prohibit Muslim prayers. The latter decision was confirmed by the next higher 
court level in 2011.  
One important issue that was touched upon within this case, which is highly relevant for the debate 
about Islam and dealing with religious practice in general, is the understanding of neutrality of the 
state. Some public actors argued that the school would violate its neutrality if it provided a room for 
religious practice. As in the case of Muslim teachers with headscarves, the courts had to weigh the 
neutrality of the state and the negative religious freedom of non-religious pupils against the positive 
Tolerance-Discourses in Germany 
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religious freedom of the teachers with headscarves and of the pupils wanting to perform their prayers. 
Even if the courts in Berlin and certain other federal states have decided against the teachers with 
headscarves, it is even more difficult for the decision to go this way with the case of the Muslim pupil 
as he is a dependent minor who is obligated to attend the school, as opposed to the teacher, who can 
chose differently. It thus becomes evident that strict neutrality of the state can in certain cases even 
lead away from tolerance – the originally intended aim of neutrality of the state towards all religions 
alike – and towards intolerance of specific religious expressions and practices.  
Even independently from this specific case the question of state neutrality and how it is understood 
will be path breaking for the handling of religious tolerance in the future. The different possibilities 
discussed are: a laic sense, that keeps religious expression away from public life, a hierarchical sense, 
that favours the interests of the established Christian churches over minority religions or a sense of 
equal treatment (and support) of religions before the law. 
The question of the relationship between the state and the different religious communities is also 
important in the second case examined in this chapter, the question of Islamic religious education at 
public schools. The questions of how and by whom it should be organised and who decides upon the 
educational content are currently being debated in many different German Länder (federal states). Due 
to a specific legal situation in Berlin however the IFB - Islamische Föderation Berlin (Islamic 
Federation Berlin) has already been teaching since 2001 at public schools after having fought in court 
for about 20 years for this right. Although the organisation and its teachers have gradually become 
accepted, the case gives some insight into the difficulties within the process of ‘gritted teeth’ 
acceptance of the Muslim organisation at public schools, that is legally enforced but encountered 
strong resistance from both the public authorities and the individual schools and teachers. 
Different from the case of the prayer room it actually seems to be in a phase of de-escalation in Berlin 
schools. The Islamic religious education began in a number of public schools in 2001 and has today 
reached a point where it seems that the organisation and its teachers have been accepted or at least 
tolerated at most of the respective schools. Even if some schools are happy to have the Muslim 
teachers at their schools and use them as mediators between the school and the Muslim pupils and 
parents, however a certain scepticism towards the Muslim teachers in general and the IFB in particular 
still seems to persist. Some interviewees even reported minor and major kinds of discrimination of 
some of the Muslim teachers at the schools in question.  
Regarding the overall situation in Germany, the most important question in relation to Islamic 
religious education at public schools is the failure to acknowledge Muslim religious organisations as 
Körperschaften öffentlichen Rechts (Corporations under public law), an important prerequisite of 
German law on religion for religious education at public schools. The law foresees a close cooperation 
of state institutions and the respective religious community, represented by the corporation, in order to 
establish religious education. As these partners of the state do not yet officially exist in any of the 
federal states that require it, interim solutions are discussed such as Muslim advisory boards. Some 
interviewees raised the concern, that these solutions might consolidate the non-acknowledgement of 
Muslim organisations and also facilitate a stronger intervention of the state in the religious content of 
the education, which would not be backed by the constitution.  
 
Chapter 3:  
The third chapter of the report analyses the national debate about the book “Germany does away with 
itself” by the former politician Thilo Sarrazin, that draws a future scenario of the German nation being 
overwhelmed by Muslims, who lower the national levels of intelligence and economic performance. 
The arguments of the author draw on already existing images of Muslims as the significant other in 
society and he takes them even further to a point, where tolerance towards this other and its religious 
practices does not seem appropriate any more. Although the book does not open a new debate, but 
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connects to similar discourses in other European countries, it extends this debate and supports the 
social boundaries towards Muslims being drawn narrower. This survey is interested in how this debate 
developed and how it can be seen as supporting the construction of a significant other against whom 
fears and anxieties are awaken that are hardly open any more for rational deliberation but support 
intolerant and even racist attitudes towards Muslims with a large part of the German population. Apart 
from the analysis of the Sarrazin debate, the report also looks at possible effects this national 
discussion has on members of the targeted minority.  
The main questions of the present study are: Has the overall effect of the debate been to make 
intolerance towards a specific minority more socially acceptable? For this purpose we look into the 
development of the debate and its effects on social and political life. Has the political debate about 
Muslims and/or minorities and maybe also political measurements changed during and after the 
debate? And how do these developments, especially the changed acceptability of intolerance or 
intolerant speech affect the people involved? How does it change both their everyday life, their self-
perception as entire part of the German society and their also their engagement in political life? 
The analytical frame for analysing these questions is the interest in discursive mechanisms of 
boundary drawing and the construction of a significant other. The study seeks to collect insight into 
these mechanisms as well as their effects on changing (in-) tolerance towards Muslims in Germany 
and Europe. 
The methodological tools of the analysis are a short discourse analysis of two major national 
newspapers and expert interviews. For the media analysis mainly the left-liberal Die Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (SZ) and the rather conservative Die Welt were followed between the 30
th
 of September and 
the 20th of November 2009 after Sarrazin had already given a widely noticed interview in the 
magazine Lettre International, and between 23
rd
 of August and the 9
th
 of November 2010 right after 
the publication of the mentioned book. The second part of the analysis deals with the perception of the 
Sarrazin debate by members of the targeted minority groups and reactions of individual Muslims 
towards it. It consists of 6 expert interviews and one group discussion with a political group of 5 
young Muslims and one of their group leaders, who had invited Thilo Sarrrazin and talked to him 
about his arguments.  
Through the public debate the immigrants and/or Muslims and their apparent cultural or religious 
difference are created as the absolute ‘other’ to German society by attributing with them every 
negative aspect that Germans want to distance themselves from - from Homophobia to anti-Semitism 
and misogyny. Following this ascription of negative attributes and values the group is then quite 
justifiably positioned outside the borders of ‘what can still be tolerated’ by German society. At the 
same time this exclusion of the other helps to construct a common national identity that is otherwise 
hardly to be found regarding the strong inner diversity of Germany and other European nations. This 
process of exclusion becomes stronger with the degree of public fears that the discourse raises. The 
worse a future scenario is constructed, in which the significant other becomes the dangerous other and 
takes over important parts of society, the more irrational the public fears become. 
One of the factors of Sarrazin’s success were the already existent anti-Muslim debates in other 
European countries and especially the growing populist parties, warning the European citizens against 
an apparent Islamisation of their societies and through this scenario creating a common European fear 
of the Muslim other, that is like the Sarrazin discourse quite untouched by rational deliberation. This 
significant other takes over a similar role on the European level as it does on the respective national 
levels, as it helps to define Europe through its perceived borders and ‘limits of tolerance’ and thus 
supports the unification process of the diverse European countries. 
Regarding the effects of the Sarrazin debate and the general construction of Muslims as significant 
others on members of the Muslim minority, this survey found, that it caused detrimental social 
divisions by enforcing the perception of many Muslims not to be welcome in German society. Some 
young Muslims obviously reacted with drawing back into their smaller communities and looking for 
Tolerance-Discourses in Germany 
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other possible identity concepts than the German one, even if they were German citizens. Especially 
young people, who had already been active in civil society organisations and projects however 
managed to empower themselves and strengthen their self-confidence by learning more about both 
their own religion and German politics and how to handle both and engage into critical debates and 
even social activism. 
 
Conclusion: 
It has been especially the excluding effect of tolerance discourse that has been of interest to the 
research as well as its power to draw borders towards specific groups, that are constructed as 
completely different from the rest of society through those discourses. This construction of Muslims as 
the significant other and their subsequent exclusion is analysed throughout the different chapters of the 
report as well as the detrimental effects, this stereotyping processes have on the social cohesion. Apart 
from examining the effects this construction and the excluding mechanisms have on members of the 
thus targeted minority, the report also generally asks about the effects of this construction of the other 
on the self-understanding of the German majority and the construction of the national identity. The 
report describes some strong links between the recent construction of the Muslim other and the 
development of the German national identity in times of rapid socio-demographic and economic 
changes. As these debates and processes of constructing a national other are not exclusive to Germany, 
the report also draws some parallels of the German debate to the overall European debates about Islam 
and Muslims and the role those debates also play for the construction of a common European identity. 
 
Recommendations: 
We propose different policy recommendations for the local, national and European level on how to 
solve some of the problems with ethno-religious diversity dealt with in this research and to counter the 
construction of Muslims as others in society.  
Following the research in the field of education we have two sets of advice, drawn from the two case 
studies: From the research about the prayer case the report recommends the Senate Administration for 
Education in Berlin and headmasters of the different schools at the local level as well as the 
Kultusministerkonferenz (joint board of the cultural ministries of the federal states) on the national 
level to reconsider the provision of a small, religiously neutral room at every school that can be used 
for spiritual purposes such as prayers or meditation.  
Another recommendation for national policy makers is to reconsider the way how the religious 
neutrality of the state is understood and how it shall be understood in the future. Following the legal 
scientist Heinig the report also favours the understanding of state support of all religion equally before 
a laicisation of law and politics or even a hierarchisation in favour of the Christian denominations over 
others. Findings from the report give some evidence, that the first model of state support of all 
religions equally is the one that is most strongly connected to tolerance in the sense of respect. It is 
therefore most suitable for an open and diverse society, where all members are able to participate 
equally and where some way of mutual understanding and/or respect of different cultures and religious 
can be found.  
The second case study on Islamic religious education at public schools led to further policy 
recommendations: Regarding the local level in Berlin, the Berlin Senate for Education together with 
regular schoolteachers, headmasters and representatives and teachers from the IFB should consider 
organising possibilities for encounter between the teachers of Islamic religion and the regular 
schoolteachers. Evidence from the report indicates that the contact at some schools might still be poor 
and that prejudice still prevails. On the other hand there is also evidence, that increased contact is able 
to strengthen mutual trust and understanding. 
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Similarly the headmasters of the public schools that offer Islamic religious education should consider 
actively integrating the IFB teachers into the school teams. This would both offer them equal 
opportunities and rights and counter hierarchical thinking between different kinds of teachers, but also 
make better use of the specific skills of the IFB teachers, such as being able to mediate between 
(religious) Muslim pupils and parents and non-Muslim pupils and teachers in potential areas of 
conflict. 
At the national and state levels the political representatives together with the representatives of 
Muslim organisations should investigate all possible ways of acknowledging the Muslim organisations 
as Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts (corporations under public law). This is a basic prerequisite 
for close cooperation with the state, similar to that enjoyed by Christian churches, and would allow for 
Islamic religious education to be in the responsibility of the Muslim communities as guaranteed by the 
constitution. It would assist with dealing with other issues of religious practice that have already arisen 
or may arise in the future.  
 
Keywords 
Tolerance, intolerance, acceptance, respect, Germany, national identity, diversity, Muslims, Islam, 
Jews, Roma, Resettlers, Vietnamese, labour migrants, Turks, Arabs, citizenship, border drawing, 
religious education, prayer room, education policy, school segregation, religious neutrality, religious 




Tolerance-Discourses in Germany 





Germany has been a de facto country of immigration since the beginning of recruitment of labour 
migrants from Southern European and Northern African countries and Turkey in the late 1950es and 
beginning 1960es. Together with later phases of refugee immigration from various countries and 
resettlement of ethnic Germans the population has steadily diversified in terms of ethnic, cultural 
and/or religious background. It has however been as late as 2000 that German politics has officially 
acknowledged Germany as an immigration country and have started considerable efforts to take 
political measures in order to meet the needs of this changing demography. 
Recent public debates about immigration or post-immigration mainly focus on Muslims and more 
often than not question the fact, that people belonging to this perceived cultural-religious group can 
successfully participate in German society. The main concept used in these debates is the concept of 
integration that tends to be viewed as a duty of the (post-) immigrants/ Muslims to integrate 
themselves rather than as the main duty of the state to create circumstances of equal participation. As 
soon as parts of the group in question are perceived as lacking the will to integrate, the question of 
tolerance or intolerance appears in the debate. Only those groups and individuals who are seen as 
positively integrating are to be tolerated, whereas those who are seen as non-integrated or even 
unwilling to integrate should not be tolerated. In this sense, the tolerance-debate has been closely 
connected to the debates about (post-) immigration, integration and Muslims and is more and more 
used as a border-drawing concept between in- and out-groups in German society rather than as a 
concept of non-discrimination as it used to be perceived in former debates. 
This report aims at analysing those debates in further detail and also following the question, if they 
have led to more or less tolerance, acceptance and/or recognition of ethno-religious minorities, notably 
Muslims as the mainly debated group in public discourse. Apart from looking at these debates and on 
the effects they have on members of the targeted minority group, the report also investigates into the 
question of what these developments tell about the national identity and self-perception of the non-
immigrant majority. 
Before looking into the public debates in further detail, the first chapter gives an overview of the 
German situation. After giving some insight into the historical developments of the formation of the 
state, the national identity and questions of citizenship, the major challenges in regard to cultural 
and/or religious diversity since the 1980es are outlined. The most important groups discussed in this 
way have been immigrants from Turkey, who have been labelled ‘labour migrants’, ‘foreigners’, 
‘asylum seekers’ or ‘Muslims’ at different times and in different political circumstances, but also 
Sinti&Roma, Jews, ethnic German resettlers and others. At the end of the chapter discourses of 
tolerance and related concepts like integration are outlined, with a specific focus on the excluding 
character of most tolerance discourses. Rather than looking at tolerance as the opposite of intolerance, 
the tolerance discourse is analysed as a means to draw borders in society, especially between the 
perceived majority and certain groups, in particular Muslims.  
The second chapter further elaborates on tolerance discourse within a specific social reality, the realm 
of education. Two case studies are used to outline the (in-) tolerance towards a religious minority, in 
this case Muslims, in the field of education. The first case deals with a Muslim boy in Berlin, who 
went to court in order to enforce his right to prayer in school. The case is especially interesting, 
because the arguments for or against his plea mainly turn around the question of the religious 
neutrality of the state as well as issues of (in-) tolerance. Most of the debates around Muslims in 
Germany have been initiated by outwardly visible religious practice, be it the wearing of religious 
garment, the building of mosques or the ritual prayer. In many of these cases the positive religious 
freedom of a person has been weighed against the negative religious freedom of others, who do not 
Nina Mühe 
10 
want to see religious symbols or practice. As soon as visibility is in question, also the public space is 
generally touched upon, which again raises the question of the religious neutrality of the state. This 
neutrality can however be interpreted in quite different, even opposing ways and is thus an important 
and interesting factor of the debates. The prayer case thus gives a unique opportunity to study those 
ways of interpretation and arguments by the different actors involved and draw some general 
conclusion also for other debates about public religious practice. As the visible practice of religion 
also touches upon the issue of tolerance, the concept and how it is related with the understanding of 
state neutrality is also analysed in detail. The second case deals with the question of Islamic religious 
education at public schools. The issue is of high importance not only for religious communities but 
also for public officials and thus has been hotly debated for some years. Religious education in state 
schools is a basic right for religious communities and is generally organised in close cooperation with 
state institutions. The prerequisite for this official cooperation however is the status of the community 
as a public corporation (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) and no Muslim organisation has yet 
been officially acknowledged as such. The city of Berlin plays a special position in this regard because 
a certain clause (Bremer Klausel) causes a difference in the right to religious education and enabled a 
Muslim organisation to give religious education at Berlin public schools. This unique experience is 
analysed in further detail in order to give some insight into a specific example that might be helpful 
also for the debates about Islamic religious education in other federal states. 
The third chapter deals with diversity challenges in political life and analyses one specific national 
debate about Muslims and the effects it had both on members of the Muslim community and on the 
status of (in-) tolerance towards this group in general. The debate about the book of the former Berlin 
senator Thilo Sarrazin “German does away with itself” (Deutschland schafft sich ab) is analysed in 
different German newspapers and different experts with considerable contact into the Muslim 
community are interviewed in regard to the possible effect it had on them. The focus of the analysis is 
both on the effects of the debate on attitudes and actions of policy makers regarding issues of Islam 
and Muslims in Germany and on reactions of members of the Muslim community with specific regard 
to their openness towards active participation in political life. The major focus and frame of analysis 
of the Sarrazin debate is the construction of the significant other in society. As Schiffauer lays out in 
his text on the logics of toleration Muslims have more and more been constructed as a group in society 
that is labelled as different from the rest by certain characteristics but coherent among each other 
(Schiffauer, forthcoming 2012). Those characteristics are then described as negative and different 
from the rest of society and the group and its members are thus rightfully viewed sceptically in various 
ways. Every attempt of the group or one of its members to claim specific (religious) rights is 
frequently debated as a question of tolerance or intolerance of the majority towards them. Intolerance 
towards these claims is in many cases and my different actors framed as the best solution as it helps 
upholding the tolerant society that is otherwise in danger by ‘tolerating the intolerant’. The Sarrazin 
debate has not been the first example of an openly anti-Muslim debate in Germany but certainly the 
strongest within the last years and the most widespread. It thus serves as a good example to study the 
way, how the significant other is constructed and subsequently excluded from the national ‘we’. To 
also look at the effect this exclusion has on the members of this group and their further social and 
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Chapter 1: Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses and Practices in Germany 
Introduction 
This chapter gives a broad overview of the major German debates concerning cultural diversity 
challenges that have taken place during the last thirty years, and of the most relevant groups and how 
they were addressed within these discussions. After summing up historical developments with respect 
to German national identity, and the politics of naturalisation and citizenship, we present the major 
debates on issues of immigration and diversity and how they were differently throughout the time 
since 1980. 
The public debates and political ideas around issues of immigration have long been discussed amidst a 
general rejection of the fact that Germany has been a de facto country of immigration since the 
beginning of labour immigration after World War II. The perception that immigrants would one day 
return home – upheld for a long time even by the immigrants themselves – made it possible to (for the 
most part) ignore important issues of diversity, the necessity to politically address the social 
participation of immigrants and their children, as well as the changing demographic structure and 
national identity of Germany becoming an immigration country.  
It was only in the year 2000, when the reform of citizenship laws gradually enabled non-ethnic 
Germans to become citizens, that politics officially declared Germany a country of immigration and, at 
the same time, pointed out the necessity to urgently design integration policies. 
Though ‘integration’ has become the key political term within a wide variety of diversity issues, 
immigrant groups often perceive the real concept behind the label as rather assimilatory
1
.  
In 2006 the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel held the first Summit on Integration with 
representatives from most immigrant groups. However, growing debates about Muslims also caused 
the Ministry of the Interior to convene a summit about Islam, the German Islam Conference (Deutsche 
Islamkonferenz), at around the same time.  
Integration, as it is widely used as a concept in political rhetoric, is regarded as an attempt by the 
majority to ‘integrate’ minorities into the already existing society and ‘culture,’ also labelled 
‘Leitkultur’ (leading culture) by mainly conservative politicians.  The possibility that the majority 
culture and society would undergo change through this integration is hardly ever addressed.  
The public debate on Leitkultur, in a tone that demanded rules for adaptation of immigrants to values 
and ways of life of the majority, was started by Friedrich Merz, then chairman of the Christian 
Democrat parliamentary group in the Bundestag in 2000, who perceived a “liberal, German leading 
culture” as an alternative to multiculturalism (Merz, 2000). Then president of the Bundestag Norbert 
Lammert (CDU) had repeatedly uttered his view about the necessity of a leading culture, which he 
extended, during the time of the Danish cartoon conflict, to include a European leading culture, and 
which he also decisively placed in opposition to multiculturalism.  For Lammert, multiculturalism was 
“at best, well intended, but thoughtless on closer inspection” and had arrived at its “obvious end” 
(FAZ, 2006).  
                                                     
1
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One leading principle of the Christian Democratic Party towards minority groups is ‘Fördern und 
Fordern’ (Supporting and Demanding), a trope that has been widely quoted and applied in recent 
decades. This basic principle of the CDU represents the leading idea of a majority, which on the one 
hand supports its minorities, while on the other hand demanding adaptation to the ‘leading culture’ 
defined by the majority. The Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel lately interpreted this slogan of 
‘supporting and demanding’ in such a way that emphasizes the demanding. At a party conference of 
the Christian Democrats in Mainz she said “whoever does not want to be supported has to be 
challenged, too” (“Wer nicht gefördert werden will, muss auch gefordert werden”) (Focus, 2010b).  
Here, she drew on one current discourse about immigrants, that they reject integration 
(Integrationsverweigerer), and gave the impression that even the supportive measures are to be carried 
out in a rather coercive context. 
The idea of cultural diversity – describing an immigration society that is made up of citizens with 
different cultural heritages and religions, and is thus also changed and formed by these differences – is 
hardly used at all in the political sphere. Because of its link to the idea of multiculturalism, however, 
diversity has likewise been rejected by politicians throughout the last decade, long before the famous 
statement of the Federal Chancellor Merkel in October 2010, when she declared that the concept of 
multiculturalism had absolutely failed (sueddeutsche.de, 2010). 
In light of this socio-political context, the following chapter will first outline the major diversity 
challenges that German society has been facing, and then describe the groups that have been most 
outstanding in public discourse on these challenges since 1980.  
Throughout the period covered in this chapter, the primary object of public debate has been labour-
migrants coming from Turkey and their children and grand children. The process of labour recruitment 
ended in 1973, after which immigration largely consisted of families joining workers who had 
migrated earlier. Whereas in the 1980s the debate still turned on ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter), the 
perception of the Turkish immigrants within this group as problematic grew stronger and the reason 
for this was not infrequently seen in their cultural origin.  
After the terror attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the debate began to turn on Muslims, who 
were to a large extent replacing ‘Turks’ in the public imaginary. One could say that, more or less, this 
same group of immigrants was perceived not only as ‘culturally’ determined, but also religiously so.  
Public discourse both culturalised and essentialised this group of (former) immigrants as ‘Turks’ and 
‘Muslims,’ widely portraying them as fixed entities, whose members are hardly differentiated and 
substantially determined by their cultural/religious belonging. 
At the same time the debate about asylum seekers, who came from very different countries, but also 
partially from Turkey, grew very strong and incited strong negative feelings in German society, 
leading even to violent outbreaks and murder in the 1990s.  
Therefore, cognizant of the ways in which the same groups were given different labels, this chapter 
chooses to discuss groups mainly in the way they are and were labelled within the public discourse. 
Therefore the immigrants from Turkey and their descendants are discussed as ‘labour migrants’, 
‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims’, depending on the respective time and pubic 
debate. 
Apart from Turkey asylum seekers arrived in Germany in the 1990s from very different countries, 
many of them escaping violent conflicts in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or the Palestinian territories.  
Some groups, such as Jews, the Roma, or Vietnamese were debated in different ways throughout the 
decades and in relation to different diversity challenges, whereas the labels hardly changed. In the 
1990s, however, Jews were often discussed in the frame of ‘quota refugees’ (Kontingentflüchtlinge), a 
label they shared with ethnic German immigrants from Russia and other countries, but not with the 
Roma, who until today demand this status in light of the genocide committed against them during the 
Nazi regime.  
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Vietnamese also appeared in very different contexts in public debate, ranging from discourses that 
problematised asylum seekers, to the praising of their perceived positive example for integration – a 
quality that was especially highlighted during the debate around Thilo Sarrazin’s 2010 book and 
subsequent discussion about Muslims, which advanced the question of whether their culture and/or 
religion keep them from being integrated. 
After pointing out the different debates and political measures concerning immigration and diversity in 
Germany over the past thirty years, this chapter sheds light on the ways in which tolerance is widely 
used in public discourse in Germany today and as a normative concept in relation to different groups 
and issues.  It explains the use of a variety of other concepts, like integration or acceptance, which are 
relevant in this context of dealing with difference.  
Germany: State formation, national identity and citizenship 
 
Citizenship outlines the borders of national belonging, of who is allowed to be an integral part of the 
society and who is not. The rules and regulations of citizenship thus reveal a lot about a country’s 
understanding of its national identity. The German citizenship law has until 1999 been dominated by 
ius sanguinis, that deems ethnic descent the major factor for national belonging. According to the 
political scientist Werner Ruf, a specifically ethnic understanding of the nation has been an important 
factor of German development of national identity since the very beginning of the nation-building 
process.
2
 An understanding of the German nation as ethnically determined has thus supported border-
drawing and exclusionary processes, that culminated in extreme degradation of ‘non-ethnic Germans,’ 
and finally in the unprecedented genocide of the Holocaust by the National Socialists.  
Historical development of the German national identity 
The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, plays an important part in the 
German historical memory. On the one hand, it ended decades of violent conflict that centred on issues 
of religious freedom between the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations by laying the 
constitutional basis for mutual tolerance. On the other hand, it strengthened the power of the 
individual principalities vis-à-vis the German emperor (Kaiser), thus laying the foundation for the 
strong position of the German federal states in relation to the national government, an arrangement 
that persists until today. The regional identities have long been more important than a common 
German identity.  Still, a strong national identity developed perhaps precisely because of these strong 
local ties; there was a necessity to construct and support a strong common, unifying identity for the 
fragmented territory, which was supposed to comprise one nation since the foundation of the Deutsche 
Kaiserreich in 1871. This, together with the developments to create a common German identity 
against those of other nations, like France, which were gradually all constructed as inferior in relation 
to the German one, led to the idea of the Volk, a specific concept of community, which developed in 
close relation to the concept of ethnicity, gaining prominence in relation to the national project until 
very recently. The concept of the Volk especially stressed the factor of a common bloodline of all the 
members of the nation, which – like one big family – were all perceived as of a common descent, of 
which the common language is an important constituting factor. Germany thus developed an idea of 
ethnic origin and common identity, which was far more ideological than the concept of ethnicity and 
that strongly linked ideology and – perceived – biological factors. This concept was directly related to 
the devaluation of other nations and ethnic groups, which eventually generated the National Socialists’ 
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idea of a superior German ‘race’, which had to govern all other ‘races’ and even extinguish other 
groups and nations. 
Among the individual states that were members of the Deutsche Bund (German Federation) from 1815 
to 1866, the questions of a common German nation and national identity were heavily debated. After 
the unification of all German-speaking territories (großdeutsche Lösung) was found to be unrealisable, 
the member states of the Deutsche Bund united under the Prussian king and without the Austrian 
territories, which was called the kleindeutsche Lösung. A common identity, however, was not yet 
established, and the question of the unification of all territories in which German was the national 
language would come up again in between the two world wars, and in the National Socialist regime.  
Germany has existed as a nation-state since 1871, when the military federation Norddeutscher Bund 
(Northern German Federation) became the core of the Deutsches Reich after other independent states 
(Bayern, Württemberg, Baden, Hessen) had joined the federation under a common Kaiser. The 
monarchy ended in 1918/19 with the German capitulation and the end of World War I. The then 
proclaimed German Republic (Deutsche Republik) adopted a new constitution, which is also known as 
the Weimarer Verfassung.  
The time of the Weimarer Republik is another important landmark in German collective memory, as 
the young republic, which had a short zenith in the 1920s before the world economic crisis in 1929, in 
the end was the precursor for the National Socialist dictatorship. The republic, which had already been 
under the pressure of reparations for World War I and was extremely weakened by the economic 
crisis, was finally gradually taken over by right-wing extremist political powers, which had portrayed 
the German reparations and loss of territory determined in the treaty of Versailles after the end of 
World War I as a ‘humiliation of the German nation’ in order to gain votes from the economically 
suffering population.  
The important factor of the downfall of the Weimarer Republik, until today is the perception that it had 
been too open for all political powers – even the enemies of the republic and its constitution – which 
eventually led to the National Socialists coming into power. 
The lesson learnt from these historical developments is the enduring conviction that the republic and 
the constitution may under no circumstances admit its own enemies into power, that no ‘tolerance’ 
may be shown to the ‘intolerant’, as explained in more detail in the end of this chapter. 
From the very beginning, Hitler’s two major goals were the war of aggression and extermination for 
creating new ‘living space in the East’ (‚Lebensraum im Osten’) and the persecution and extermination 
of the Jews. This racist worldview of the Nazis and the attempt to create a ‘pure’ and ‘healthy’ 
common and superior ‘race’, the embodiment of intolerance in its most cruel form, targeted (apart 
from the Jews) two other minorities considered a ‘foreign race’ (Fremdrasse): the Roma, and 
members of Slavic ethnic groups, like Poles, Russians or Ukrainians. Other persecuted groups that 
were not considered a ‘foreign race’ but as a danger to the ‘health and purity of the population’ were 
homosexuals, disabled people and many other weak or minority groups, who were also victims of 
persecution, violence and murder. In the year 1941, the Nazis began with a systematic murder of Jews 
in specially constructed extermination camps. In the camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau alone, about one 
million people died in gas chambers.  
The unconditional capitulation on the 8th of May, 1945, was circumvented by Hitler and other major 
responsible politicians and members of the military through suicide. Those major responsible persons 
that survived were convicted in the Nuremberg Trials (Nürnberger Prozesse).  
After the allied forces occupied in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in the three 
Western zones and the German Democratic Republic in the Soviet zone. The Cold War and the 
building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 completely separated the Eastern and Western parts of the German 
population from each other. It was only in 1991 that Germany was completely reunified and regained 
its state sovereignty. 
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An important historical heritage is the collective memory that Germany incited and lost two World 
Wars. Ruf claims that this memory will probably have destroyed the perception of a German ‘cultural 
superiority’ once and for all (Ruf, 2000). Ruf argues that the cognizance of these historical events and 
developments broke the consensus of a superior German nation, on which both the Prussian-German 
Empire and the expansionism and racism of the Nazis had been based. As a result, considerable parts 
of the population are today deeply sceptical towards the militarism that was once the backbone of the 
state. Recent political developments, however, run counter to this view to a certain extent. Not only is 
German military engagement gaining international importance and intensity, but so are very recent 
debates about German (cultural) identity, especially in contrast to (mainly Muslim) immigrants. The 
influential book by Thilo Sarrazin (Sarrazin, 2010) – former member of the board of the Federal Bank, 
about ‘Germany doing itself in’ through the demographic rise of certain immigrant groups (namely 
Muslims), who are qua culture and/or religion less intelligent and economically effective than others – 
has marked a new German self-perception of superiority. This feeling of superiority is marked not so 
much biologically – even if Sarrazin also refers to biological factors – but more to cultural and first of 
all economic strength. It is nevertheless a nationally and culturally determined perception of 
superiority, where the understanding of culture is very essentialising, defining cultures as fixed and 
inflexible entities, and thus to a certain extent takes the place that was formerly inhabited by a 
similarly fixed and essentialising understanding of ‘race’. The debate and its effects are analysed in 
depth in the third chapter of this report. 
After World War II, however, a certain ‘normalisation’ of the German national self-perception, the 
identification of the German citizens with the constitution, and the final acceptance of the borders of 
the Federal Republic made it possible to gradually leave the old concept of the ethnically and 
culturally determined nation behind.  
Philosophers like Jürgen Habermas have been trying to introduce a specific understanding of the 
nation, called Verfassungspatriotismus
3
 (patriotism towards the constitution). The national belonging 
in this concept is based on common political values like democracy and freedom of opinion instead of 
common descent. It thus becomes an alternative to the ethnic identification of the state.  
Partially following this concept, the latest reform of the citizenship law adds aspects of ius soli, but 
does not completely abolish the ius sanguinis. It is however an important step towards a complete 
equality before the law, which enables the integration of immigrants without the assimilatory demand 
to give up cultural characteristics. Equality before the law would mean that the acceptance of and 
respect for the constitution would be the only necessary prerequisites for naturalisation. Significantly, 
the branch of the German intelligence service concerned with internal security is called the agency for 
the ‘protection of the constitution’ (Verfassungsschutz), as the constitution and the acceptance of it or 
even a certain ‘patriotism towards the constitution’ are perceived as lying at the core of the 
constitutional state. 
However this process has not yet been completed; the citizenship law still contains many aspects of 
the ius sanguinis, and the understanding of national identity based on ethnic origin is still strong 
within society and politics. Although the general opening up of citizenship status towards non-ethnic 
Germans (most importantly children and grand-children of immigrants) has been a fundamentally 
important political step towards more equality before the law and an inclusive national identity, it can 
still be observed that immigrants and their descendents are often facing a conflicting situation today, 
as they are asked to identify with German national identity and even enabled to acquire citizenship, 
but are hardly accepted as ‘real Germans’ in everyday life. The currently heightened debate about 
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integration is generally mentioning ‘Germans’ in opposition to ‘immigrants’ or ‘people with migration 
background’, thereby consolidating the foreignness instead of enabling a feeling of belonging.  
Citizenship and access to citizenship  
 
Since the reform of the citizenship law in 1999/2000, children of non-German citizens born in 
Germany have access to German citizenship, subject to fulfilling certain requirements.
4
 In part, this 
signifies recognition of the importance of citizenship for integration, and is partly based on major 
changes in the national self-understanding. For those born before 2000, however, access to citizenship 
remains more difficult.
5
 In particular, this is because new rules and regulations increasingly stress the 
economic potential of those aspiring to immigration and naturalisation. For example, the latest change 
to the naturalisation law of 2004 (enacted in 2007) requires young immigrants less than 23 years of 
age (mostly children of immigrant parents) to show proof of income sufficient for their own 
sustenance.
6
 This requirement is, however, waived where applicants are able to prove that their 
missing income is due to the lack of employment trainee and apprenticeship positions. 
Development of naturalisation figures 
At first, the introduction of the law led to the naturalisation of large numbers of people (Stahl, 2002). 
Recent statistics, however, suggest a steady decline in rates of naturalisation, which may originate 
from a combination of factors. These include: a corollary to the time it has taken to provide access to 
citizenship; the reluctance of immigrants to apply for citizenship due to the stigma of betraying one’s 
national background; the perception of growing hostility towards Muslims in Germany – who make up 
the largest part of the immigrant population - and frequent and far-reaching feelings of discrimination.  
Apart from the positive changes in the law, especially the shift from an ethnic understanding of the 
nation towards one based on place of birth, the new citizenship legislation also explicitly forbids dual 
citizenship. Naturalisation dropped considerably after a number of cases demonstrated that Turks who 
retook their Turkish citizenship after having received a German passport would lose their German 
citizenship once and for all. This is one of the major reasons why, despite supportive attitudes from 
Turkish consulates and legal arrangements that allow former Turkish passport holders to keep most of 
their citizenship rights, many Turks in Germany think twice before giving up their Turkish passports 
(Mühe, 2010). 
Another legal change that creates difficulties for those young people who hold dual citizenship is the 
requirement to choose one of the two passports when they reach the age of 18. Under the citizenship 
law of 2000, children born in Germany whose parents have lived there for at least eight years receive a 
German passport, even if they possess another nationality. From the age of 18, however, they have to 
decide between the two citizenships. In 2008, this regulation affected 3,300 Turkish-Germans. Kerim 
Arpad, chairman of the European Assembly of Turkish Academics is among those who have criticised 
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 A precondition for the children’s naturalisation by birth is a legal and unlimited residence permit of at least one of the 
parents for at least eight years. When aged 18–23, the child has to decide on German or another nationality. The latter is, 
however, challenged by several jurists, who doubt the compatibility with the constitution, which generally does not allow 
deprivation of citizenship in Art. 16 GG. 
5
 Those born before 2000 had the possibility for one year to additionally choose German nationality if younger than ten years 
old. 
6 Deutscher Bundestag (23.04.2007) Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung aufenthalts 
– und asylrechtlicher Richtlinien der Europäischen Union (Draft Law for the Implementation of Guidelines from the 
European Union concerning the Rights of Residence and Asylum), Drucksache 16/5065, 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/050/1605065.pdf   
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the double standards, noting that EU nationals with two passports are not required to make this kind of 
choice (am Orde, 2008).  
Exclusionary laws and regulations 
Recent legal regulations may further aggravate this sense of alienation. As of September 2008, the 
naturalisation process requires the passing of a national naturalisation test, which demands detailed 
knowledge about Germany’s culture, history and society. The test, which will be applied throughout 
all of the federal states, is an improvement in comparison to certain tests in Baden-Württemberg and 
other federal states, which specifically target Muslim immigrants and ask questions about private 
attitudes in a discriminatory manner.  (For a detailed critique of the naturalisation test, see Joppke, 
2007.) Some of these are, however, still in use, even after the introduction of the national test. 
Germany has also introduced language proficiency tests for spouses wishing to join their partners in 
Germany. The difficulty of obtaining the necessary language skills in rural areas of Turkey, combined 
with the fact that such requirements were not applicable to citizens from, for example, the USA or 
Japan, increased perceptions that this was targeted at especially preventing immigration from Turkey. 
Such perceptions are reinforced by comments from politicians such as Uwe Schünemann, the Interior 
Minister for Lower Saxony, during the discussion of changes to immigration laws, when he stated, that 
“Germany needs less people that abuse us and more that are useful for us” (Mühe, 2010: 46).  
Other public officials like Lammert, president of the federal parliament, have recognised lately, 
however, that the fact that Germany is home to the highest number of third-country nationals in 
Europe, yet has one of the lowest naturalisation rates, represents a major barrier to civic participation. 
“Our problem in Germany is not too high an immigration rate, but rather too little naturalisation,” he 
said (Welt online, 2010a). 
Cultural Diversity Challenges during the last 30 years 
Germany has been a de facto country of immigration since it started signing labour recruitment 
contracts with Italy (1955), Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal 
(1964) and Tunisia (1965). Until only a few years ago, however, official national politics denied the 
fact that Germany had since then been an immigration country. It was only in the year 2000 that the 
citizenship law was reformed and the children of immigrants, born in Germany, were given German 
citizenship under certain conditions. This reform also marked a major shift in political rhetoric. 
Whereas the long-time resistance of the political elites to regard Germany as a country of immigration 
also included a reluctance to implement or even debate integration measures, the reform of the 
citizenship laws changed the social reality, and a debate about the necessity to ‘integrate’ immigrant 





Table: People with migration background according to origin, migration experience and gender, micro 
census 2007 











absolute in  % absolute 
3,686 
in  % 
48.9 2,545 69.0 1,141 31.0 
not included: Greece 240 62.5 144 37.5 384 45.1 
             Italy 431 56.6 330 43.4 761 41.3 
             Poland
1
 529 82.9 109 17.1 638 56.7 
             Rumania
1
 207 86.3 33 13.8 240 55.8 
Other Europe 3,327 69.1 1,486 30.9 4,813 49.4 







             Kroatia 251 67.3 122 32.7 373 51.7 
             Russian Federation
1
 510 90.9 51 9.1 561 53.8 
             Serbia 287 73.4 104 26.6 391 48.3 
             Turkey 1,511 59.8 1,016 40.2 2,527 47.6 
             Ukrainia 192 89.3 23 10.7 215 54.9 
Europe in total 5,872 69.1 2,627 30.9 8,499 49.2 
Africa 342 71.3 138 28.8 480 40.4 
America 233 67.3 113 32.7 346 52.6 
Asia, Australia and Oceania 1,183 78.8 318 21.2 1,501 49.0 







             Kazakhstan
1
 203 94.4 12 5.6 215 51.2 









 2,756   -   2,756 51.6 
              from Poland 518   -   518   
              from the Russian 
Federation 
475   -   475   
              from Kazakhstan 320   -   320   
              from Romania 173   -   173   
              from the former Soviet 137   -   137   
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Without Information 2,904 63.3 1,682 36.7 4,586   
People with migration 
background altogether  
10,534 68.4 4,877 31.6 15,411 49.3 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Agency for Statistics); 
http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/; 
Quoted after Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Agency for Migration and 
Refugees); Grunddaten  
der Zuwandererbevölkerung (Basic Data of the immigrated population); 
https://milo.bamf.de/llde/livelink.exe/fetch/2000/702450/7940651/13318648/customview.html?func= 
ll&objId=13531090%20%20&objAction=browse&sort=name 
(Translation from German done by the author of this text) 
Fachserie 1 Reihe 2.2 (Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund - Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus; 
Population with  
migration background – Findings of the micro census), 2008. Data in Thousand. Own Description. 
     
2) About one million (late-)resettlers could not be assigned to a country of origin; this is why there is 
a 
difference between the total number of 2.76 million and the aggregate of the individual countries of 
origin,  
specified thereunder. The categoryof (late-)resettlers concerns only people, who have immigrated 
themselves.  
 
The largest immigrant group numerically has always been Turks or their children and grandchildren. 
The public perception of this group has changed throughout the decades in relation to political 
developments and issues that gained prominence in public discourse.  
Apart from labour migration, refugees from different war torn countries make up another set of 
important immigrant groups. The Afghan diaspora in Germany is the largest in Europe. There are also 
significant numbers of Pakistanis and Indonesians in Germany, as well as refugees from the Balkans. 
The German-Arab population numbered approximately 290,000 in 2002 (Blaschke, 2004). Many 
Palestinians enter the country as official refugees from other countries, making it difficult to obtain 
precise numbers for this immigrant population.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the borders, the number of ethnic German 
resettlers increased considerably. (For the different types of immigrant legal statuses, including 
refugees and asylum seekers, see also Ohliger and Raiser, 2005). The immigration consisted of both 
inhabitants of the Eastern German territories (Übersiedler) and of immigrants of ethnic German origin 
from the territories of the former Soviet Union (Aussiedler), who received the German nationality.  
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Another minority group is the German Sinti and Roma, who have not immigrated recently, but have in 
fact resided in Germany for several hundred years. After having been persecuted by the Hitler regime
7
, 
which attempted a complete genocide, about 70,000 German Sinti and Roma are living in the country 
today. However, large numbers of Roma are refugees from Kosovo.  Since the end of that war, they 




Jews have been living on the territory of contemporary Germany for about 1700 years. In 1933, about 
515,000 Jews were living in the country. After the Holocaust, which killed around 6 million Jews, 
only 20,000 to 30,000 remained in Western Germany. In the German Democratic Republic, only a few 
Jews remained, and their communities gradually disappeared.  
Since 1991, Germany admits Jews and their relatives from the former Soviet Union as so-called 
Kontingentflüchtlinge (quota refugees), which has led to considerable growth of the Jewish 
community, mainly due to immigration from Russia.  
As of 2005, the population of Jews in Germany numbered around 105,000, most of whom are 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union and their descendants. Life in the communities reflects a 
growing diversity – from orthodox to liberal – of Jewish life in Germany. However, anti-Semitism has 
been growing again to a threatening extent. In addition, anti-Semitism within certain immigrant 
communities, especially the Muslim community, has been increasingly discussed in recent years. 
In the past decade, debates about immigrants in general and Turks in particular have been 
supplemented by an overlapping discourse on Muslims as ‘problematic.’  Apart from rising anti-
Semitism, other phenomena, supposedly specific to Muslims, such as forced marriages, headscarves or 
homophobia, are more or less continuously circulated within the public sphere. To the general 
tendency of culturalising social issues has been added the specific issue of religiosity, namely that of 
Muslims. Also populist and extremist groups, especially on the Internet, are increasingly dominating 
the debate and inciting and supporting anti-Muslim attitudes within the public perception. 
Labour migrants 
Since the labour recruitment in the 1960s and early 1970s, the growing amount of immigrants from 
rural areas of Turkey and other countries has been one of the major sources of cultural and/or religious 
diversity. In the early years of labour migration the immigrants were mainly seen as workers, who 
were to remain for a limited time, but who had similar interests with the rest of the working class in 
Germany and often joined the same worker’s unions. At the same time, although in a fragile situation 
in general, the immigrants were important for the German economy and thus had a certain power to 
have their basic needs met.  
The official end of labour recruitment in 1973, however, restricted the former labour migrants from 
travelling freely back and forth.  Many responded by having their families – most of them from rural 
areas in Turkey – join them in Germany. Even if both German politicians and the labour immigrants 
expected the situation to be temporary, only half of the four million migrants actually left Germany. 
Due to this change in the character of migration, the so-called ‘guest-workers’ moved out of the 
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workers’ accommodations and rented their own apartments, usually in run-down, inner-city areas 
(Schiffauer, 2005). 
The settlement pattern of this time is still visible in the residential distribution of many people with 
Turkish background today. Formerly industrialised areas – such as Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg, 
Duisburg, Augsburg-Munich and others – are still centres of Turkish life in Germany, and only very 
few live on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. The labour migrants were usually 
concentrated in certain districts with low rent prices. This phenomenon was encouraged by official 
policies and supported by public opinion at the time; however today it is widely criticised in public 
debate as a manifestation of ‘parallel societies’ (Parallelgesellschaften). 
In East Germany, the recruitment of foreign workers (from then-socialist states such as Algeria, 
Hungary or Vietnam) was on a far smaller scale than in West Germany. This might explain why few 
people with an Italian, Greek or Turkish immigration history live in the eastern parts of the country 
today (Ohliger and Raiser, 2005: 12). 
Like in the housing issue, German politics generally perceived the former labour immigrants as 
temporary guests long after it became evident that a large proportion did not return with the end of 
recruitment. Thus policies to foster integration, like language courses or other measures, have been 
denied for a very long time. 
In 1989, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, member of the Green party, initiated with the support of his party the 
Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten (Agency for Multicultural Affairs) in Frankfurt/Main, that 
aimed to mediate between immigrants and the broader German society and mark the beginning of a 
change in immigrant politics. Supporters of the concept of multiculturalism at this time criticised the 
Federal Government for its negation of the actual reality of Germany having become an immigration 
country through the recruitment of labour migrants. With the memory of World War II and the racist 
ideology of the National Socialists having led to mass killings of Jews and Roma and other ethnic, 
religious and political groups, the supporters of the multicultural idea wanted to prevent any form of 
hostility or even pressure to assimilate directed towards immigrants. 
During the late-1970s and 1980s, however, the economic boom in Germany ended and with growing 
refugee-immigration from war-torn countries and inner-German migration from East to West the 
attitude towards the immigrants changed and political measures were taken to encourage immigrants 
to return to their home countries. In light of the large immigration from the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Germany as well as refugees and asylum seekers from different war-torn countries, the 
supporters of multiculturalism became weaker and anti-immigrant rhetoric became stronger in public 
discourse. The perception of the former ‘guest-workers’ (Gastarbeiter) turned into a ‘foreigner’ 
problem, most of these foreigners being Turks.  
Apart from the deterioration of public opinion about ‘foreigners’ in the face of massive immigration in 
the early 1990s, anti-immigrant rhetoric and violent attacks, Turks and other labour migrants, some of 
whom had been living in the country for around 10 years at the time of German reunification, mainly 
suffered from a setback in rights and social participation through the systematic preference for ethnic 
Germans. Although the resettlers from the former Soviet Union came into Germany as new 
immigrants and to a large extent spoke no German, they were treated as part of the German 
‘Staatsvolk’ – the people who were ethnically assigned to the German nation – and preferred in rights 
and status to the labour migrants, who were seen as foreigners, even if they had been living and 
working in the country for many years. Unlike refugees and former labour migrants, the resettlers, 
often called Russian Germans (Russlanddeutsche), were granted integrative support, German 
citizenship and language courses.  
This ethnic understanding of nationality and ethnic determination of belonging formed a great barrier 
to integration and participation for large segments of those immigrants who had come into the country 




Another wave of immigration from Turkey was initiated by the second coup d’ état in 1980 and the 
civil war in South East Turkey (Schiffauer, 2005). Around 125,000 Turks and Kurds – mainly critics 
of the regime – came to Germany as asylum seekers. One major group were the Yezidis, who were 
granted collective asylum on grounds of religious persecution.
9
 Kurdish asylum seekers also arrived 
from the Kurdish areas in Iraq, Iran and Syria. Compared to other Western countries, Germany has the 
highest share of Kurds amongst its immigrant population.  
About 35,000 Assyrians, a Christian minority in Turkey and other countries, fled from Turkey and 
from Iraq to Germany, where today they have communities mainly in Berlin and Wiesbaden/Mainz 
(Kleff, 1984). 
Another religious minority that has been persecuted in Turkey are Alevis, some of whom regard 
themselves as Muslims while others, like the secretary-general of the Alevi Community in Germany 
(Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland) Ali Ertan Toprak
10
, claim acceptance in Germany as a religious 
community in its own right instead of being regarded as merely a liberal branch of Islam (Facius, 
2007).  
Apart from the large Turkish community, there is a considerable Afghan Diaspora in Germany, 
constituting the largest in Europe. While between the 1950s and the 1970s Afghan immigrants were 
mainly students and business people, the second wave of immigration consisted of asylum seekers 
fleeing the Soviet invasion and communist regime after 1979. 
At the same time, Vietnamese came to East Germany as labour migrants, having been recruited to 
substitute for the large numbers of emigrating Germans, and came to make up about two-thirds of its 
immigrants.  They arrived in West Germany mainly as so-called ‘boat people’ – refugees who had 
reached Germany by boat.  By 1985, they made up the biggest part of the 30,000 quota refugees
11
 
(Kontingentflüchtlinge) who lived in Germany. 
However, up to 1989, refugees were not very large in number and caused no major public debate in 
Germany. 
Asylum seekers 
Due to the wars and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, many refugees arrived in 
Germany during the 1990s
12
 from Albania, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
predominantly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of them Muslims.  There were also many refugees 
from Afghanistan, who fled the civil war and the take over of the Taliban in the mid-1990s. Other 
refugees from Asia – with different rights and statuses – were Tamils from Sri Lanka, Ahmadiyas 
from Pakistan and Sikhs from India.  
Additionally - beyond the group of labour migrants from Morocco and Tunisia - most of the Arab 
immigrants to Germany had arrived as refugees and asylum seekers (Schmidt-Fink 2001). 
The rhetoric and violence wielded against immigrants in the early 1990s did not focus especially on 
Muslims or Turks, but concentrated on asylum seekers and repeatedly challenged their right to asylum 
by questioning the real necessity of their asylum and supposing mere economic reasons for seeking 
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refuge in Germany. In the media asylum seekers were often portrayed as an uncontrollable flood
13
 
overwhelming Germany. In 1991, the weekly magazine der Spiegel presented a cover that showed 
Germany as a full boat about to drown in the sea of immigrants and refugees (der Spiegel, 1991) - the 
‘full boat’ became a trope of increasing prominence, invariably reproduced within public discourse at 
this time. 
Probably as a result of this anti-immigrant and especially anti-asylum atmosphere, the early 1990s 
witnesses several violent attacks and even murders of asylum seekers and other immigrants. 
A year after the first attacks on foreign workers and asylum seekers in 1991 in Hoyerswerda, the city 
of Rostock witnessed the worst attacks against foreigners in Germany since the war, when several 
hundred right-wing extremists attacked the homes of asylum seekers under the eyes and with the 
applause of around 2,000 citizens altogether. Most of the people living there were Vietnamese, but 
also Roma and other asylum seekers from different countries. 
At the end of 1992 neo-Nazis attacked houses of Turkish citizens and two girls and their grandmother 
were killed. Another attack in 1993 against the homes of people of Turkish origin in Solingen killed 
five people. 
Not long after these outbreaks of violence, the Federal Government tightened the immigration laws 
and restricted the right to asylum in 1993
14
, which led to a substantial reduction of asylum seekers and 
other immigrants. In 1997/98 net immigration rates were approaching zero because of the return of the 
refugees from war-torn Bosnia. 
At the same time that Germany saw the abolishment of the right to asylum in 1993, however, the 
reform of immigration law also recognised a right to naturalisation for the first time.
15
 
Roma and Sinti 
Apart from Roma labour migrants, who arrived when labour recruitment was at its peak, about 60,000 
to 70,000 Roma have been living in German territories for several hundred years. According to the 
Documentation and Cultural Centre of German Sinti and Roma in Heidelberg, ‘Sinti’ names that part 
of the minority that has been living in Western Europe since the late Middle Ages, while ‘Roma’ 
refers to those of south European descent. This distinction is only made in the German-speaking 
countries.
16
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 The metaphor “The boat is full” (Das Boot ist voll) was introduced by a cover story of the weekly Der Spiegel, that was 
titled “Ansturm der Armen – Flüchtlinge, Aussiedler, Asylanten” (Inrush of the poor –Refugees, Resettlers, Asylum 
Seekers”) on the 9th of September 1991 with an image of an overcrowded Noah’s Ark representing Germany, which was 
endangered by a growing “Asylantenflut” (Asylum Flood). 
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 In the so-called Asylkompromiss (asylum agreement) in 1993 the basic right to asylum for political refugees was 
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15 Hagedorn, H. (2001) “Einbürgerungspolitik in Deutschland und Frankreich” (Naturalisation Politics in Germany and 
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In 1995, the German Sinti and Roma gained legal recognition as a national minority
18
, the Charta of 
the European Council recognized German Romanes as a minority language. Their status as a national 
minority guarantees the continuous support of the Central Council as well as the Documentation and 
Cultural Centre of German Sinti and Roma.
19
 The Documentation Centre together with nine federal 
state and local associations form the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma
20
, which was founded 
in 1982 and played an important role in generating recognition of the minority as victims of the 
Holocaust, in which around 500,000 Sinti and Roma were killed in concentration camps, aiming at 
their complete extermination.  They also advocate for compensation and antidiscrimination. 
The law about the Federal Budget (Bundeshaushalt) states that since the year 2002, the law about the 
protection of national minorities and the European Charta for regional and minority languages ensures 
protection and support for the German Sinti and Roma. The declared aim is to provide for their equal 
participation in the political and cultural life of Germany, which is in part ensured by governmental 




Parts of the Roma population in Germany are thus under specific protection as a national minority. 
Although even this group has to struggle with discrimination in society and difficulties with equal 
participation in the labour market, the Roma are hardly ever openly problematised in public discourse 
as certain other groups are. The reason for this might be the history of mass murder and genocide of 
Sinti and Roma by the National Socialists, which could cause reluctance among journalists and others 
to negatively portray this minority group. The public repatriation and open mistreatment that the Roma 
are suffering in France is therefore hardly thinkable in Germany. 
This protection as a national minority, however, only includes Roma with German citizenship and of 
German descent.
22
 Those not included in this status are the refugees from Kosovo, who fled the wars 
in the early 1990s and in 1998/99 and a third group of migrants from the EU-member states Bulgaria 
and Romania. While the latter have freedom of movement within the EU, the former refugees have 
never had an unlimited right to stay and have always lived in danger of repatriation. 
In April 2010 the Federal Government signed an agreement with the government of Kosovo, 
regulating the repatriation of refugees from Kosovo, about 12,000 of whom are Roma and Ashkali- 
and Kosovo-Egyptians. Based on a UNICEF survey, the families in danger of repatriation have been 
living in Germany for an average of 14 years, and although almost half of the 12,000 people are 
children, the well being of the children played no role in the agreement. 
Critics of this agreement, including politicians like Erhart Körting, then senator of the interior in 
Berlin, argue, that the Roma refugees were well-integrated, working, and that their children were 
socialised in Germany. It would be a great hardship for them to be repatriated to Kosovo, where they 
could not speak the language and were still highly stigmatised and discriminated against.
23
 The 
UNICEF survey also stated that about 75% of the repatriated Roma children abandoned their school 
education in Kosovo. 
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The German government is however determined to repatriate around 2,500 Roma each year, thereby 
avoiding the public attention that a mass repatriation like the one in France could attract, but 
nevertheless gradually carrying out the planned repatriation of Roma families, long resident in 
Germany. 
Vietnamese 
Similar to the Roma, Vietnamese immigrants and their descendants in Germany have very diverse 
histories of migration and social situations. 
On the one hand, public discourse today often positions people with a Vietnamese immigration 
background on the opposite side of Turkish migrants on a scale of successful integration and 
educational achievement.  This success is often attributed to their (postulated) greater efforts in 
education, captured in the latest debate surrounding Thilo Sarrazin, discussed further in chapter 3, who 
attributed low intelligence to certain immigrants – like Turks – and high intelligence and integration to 
other immigrants – like Vietnamese and other Asians. 
On the other hand, Vietnamese immigrants have gone through difficult times, when their positive 
welcome in the GDR gave way to rising discrimination and even racist attacks, reaching their peak in 
the attacks against an asylum seeker’s home in 1992 in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, where, among others, 
hundreds of Vietnamese asylum seekers feared for their lives. 
But even today, many Vietnamese – who have been among the groups with the highest numbers of 
asylum seekers in Germany in the last ten years – have the same problems as other immigrants in 
terms of language and integration into the labour market. 
Additionally there are only very few Vietnamese asylum seekers whose reasons for applying for 
asylum are accepted by federal agencies, and so the large majority of them are repatriated again.
24
 In 
2008, almost 1,300 Vietnamese applied for asylum, while the quota of acceptance was 0.1 percent, 
which means that 99.9 percent must anticipate repatriation, although Amnesty International reports 
that torture, political imprisonment and capital punishment are widely practiced in Vietnam. 
In June 2009, more than 100 Vietnamese from 12 federal states and Poland were deported to Hanoi, 
which, according to the federal police, was the first mass repatriation since the mid-1990s. 
Although Vietnamese are portrayed quite positively in public discourse – especially in contrast to 
other immigrant groups – their reality in Germany is mainly that of two classes: those who arrived in 
the former GDR and who often had higher educational degrees, many of whom managed to make a 
living in Germany in spite of difficult conditions, and those who have been coming as asylum seekers 
since the fall of the communist regimes and who are often living as non-accepted asylum seekers or 
undocumented migrants. 
While the former are portrayed as hard-working, education-oriented and well-integrated immigrants – 
thus contradicting the criticism against failures of German integration policies – the latter are 
portrayed as cigarette smugglers and petty criminals, misusing the asylum laws, who are rightly 
repatriated. 
Inner-German migration and ethnic German resettlers 
Even if emigration to Western Germany was not easy and the application for it could take 10 years and 
deteriorate the social situation of the person willing to leave the GDR, between 1961 and 1988 around 
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383,000 people managed to migrate to the Western parts of Germany, most of them through the 
exchange of prisoners – mostly for financial contribution from the FRG – or through the refusal to 
return from a legal visit to the FRG. In 1989, the year of the German reunification, around the same 
number of people – 344,000 – left the GDR for West Germany (Schroeder, 1988). 
Also, descendants of ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern European countries – most of them through 
migration and displacement during the course of World War II – have had the right since 1950 to 
immigrate to Germany as members of the German nation (Volkszugehörige) and are directly given 
German citizenship. Between 1950 and the mid-1980s about 1.5 million resettlers came to Western 
Germany, mainly from the former Soviet Union. At the end of the 1980s the numbers of resettlers, 
together with inner-German migrants and asylum seekers, grew strongly (Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung, 2005). Somehow this process of large immigration, and the quite successful 
integration of large numbers of resettlers, could be viewed as a positive example for dealing with 
challenges of diversity. The growing economy after the war probably contributed to this positive 
integration to a large extent.  
Although in public and political discourse the ethnic German resettlers from the former Soviet Union 
were often perceived as less problematic in terms of integration and assimilation than immigrants 




In spite of their many legal advantages in comparison to other immigrants, the resettlers were also 
confronted with high rates of unemployment – especially in the field of unskilled work – and with the 
non-acceptance of many of their professional and academic certificates. 
A 2007 analysis from the Institute for Research about the Labour Market and Professions of the 
Federal Agency for Employment (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit) showed that the integration of resettlers into the labour market had to a certain degree been 
even less successful than that of other immigrants, especially among people with higher education.
26
 
In recent years the so-called ‘Russian Germans’ have repeatedly been debated as problematic, and as 
overrepresented in unemployment and criminality.
27
 In some debates it can be observed that ‘German 
resettlers’ turn into ‘Russian Germans’ as soon as problematic aspects are being discussed. 
One example of this identity labelling in media coverage could be observed in 2009 after the murder 
of the young Egyptian woman in a courtroom, killed by a young German resettler with right-wing 
extremist political views. Not only was the Islamophobic motivation of the murderer not mentioned in 
the media until about a week after the killing, but also, the perpetrator was very quickly named a 
‘Russian German.’ In the aftermath of the murder, the criminality and right-wing views of Russian 
Germans were heavily discussed in the media, while the growing Islamophobia in mainstream society 
was – in an evidently dis-burdening manner – almost entirely blended out. 
The inner-German migration from the five new federal states to the old federal states in the former 
West also produced debates and tensions. The pejorative naming of Germans from the former Eastern 
parts as ‘Ossis,’ along with a certain negative stereotyping, can be seen as indications of a culturalising 
of the German reunification process. Shortly after the reunification of Germany, socio-economic 
differences between the former Western and Eastern parts were perceived more and more in socio-
cultural terms and mutual stereotyping took place. This culturalisation process remains salient: a 
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German woman who had been denied a job with the (unintentionally uncovered) remark on her 
application that she was an ‘Ossi,’ sued for discriminatory hiring practices. In order to be regarded 
before the law as ‘discrimination,’ she had to appeal to the court to accept the category ‘Ossi’ as an 
ethnicity – a claim that the court ultimately rejected.28 Thus, socio-economic differences and 
difficulties are in some cases portrayed and perceived as fundamentally cultural or – in the case of 
Muslims – religious.  This so-called culturalisation of social relations and challenges can be frequently 
observed in German public discourses, not only concerning immigrants from other ethnic 
backgrounds, but even so-called ethnic Germans who have historically belonged to different nations 
and political systems. 
EU-foreigners 
Immigrants from EU countries – like the Poles, who, after people of Turkish origin, make up the 
second largest group of immigrants in Germany today – practically disappeared from the public debate 
and consciousness as soon as their countries joined the European Union, like Poland did in 2004. One 
might conclude that a corollary of disappearing from the lists of illegal immigrants is vanishing from 
public attention.  This leads to an interesting question: could a future joining of Turkey to the EU have 
a similar affect on Turks in European countries, especially Germany? 
Jews 
During the Holocaust the Hitler regime killed between 5.6 (Pohl, 2003:109) and 6.3 (Benz, 1996) 
million people from many different countries, all of whom the National Socialist regime defined as 
Jews. This historically unique genocide aimed at exterminating all European Jews.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, about 20,000 to 30,000 Jews lived in the Federal Republic of Germany, most 
of them old and sick people, unable to emigrate to the US or Palestine.  
Those who stayed in Germany or came back after the war were under considerable pressure from 
within the community to justify their decision to stay in the country of the perpetrators after surviving 
the Holocaust (Schoeps 1991). Especially in Eastern Germany the small number of Jews constantly 
diminished from 3,500 in 1945 to 350 at the end of the GDR. The Jewish community was also quite 
elderly. After the fall of the Eastern regimes and the German border since 1989, and after the 
reunification in 1989, about 28,000 Jews were members of the state-recognized Jewish communities, 
and another 20,000 to 30,000 Jews were non-members. 
In 1986 the historian Ernst Nolte initiated an open debate about anti-Semitism, the so-called 
historians’ dispute (Historikerstreit), with his assumption that the German concentration camps had 
been a reaction to the mass destructive Gulags of Stalin. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas countered 
these assumptions, which he called “apologetic tendencies within German historiography” (Habermas, 
1986). Habermas concluded from this debate that “the only patriotism that does not alienate us from 
the Western world is a constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus)” (Habermas, 1987). 
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In 1991 the law mandating a refugee quota (Kontingentflüchtlingsgesetz) was passed, which, among 
other rights, guaranteed certain groups of immigrants the status as refugees, among them Jewish 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Within a span of 20 years, around 220,000 people came 
into Germany through Jewish immigration.
29
 The German Jewish community saw only about half of 
these as Jews in the religious sense, while the others were people with Jewish families, but without a 
Jewish mother. Still, the latter had often been victims of anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union, 
mainly because of their Jewish names. Their non-acceptance as parts of the Jewish community in 
Germany led to some inner conflicts.
30
 Through this immigration of Jews and their families from 
Russia, the German Jewish community has grown to four time its 1989 size, numbering around 
120,000 members today. In many cities new communities have been founded and new synagogues 
have been built. 
Although Jewish immigration was encouraged after World War II, most of the immigration 
advantages for Jews were abolished with the EU-membership of the Baltic countries from the 1
st
 of 
January 2005. The new regulations practically stopped Jewish immigration. In 2009, only 1,088 
immigrants came to Germany, again 24 percent less than the year before.
31
 
Like in other European countries, anti-Semitic violence in Germany grew after 2001. Anti-Semitism 
debates have centred on the one hand around the demand to put an end to the debate about the past and 
German guilt (Kollektivschulddebatte)
32
, and on the other around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Also, anti-Semitism of the immigrant – in particular the Muslim – community has been strongly 
debated in recent years, and various conferences have been organised on this issue.
33
  
On the other hand, discrimination against Muslims, or Islamophobia, is compared to anti-Semitism 




The two minorities have on the one hand problematic relations towards each other, because of mutual 
prejudices and conflicting views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  On the other hand, they share 
certain interests and issues as two non-Christian minority religious communities; especially as far as 
religious freedom and religious group rights are concerned.
35
 
                                                     
29 Hagalil (2009) Mauerfall 1989, 20 Jahre jüdische Zuwanderung nach Deutschland (Fall of the Wall 1989, 20 years of 
Jewish Immigration to Germany), 02.10., http://www.hagalil.com/archiv/2009/10/02/kontingent-1/ 
30
 see: Bodemann, Y. M. & Bagno, O. (2010) “In der ethnischen Dämmerung. Die Pfade russischer Juden in Deutschland.” 
(The ethnic dawn: The pathways of Russian Jews in Germany), in: Yurdakul, G. & Bodemann, Y. M.: 
Staatsbürgerschaft, Migration und Minderheiten; Inklusion und Ausgrenzungsstrategien im Vergleich, (Citizenship, 
Migration and Minorities: Inclusion and Strategies of Exclusion compared), Wiesbaden, 161-181. 
31
 In 2008 1,436 came to Germany; see: BAMF (2010) Entscheiderrundbrief des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
(Newsletter of the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees), 5. 
32
 Critics of Daniel Goldhagen’s book “Hitler’s Willing Executioners” (Hitlers willige Vollstrecker) said that the author 
pleaded for a collective German guilt for the crimes of the Nazi regime, which the author denied. 
27  The Centre for Research about anti-Semitism in Berlin (Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung), an important institute in 
the academic work about anti-Semitism, organised a conference in 2005 about anti-Semitism of Islamists, and the Federal 
Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) organised a conference about the 
question of a “New anti-Semitism.” See: Gessler, Ph. (2005) Die Juden als Weltfeinde (The Jews as Enemies of the 
World), taz, 15.12., http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/archiv/?dig=2005/12/15/a0159 
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 In 2009 the Centre for Research on anti-Semitism organised a conference called “Feindbild Jude, Feindbild Muslim,” 
comparing and analysing different and similar ways of stereotyping of the minortiy groups. 
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 A striking example for this common interest as religious minorities has been displayed in June 2012, when the regional 
court of Cologne ruled, that the circumcision of Muslim and Jewish young boys was a bodily harm and the physician, 
who carried out a respective operation would have to be fined by the law. In reaction to it both the Muslim and the Jewish 
community , and even parts of the Christian Churches, have spoken out against the decision as a violation of religious 
freedom. Although the voices of the Muslim community have been displayed in the media as well, it was especially the 
outrage of the Jewish representatives that has caused a major debate, especially as they saw the Jewish life in Germany in 
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Especially Muslim representatives increasingly point towards similarities in the manner of 
discrimination of the two minorities, partially to give their demands for minority rights and anti-
discrimination more weight and attention. Jewish representatives take up this new solidarity in 
different ways. Even if certain parts of the Jewish community reject this approach of Muslim 
representatives as instrumentalising, others try to establish new bonds of solidarity.
36
 
The heightened debate about Muslim anti-Semitism – which has to a certain degree been more 
prominent than the debates on the anti-Semitism of ethnic Germans - can be regarded as part of the 
transformation of Muslims from victims of discrimination to perpetrators and thus from the ones to be 
tolerated to the intolerant ones, almost unable to claim tolerance for themselves. 
Comparisons of (early) anti-Semitism
37
 with rising Islamophobia in German and European society, on 
the other hand, return Muslims to the position of objects of (in-) tolerance and through this comparison 
with anti-Semitism points to continuities in German intolerance towards religious minorities. 
Muslims 
A major turning point for public perception of immigrants was – as in many other countries - the 2001 
terror attack on the World Trade Center. The public perception of the former labour migrants – earlier 
referred to mainly as ‘Turks’ – transformed into ‘Muslims’ and the two markers of difference – often 
deployed in an exclusionary way – became interchangeable and also partially reinforced one another. 
With the concentration on the religious background of the former immigrants, the problems grew more 
and more culturalised and essentialised. The factor of class – which plays an important role in the 
analysis, as the former labour migrants were almost exclusively recruited from working classes – was 
almost completely blended out in the public discourse after 9/11. 
As this culturalising of social problems went on with every new issue attributed to the Muslim 
community – arranged/forced marriages, homophobia, anti-Semitism, and others – the stigmatisation 
and exclusion of this group became less and less socially vexed. The concept of multiculturalism – 
although never really strongly influencing German politics – was harshly criticised as too tolerant 
towards cultural groups, equating this tolerance with naïve indifference.  
At the same time, a major shift in the use of ‘tolerance’ regarding Muslim groups and individuals can 
be observed: intolerance towards Muslims and other immigrant groups – especially in light of the 
early nineties’ violent attacks and murders of immigrants – had always been stigmatised and easily 
connected to right-wing extremism and National Socialism, with Muslims and other immigrants as 
their potential victim. However, after 9/11, Muslims were increasingly perceived as the perpetrators 
instead of the victims of intolerance. While in the 1990s mainly right-wing extremists represented the 
intolerable in society, in the years after 2001 Muslims came to occupy this position more and more. 
Thus border-drawing in German society is increasingly done against the Muslim ‘other,’ which is 
forthwith perceived as intolerant and his/her right to being tolerated is at the same time challenged. 
This positioning of Muslims as the intolerant other can be seen as fulfilling diverse functions in 
German society, among them a certain relief for ethnic Germans of a kind of post-war burden. 
Muslims became the locus of different negative aspects in society – like anti-Semitism, homophobia 
(Contd.)                                                                  
danger and Pinchas Goldschmid, president of the European rabbis, even called the decision the “possibly gravest attack 
since the Holocaust” (http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/europaeische-rabbiner-kritisieren-koelner-urteil-zu-
beschneidung-a-844100.html).  
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 Gökce Yurdakul distinguished mainly between the ‘sceptics’ and the ‘allies’ among the Jewish representatives’ reactions 
towards the Muslims’ approach. See: Yurdakul, G. (2010) “Juden und Türken in Deutschland” (Jews and Turks in 
Germany), in: Yurdakul & Bodemann: Staatsbürgerschaft, Migration und Minderheiten (Citizenship, Migration and 
Minorities), Wiesbaden, 127-159. 
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or disadvantaging of women – which had been attributed to certain non-Muslim Germans before. This 
disburdening capacity even went so far as to equate Muslims with fascism, as the word-construction 
Islamo-Fascism indicates, which is widely used by anti-Islamic populism and even within mainstream 
media
38
. With the widely held conviction that Muslims represent intolerance, issues of their exclusion 
and discrimination got blurred and the acceptance of their individual and group rights became a point 
of major debate. Also, essentialising discourses blurred the real reasons for social problems, while 
tolerance towards the Muslim minority generally diminished. 
However, Turks and people with Turkish background are not the only Muslim groups – and many of 
them are not Muslims at all.  Nor are they the only ethnic minority in Germany that has to fight for 
integration and inclusion. But even apart from the religious and cultural spheres, many (former) 
immigrants share the same obstacles and challenges that large parts of the German white socially 
deprived segments of the population face – a fact that is rarely taken into consideration within debates 
and political measures. Instead, the heightened media and political concentration on Muslims in the 
last decade has drawn a lot of attention and efforts for integration away from many other vulnerable 
groups that transcend ethnic categories.  
Tolerance Discourses in Germany  
The concept of tolerance is increasingly used in German public discourse about immigrants and 
integration. By far, the most heavily discussed issues concerning diversity challenges in contemporary 
German society concern Muslims and Muslim religious practices. The most widely used concept 
within this discourse is the concept of integration. Government figures mainly talk about integration as 
the key concept to solving problems in society, which are portrayed as the result of cultural and/or 
religious pluralism, mainly that of Muslims. Indeed, most issues surrounding the Muslim community 
in Germany are connected to their cultural and/or religious difference, even if socio-economic and 
other factors would in many cases be the most relevant frames of reference. Government officials tend 
to accentuate the duty of Muslim individuals and groups to work for their own integration, though they 
do also frequently mention the failure of politics to look at issues of integration for many years. 
As was made evident when the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel recently declared that attempts at 
multiculturalism had failed, and at the same time demanded that immigrants expend more effort 
towards education and integration
39
, minorities are often portrayed as most responsible for their own 
integration. The slogan ‘supporting and demanding’ (‘Fördern und Fordern’)40 is at the core of 
integration politics of Merkel’s party, the CDU, but in practice the demanding part seems to be more 
emphasised. Against this backdrop, we observe increased use of the concept of tolerance in the 
discourse on Muslims and/or integration.  
There are generally a wide variety of interpretations and ways to use the concept of tolerance. It can, 
for example, be seen as the opposite of discrimination
41
. Recent discourse and politics show, however, 
that it is more and more concerned with the limits of tolerance and with drawing lines within society 
between those who are to be tolerated, and those who should not be tolerated.  
                                                     
38
 After the terror attacks in London in 2006, the German weekly Die Zeit titled “Die Offensive des Islamo-Faschismus” 







 One example of this way of using it could be the name of a project of the Ministery of the Interior, called Bündnis für 
Demokratie und Toleranz (Union for Democracy and Tolernce), which supports among others projects against racism 
and rightwing extremism. http://www.buendnis-toleranz.de/cms/ziel/423616/DE/ 
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The slogan ‘no tolerance for intolerance’ is widely used in public debates around Muslims. One 
striking example is an extensive dossier by Ulrich Greiner in the prestigious weekly Die Zeit in 
January 2010. Under the heading “Islamismus: Toleranz für die Intoleranz?” (Islamism: Tolerance for 
Intolerance?) the author reminds us of a recent controversial media debate about Islam, Islamism and 
Islamophobia, where different journalists had issued conflicting views on how to frame the debate on 
Muslims and Islam in the media. The author also takes a stand within this debate, arguing for a deep 
cultural conflict between Islam and the West and cautioning the reader against too much tolerance in 
the face of violent Islamist threats.
42
 This emphasis on the limits of tolerance is intended to call for a 
vigilant awareness of the dangers for society, dangers that could be overlooked by too much tolerance. 
Even the defenders of the concept of multiculturalism, like Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the founder of the 
Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten in Frankfurt, caution against “naïve” forms of 
multiculturalism, that could lower human rights standards in society. Heiko Henkel explains how 
Cohn-Bendit and also Habermas draw a line of tolerance against what they call ‘fundamentalism’ or 
‘fundamentalist immigrant cultures’ (Henkel, 2008). This association of a society putting itself in 
danger by tolerating the intolerant is a strong image within German discourse, because it recalls an 
important part of national history; it was precisely the Weimar Republic’s tolerance even towards its 
own enemies that boosted the rise of the Nazi regime. For this reason too much tolerance is seen as a 
danger to democracy. The Weimar Republic was perceived as too weak because of its openness, and 
the lesson learnt from this is often summed up in the slogan “no tolerance for intolerance”.43  
For analysing the political function of the use of tolerance, Wendy Brown has provided a very useful 
concept, which regards tolerance as a “political discourse and practice of governmentality”, rather than 
a “transcendent or universal concept, principle, doctrine or virtue.” (Brown, 2006:4) In the German 
context, the increased use of the concept of tolerance works hand-in-hand with the general political 
approach towards the inclusion of others, framed as integration. Rather than discussing structural 
inequalities and discrimination against certain immigrant groups as a major barrier to participation and 
inclusion, the integration debate positions the minorities vis-á-vis the majority and the state in a 
situation of ‘the others’, who are to be supported, and also challenged, but who are not framed as an 
integral part of the society. The otherness of non-ethnic Germans, mainly Muslims, is thus reproduced 
and reaffirmed through the discourse on integration. The concept of tolerance supports this process of 
othering, at the same time that it positions the tolerating side above those who are to be tolerated or not 
tolerated – constructing both borders and hierarchies between in- and out-groups. The way, how this 
process of constructing a group as the significant other is further discussed also in chapter 3. 
Especially the role this other plays for the formation of a national identity is elaborated on in further 
detail. 
How are claims of toleration made and by whom?  Under which conditions is toleration granted or 
withheld?  In which cases is something more than tolerance – namely, respect or recognition  -- 
demanded for specific groups?   Most of the debates turn on a variety of claims by Muslim groups for 
recognition and acceptance of specific religious practices.  




 Prof Dr. Carlo Schmids (SPD), who is among the fathers of the German constitution (Grundgesetz), declared in a speech 
before the plenary of the parliamentary council (Plenum des Parlamentarischen Rates) the 8th of September 1948: 
“Demokratie ist nur dort mehr als ein Produkt einer bloßen Zweckmäßigkeitsentscheidung, wo man den Mut hat, an sie 
als etwas für die Würde des Menschen Notwendiges zu glauben. Wenn man aber diesen Mut hat, dann muss man auch 
den Mut zur Intoleranz denen gegenüber aufbringen, die die Demokratie gebrauchen wollen, um sie umzubringen.“ 
(Democracy is only then more than a product of a mere decision out of political convenience, if one has the courage to 
believe in it as something that is essential for human dignity. If one, however, has this courage, one also has to get up the 
nerve for intolerance towards those who want to use democracy in order to murder it.) Translation done by the author of 
this text. http://www.derhistoriker.de/deutsch/04+Rede_Parlamentarischer_Rat_von_Carlo_Schmid_08-09-48.pdf 
Nina Mühe 
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The demands made by Muslim individuals and groups themselves are generally not framed in terms of 
toleration, but in terms of granting equal rights, especially the right of freedom of religious expression, 
which is perceived as both a fundamental right of the German constitution, the Grundgesetz, as well as 
a fundamental human right. The claims are thus not made as demanding tolerance towards something 
alien to German society and culture but as the granting of basic rights, which is perceived as an 
integral part of Europe’s basic values. Muslim groups often especially refer to the German 
Grundgesetz, which they perceive as a guarantor of their freedom of religious expression. When Aygül 
Özkan was nominated Minister of Social and Integration Issues of the federal state Lower Saxony in 
April 2010 by the conservative party CDU, it was widely presented as the first nomination of a 
Muslim as Minister of a German federal state, and in this context as an act of tolerance. One of the 
major Muslim organisations, however, spoke about the nomination as “a sign of increasing normality 
and acceptance that all offices and positions of this country are also open for Muslims, just as for all 
other religious communities (…)”44  
But even if the minorities themselves are not arguing from outside but from inside the society and its 
legal institutions, public figures and media perennially refer to these claims as issues of toleration or 
non-toleration. After Özkan incited a controversy within her own party and beyond by stating in an 
interview with the weekly Focus
45
 that, herself following a secular rather than a religious view, she 
would prefer public schools to be free of all religious symbols, including headscarves but also 
crucifixes, a local newspaper printed a story titled “Aygül Özkan – Der schwierige Start einer 
Muslima” (Aygül Özkan – The difficult start of a Muslim woman). The paper argued that the 
nomination of Özkan, which had been intended as a sign of tolerance and cosmopolitanism, was 
quickly putting these same values to the test.
46
  
This can be seen as a clear example of what Wendy Brown calls a discourse of depoliticization, in 
which “tolerance can function as a substitute for or as a supplement to formal liberal equality or 
liberty; it can also overtly block the pursuit of substantive equality and freedom”(Brown, 2006:9). By 
using the concept of tolerance in the context of Muslim individuals or groups being granted rights, that 
are anyway guaranteed to them by the constitution, the issue is taken out of the realm of liberal 
equality or liberty and into the area of what Rainer Forst calls “allowance tolerance”, which – in 
contrast to his perception of “respect tolerance” - marks the relation between a powerful entity, in this 
case the political and social majority, and a less powerful minority, which is granted tolerance, but can 
also lose it by the will of the tolerant group (Forst, 2003:42). The precondition for the granted 
tolerance in this conception is generally the fact that the tolerated group does not challenge the given 
distribution of power.  
In this sense it can be suggested that tolerance talk undermines the ‘pursuit of equality and freedom’ 
that Muslim groups and activists aim for, and reaffirms unequal distributions of power between 
different (ethno-religious) groups in society.  
The discourses on tolerance and integration help not only to draw borders between an ethnic German 
in-group and out-groups with immigrant backgrounds, but also to differentiate between those parts of 
the perceived immigrant population that are more easily tolerated, and those towards whom tolerance 
has to be limited. The effect of border drawing of tolerance talk is thus both differentiating between in- 
                                                     
44
 Translation by author; German original: „Es ist im Weiteren auch ein Zeichen von zunehmender  Normalität und 
Anerkennung, dass  auch Muslimen genau wie allen anderen Religionsgemeinschaften alle Ämter und Positionen dieses 
Landes offen stehen (...)“; KRM (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland) (April 2010): “Ein Schritt in die richtige 
Richtung” (A step in the right direction),http://www.igmg.de/nachrichten/artikel/2010/05/03/ein-schritt-in-die-richtige-
richtung-krm-begruesst-ernennung-der-neuen-sozial-und-integrationsministerin.html 
45
 Focus (2010) Aygül Özkan: Niedersachsens neue Sozialministerin gegen Kruzifixe (Aygül Özkan: The new Minister for 
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and out-groups, but also within out-groups between those who are (more) easily tolerated and those 
who are grudgingly tolerated, or who should not be tolerated at all. 
As the granting or denial of tolerance, and with it the granting or denial of certain legal rights, is 
within the discourse often linked to the (in-) tolerance of the respective group, the perception of a 
group as (in-)tolerant has substantive effects. Within this discourse, a certain tendency can be observed 
to regard secular Muslims and immigrants as more tolerant than religious ones, and at the same time to 
favour individuals over groups. This is quite symbolically reflected within the German Islam 
Conference, where the Minister of the Interior invites certain religious Muslim organisations, but 
limits their weight within the discussions through an even higher amount of participants, who are not 
organised and many of whom are not religious or are even outspoken critics of Islam.
47
  
However, not all religious groups are perceived as equally tolerant or intolerant. While the major 
Sunni organisations are portrayed with criticism and often viewed as backward and patriarchal
48
, other 
communities, such as the Alevi organisations, are perceived as tolerant and liberal. The Alevi claims 
for specific religious instruction at public schools have thus caused far less resistance by public 




Certain other ethno-religious minorities like the Jews or the Roma are today generally not discussed as 
receivers of tolerance, as tolerance talk would be viewed as absolutely inappropriate towards groups 
who have been major victims of the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. There have, however, been recent 
debates about Jews as victims of a rising anti-Semitism, which has lately mainly been portrayed as a 
phenomenon amongst Muslims, as described above in more detail. Another recent debate, in which 
prominent Jews, too, have raised their voices, is the debate about rising Islamophobia. There have 
been different public representatives who have opposed this perceived social development.
50
  
The positioning of representatives of the Jewish community is of specific importance within the debate 
about Islamophobia, because of the unparalleled German history of persecution and extermination of 
Jews during the Holocaust. 
As the authors Bodemann and Yurdakul argue, tolerance was a term that in Germany “invariably 
evoke(d) the Jewish question and anti-Semitism” (Bodemann, 2008; 76). In the view of Bodemann 
                                                     
47
 The former general secretary, now chairman of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, Ayman Mazyek, declared, 
that those participants, who had a renunciatory attitude towards Islam, had been favoured even more strongly in the new 
composition of the Islam Conference in 2010, which in the end made a debate at eye level between Muslim communities 
and the state impossible. http://islam.de/15570.php. 
48
  See for example the statement of Lale Akgün, Commissioner on Islam of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), who 
commented the unification of four of the biggest Muslim umbrella organisations in Germany under the roof of the 
Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany, that the four organisations together would represent a very conservative 
Islam, which would leave no room for liberal views any more. 
http://www.welt.de/politik/article805367/Neuer_Dachverband_als_zu_konservativ_kritisiert.html 
49
 One major reason for the public resistance to accept the major Sunni organisations as a religious community – the basic 
pre-condition for giving reliigous instruction at public schools – has for many years been the fact, that they representated 
only a minor part of the whole Muslim population in Germany. The same holds true however for the Alevi communities 
but has never been presented by politicians as a reason against Alevi religious instructions. See for example: 
http://www.taz.de/1/debatte/kommentar/artikel/1/aleviten-machen-schule/ 
50
 The general secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany Stephan Kramer has together with the Ayman Mazyaek, 
then general secretary of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany visited the family of the murdered Marwa El 
Sherbini in 2009 in Dresden and cauioned about rising Ilsamophobia in German society (http://islam.de/12733.php).  
The former vice president of the Central Council of Jew, Michel Friedman, recently demanded ‘no tolerance for 
intolerance’ pointing at the debate around the anti Muslim arguments of the then board member of the Federal German 




and Yurdakul “the ideological labour of Jews in German society today encompasses the role of 
‘guardians of memory’, not merely on their own behalf but also on the behalf of their German 
surroundings” and their mere presence in contemporary Germany was “‘proof’ that Nazism has been 
overcome and that German society is now truly democratic and tolerant of outsiders.” (Bodemann, 
2008; 78) As can be seen from this quotation, however, Jews are still always in danger of being 
perceived as outsiders; such adjustments are made more rhetorically than in practice, made evident by 
the frequent reference by German politicians to a ‘Christian-Jewish’ heritage of Germany and Europe. 
In their article Learning Diaspora: German Turks and the Jewish Narrative Bodemann and Yurdakul 
also describe how Turks and other Muslim groups in Germany increasingly refer to the Jewish history 
in Germany as well as to the handling of Jewish religious issues today – like the slaughtering of 
animals - in order to have their own claims for acceptance of religious difference met as well as their 
fear of Islamophobic developments better heard in German society. 
Other immigrant groups like the Poles, or even more the ethnic German resettlers, have largely 
disappeared from public debates. It can be suggested that they are more and more becoming part of the 
‘we-group’, maybe in line with the development of the stronger integrative character of the EU 
towards EU-citizens, which would have to be further investigated. It can, however, be observed that 
Poles are no longer debated in the context of tolerance or integration. The best example for the 
different debates is the German soccer team. The majority of the players in the team have an 
immigration background. While players with Polish background are, for example, not seen as ‘others’ 
any more, players with Arab or Turkish origin are heavily debated in regard to integration. In the 
positive sense, the team was portrayed around the World Cup in South Africa as a sign of an inclusive 
and multicultural Germany, while in the negative sense a politician of the far right called the national 
player with a Turkish background, Mesut Özil, a ‘passport-German’51.  
However even mainstream media made a difference between the players with different ethnic 
backgrounds by according Özil a prize for integration at the Bambi award 2010 in Potsdam, which 




Here, we see an example of the general effect that the focus on the concept of integration, and the way 
in which it is perceived often as mainly a duty of the immigrants or their descendants, has an 
exclusionary rather than an integrative effect. Especially German citizens, raised in the country but 
whose parents or grandparents had once immigrated to Germany, perceive the strong political and 
discursive focus on integration, which they have actually been living all their lives, as marking them as 
outsiders. A young Muslim woman is quoted in the survey of the Open Society Foundation on 
Muslims in Berlin as stating that the integration debate made her feel “pushed into a corner” (Mühe, 
2010; 51). 
Concluding Remarks 
Similar to other neighbouring countries, like France, the Netherlands or Denmark, German society is 
struggling today with the transformation of its population, a transformation that has become more 
visible and more accelerated in recent decades. The most important factor for this development has 
been immigration, which mainly started during the 1960s as workers were recruited from different 
countries – mainly from Turkey – in order to help build up the destroyed country after World War II, 
and continued with refugees and asylum seekers from war torn countries mainly during the 1990s. 
Unlike countries like France or the UK, Germany had hardly had any experience with immigration 
from formerly colonised countries.  
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Another difference in relation to some neighbouring European countries lies in the national identity 
and national self-perception of German society. Until very recently, the close coupling of national 
identity and ethnic origin stood largely unchallenged, and until today the idea that a non-ethnic 
German could not be a ‘real’ German is still widespread. 
In this national atmosphere it is still difficult today for young people, whose parents or grandparents 
were immigrants, to feel as an equal part of the society and to identify positively with the country, 
especially as unequal treatment of non-ethnic Germans is widespread in various areas of life. The 
situation has become additionally difficult for people of the Muslim religion or with a Muslim cultural 
background
53
, since hostility against Islam has risen in many European countries. Different surveys 
show that Germany is especially affected by it. At the same time, the diversity in the country keeps 
growing, and since the citizenship reform of the year 2000, children of non-nationals can under certain 
circumstances become nationals, which means that more and more people with different ethnic 
backgrounds and/or different cultural or religious affiliations are being naturalised or are born as 
Germans. The necessity for social and structural changes becomes evident and is especially felt on the 
local level, as in certain regions and cities the diversity is higher than on the overall national level.   
(According to the micro census
54
, 26.8 percent of the population of Hamburg and 24 percent of Berlin 
has an immigration background
55
 compared to 19% on the national level
56
. In certain areas of big 
cities, the percentage rises to half or more of the population). 
Therefore, projects and reforms that aim towards more inclusion are especially found on the local 
level. 
Muslims are not the only minority community suffering from this lack of an inclusive national identity 
and unequal treatment in society. They have, however, both for national and for international reasons, 
become the most important focus of public debates on integration, religious diversity and also 
discrimination and racism.  This attention gives rise to strong effects on the situation of the community 
as well as individuals belonging – or seeming to belong – to this minority.  
Research about Islamophobia and the effects of Islamophobic discourse on Muslims in Germany is 
still rare.  Much of the academic work on Muslims concerns questions of whether they are more or 
less easily integrated than other groups, if their culture and/or religion keeps them from being 
integrated and makes them (in-)compatible with German values and norms, including non-violence, 
equality of women and respect of a secular legal constitution.  
It is in this context that the discourse on tolerance becomes especially strong. It is, however, used not 
primarily in order to demand tolerance towards Muslim cultural and religious practices, but more as a 
discourse of border drawing between tolerant and intolerant minority groups, both within and between 
Muslim and other subgroups in German society. Naming certain minority groups – especially Muslim 
ones – as intolerant is within this discourse often used as an argument for not tolerating certain 
Muslim practices in return or creating stricter laws against religious practices, like the Muslim 
headscarf in certain public services or accommodations for prayer at public schools. Tolerance is thus 
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 In the recently published survey “At Home In Europe” of the Open Society Foundations on Muslims in European Cities 
the German cities Hamburg (22%) and Berlin (25%) had the lowest percentage of Muslims who perceived themselves as 
German (resp. British, French…) and even lower percentages of those who thought others would perceive them as such. 
(Mühe, 2010; 58 & Hieronymus, 2010; 55). 
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 In comparison with a full census the micro-census surveys only a representative sample of 1 per cent of the households in 
Germany, covering 390,000 households with 830,000 people. Available at http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikrozensus 
55 HHAP, p. 10. & Press release 297of the Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 15th of September 2009, online available: 
http://www.statistik-berlin-brandenburg.de/pms/2009/09-09-15c.pdf. 
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used more and more often as a discourse that draws lines between in- and out-groups, between the 
ones to be tolerated and those who are only grudgingly or not at all to be tolerated. The most 
frequently used phrase in this context is ‘no tolerance for intolerance’ and reaches back to the national 
memory of historical experiences with the Nazi regime, that could, on this view, only come into power 
because the preceding Weimar Republic had been too open even towards the enemies of the republic.  
Amidst this background, the discourse on tolerance is especially targeted towards Muslim groups – 
especially those that are religious -- and becomes at times even exclusionary. 
Regarding this specific German context, this report takes on an important and interesting task by 
further investigating anti-Muslim rhetoric and its effects, as well as the general attitude towards ethnic 
and/or religious diversity, especially in fields of society that are at the heart of identity formation and 
inclusion, like education and political participation. Anti-Muslim discourse and practices are not the 
only issues of (in-) tolerance or (non-) acceptance in German society, but they are today the ones that 
are least restricted by political correctness and much more openly uttered and practiced than other 
forms of intolerance or discrimination, like the still prevalent anti-Semitism or racism against black 
people. They can thus be an interesting focus of research, as investigation into general inclusiveness, 
(in-) tolerance and acceptance of diversity of the German society might be most easily measured in 
regard to discourse on and practice towards Muslims or people perceived as Muslims. 
 
Chapter 2: (In-)Tolerance towards religious diversity in German schools  
Introduction  
The German educational system 
In Germany the educational system varies between individual federal states, which have autonomy on 
educational issues. However a certain skeletal structure of the education system is common to all 
federal states, with the following four stages: 
Grundschule (basic primary school),  
Sekundarstufe I (secondary schools I) consisting of Hauptschule, Realschule, Gesamtschule and 
Gymnasium until the 10th form,  
Sekundarstufe II (secondary schools II) consisting of gymnasiale Oberstufe (upper school level of 
Gymnasium), vocational schools and adult further educational training 
and the tertiary level, consisting mainly of universities and Fachhoschschulen (technical colleges). 
The three-tier differentiation of the secondary schools into Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium 
has been criticised both nationally and internationally
57
. The early separation of school children 
between the different school types has disadvantaging effects on certain pupils, among them children 
with a mother tongue other than German. In most federal states – except Berlin and Brandenburg – the 
basic primary school ends after four years (six years in Berlin and Brandenburg) and the children are 
then sent to the different school types, fixing their educational career often before they have had the 
chance to adjust to the linguistic level of their fellow pupils. Another critique concerning this 
educational structure is the school type of Hauptschule, the lowest educational level of secondary 
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schools, which has in many cases developed into a dead end school, with such a bad reputation that 
students finishing Hauptschule have great difficulty finding work or apprenticeship training positions.  
Combined with the fact that children from immigrant communities were found disproportionately 
often in this school type and teachers were criticised for discriminative allocation of migrant children 
due to their background and language competencies rather than intellectual abilities
58
, this school type 
has been harshly criticised and abolished in some federal states, or not even established as in the case 
of the new federal states in former East Germany.  
The Gesamtschulen (comprehensive schools) that exist in different forms in some of the federal states, 
can be seen as an attempt to prevent early segregation of children, not only concerning migrants, but 
more generally children from different social classes. The common learning and mutual enrichment of 
the pupils is one of the goals of this school type. 
The Berlin educational system 
In contrast to most other federal states, Berlin pupils generally visit Grundschule for six years, 
although there are some exceptions possible for certain schools that can offer secondary education 
beginning with the 5
th
 form. 
Berlin has run a pilot project of Gemeinschaftsschulen parallel to the three-fold school system since 
2008. Individual schools can become Gemeinschaftsschulen and offer all types of certificates while 
educating all children together. The aim of this school type is to support equal chances through 
extended common learning and to individually support the skills and talents of all pupils
59
.  
In 2010 this aim was to be further strengthened through a major school reform of the whole Berlin 
education system. The school forms Hauptschule, Realschule and Gesamtschule were all combined 
into Integrierte Sekundarschule (integrated secondary schools), which is now the only type of 
secondary school besides Gymnasium. The aforementioned Gemeinschaftsschulen still exist parallel 
and are supposed to be become some special form of Integrierte Sekundarschulen. 
The aim to integrate all school types has only been taken half way, as the Gymnasiums, which lead to 
Abitur (school leaving certificates necessary for university entrance) are still separate from the rest of 
the system.  





 form or even until the 12
th
 (or 13th) form, leading to university entrance certificates. Pupils 
aiming for Abitur can thus choose between the traditional Gymnasium and the same kind of 
educational career within the Integrierte Sekundarschule. 
The slogan of the reform is ‘from differentiation in the education system to differentiation in the 
classroom’60, meaning that children are not segregated any more between different school types, but 
are individually supported (in learning groups or courses) and are learning together in the same school 
or even same classroom. 
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Motivation of case selections 
German public debates regarding (in-) tolerance or (non-) acceptance of ethno-religious minorities 
have been strongly focussed on Islam and Muslims during recent years. Although there are other 
pressing issues, such as the rights of the Roma people in Germany, the debate around Islam 
(Islamdebatte) has drawn much attention in the media and political circles. Thus the understanding of 
tolerance towards or acceptance of minorities can be studied extensively with this religious minority. 
Although it is debated both on a religious and ethnic basis in public discourse, I will try to focus more 
on the aspects of attitudes and politics towards Muslims as religious minority, rather than looking at 
the general debate about ‘people with immigration background’, the German expression for 
immigrants and their descendants. Firstly, this expression is rather unspecific and secondly, not all 
Muslims in Germany have recently immigrated. Among those concerned are also – such is the case 
with the headscarf banning laws – Muslim women with no immigration history. Although these 
different aspects cannot be separated, a focus on the issues concerning Islam as a religious minority in 
Germany allows for a better analytical differentiation. 
Germany is distinctly separated into federal states with much autonomy in various fields, such as 
education, making it difficult to generalise on certain issues. For the two cases discussed in this 
chapter I have chosen the federal state of Berlin, which is generally perceived as a rather non-religious 
society and political climate, in contrast with states such as Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. On the 
other hand Berlin has also a rather multicultural, open and tolerant self-perception, where diversity is 
generally appreciated. Different social minorities, like different kinds of artists, alternative scenes or 
the gay movement have long appreciated Berlin for its open mindedness and liberalism. 
On the other hand Berlin has, partly because of its strong leftist influence in politics both in the former 
western, but even stronger in former eastern parts of the town, always had a rather distant approach 
towards religion and especially public expression of religion.
61
  
It is this particular combination that made it difficult for Berlin’s politicians to establish a law against 
the wearing of headscarves for Muslim teachers and other professionals, as had been passed in Bavaria 
and other federal states where Muslims were more obviously discriminated against compared with 
members of other religions. Berlin rather tried to both prevent Muslim teachers from wearing 
headscarves and at the same time not discriminate against Muslims, but treat all religions equally. It 
thus passed a law, the Neutralitätsgesetz (law on neutrality), which forbade the wearing of any kind of 
(ostensive) religious symbols for teachers and some other professions within public services. At least 
the wording of the law thus cared for an equal treatment of different religions, while in Bavaria only 
Muslim teachers are forbidden from wearing religious head-coverings in public schools, whereas the 
ban does not affect Christian nuns. 
It is this specific situation that makes Berlin especially interesting to study regarding the (in-) 
tolerance towards a minority religion.  
Both in Berlin and across Germany, the ‘neutrality of the state’ regarding religious issues has been a 
major topic within the debate about Islam and religious expression by Muslims during over recent 
years. ‘State neutrality’ is often used as an argument to reduce or demand the reduction of public 
religious expression, especially that of Muslims. As neutrality is in this debate understood and used 
differently by different actors, it is interesting to have a closer look at those arguments and also to their 
relation to the understanding of neutrality within the German constitution. 
The German legal background to this is a specific understanding of state neutrality, not banning 
religious expression from public space, as in laic France, but demands that the state be neutral by not 
prefering one religious denomination over another, and to even support religious expression and 
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practice where necessary. The state is not bound to keep religion private but to not favour one 
religious faith over another. On the other hand there is a strong position of the Christian churches 
within the society and vis-à-vis the state, which makes this constitutional basis of state impartiality 
challenging in many cases, among them the headscarf bans and the right to prayer. 
The headscarf debate heavily referred to the neutrality of the state, the Berlin and other respective laws 
even being called Neutralitätsgesetz. Another important discussion turned around the conflict of 
positive religious freedom (of the Muslim women) and negative religious freedom (of the non-Muslim 
or non believing pupils and parents).  
The latter arguments appeared also in a more recent conflict of a Muslim boy in Berlin demanding his 
right to pray in schools. Within the public debate about this issue as well as in the argumentation of the 
court, the argument of neutrality of the public school was used to counter the demand of the Muslim 
boy for his right to prayer. I chose this case of the prayer in school for the analysis of the present 
chapter, because it is in line with the headscarf debate regarding the debate about neutrality and the 
different (positive and negative) freedoms of religion, but is more recent and has not been widely 
analysed so far. It is in parts specific to the Berlin political landscape but has also general relevance 
for the whole of Germany. This relevance had also be seen by the different court levels, thus allowing 
for further appeals to higher instances.  
The specific German understanding of state neutrality is also at the core of the local and national 
debates around the introduction of Islamic religious education at public schools. The German 
constitution (Grundgesetz) states, that the state should actively support religious expression, but has to 
refrain from unequal treatment between the different denominations. Religious education is thus a 
basic legal right and its teaching as a regular subject at public schools can be legally demanded, while 
the definition of the theological content is entirely up to the respective religious community. As no 
Muslim religious community has ever been officially acknowledged by the state, the implementation 
of Islamic religious education remains a challenge. Berlin is one of three federal states where religious 
education is organised in accordance with the Bremer Klausel (the ‘Bremen clause’), which provides 
an exception to the law. Religious education is not a regular school subject in Berlin, as in most of 
other federal states, but only taught as a voluntary additional subject and organised by the religious 
communities themselves, with some public financial contributions. One Muslim organisation, the 
Islamic Federation Berlin (Islamische Föderation Berlin - IFB), legally for many years fought for 
acknowledgment as a religious community, allowing it to give religious instruction at Berlin. The 
courts decided the situation, and political will opposing the Muslim organisation could not change it. 
This has created a situation where Islamic religious education has been taught for about ten years, in 
contrast to other federal states. In most other federal states, Islam has only been taught in schools in 
connection with the Muttersprachlicher Ergänzungsunterricht (additional tuition in mother tongue), 
where children of Turkish immigrants were taught in Turkish about Islam, which was not explicitly 
religious education as such. The introduction of regular Islamic religious education in line with the 
constitution is in development in various federal states. However, the content of this education will not 
be decided upon by the state institutions alone, but as a ‘res mixta’ in cooperation with representatives 
of the religious communities As the existing Muslim organisations are not yet recognised as religious 
communities by the constitution, this causes major difficulties and different federal states are currently 
looking at different options of cooperation between the state and the Muslim communities in order to 
be able to introduce regular Islamic religious education at public schools
62
.   
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 The German constitution does not foresee a state church, but close cooperation between the state and religious 
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Nina Mühe 
40 
The experiences of the Islamic Federation Berlin and its teachers both with the public institutions and 
the schools, where they work is thus exceptional for Berlin but through its longer experience might 
function as an interesting pioneering example for the current national and local debates and models. 
The number of Muslim pupils 
No official numbers exist with regard to the exact number of Muslim students in schools and higher 
education. Data only reveals the number pupils of German or other nationalities in schools. Of the 
German students, the number with an immigration background has been counted for several years 
now. The PISA consortium published the numbers of students with an immigration background in 
2003
63
 as 22 percent and in 2009
64
 as 25.6 per cent.  
Estimates suggest 700,000 German pupils have a Muslim background,
65
 while the educationalist 
Havva Engin suggested in 2001 that six percent of pupils were Muslim (Engin, 2001). The percentage 
is probably much higher today and highly fluctuating between former west and East German states, as 
well as between cities, districts and even individual schools.  
In Berlin, a fifth of all school children (95,211) were said to have a ‘mother tongue other than 
German’ in the school term of 2008/09, compared with one fifth or 72,633 in 2000/01.66 Nicht 
Deutsche Herkunftssprache (NDH) (non-German language of origin) is a term that is quite 
problematic in itself, as it also includes children who were born and raised in Germany and have 
German citizenship. The official definition on the website of the Berlin Senate says that the language 
used in the family decides whether a child is counted as having ‘German language of origin’ or ‘non-
German language of origin’. In school however the label of NDH tends to support a further ‘othering’ 
of certain children because of their ethnic background. The Berlin based NGO Migrationsrat Berlin 
Brandenburg for example criticised the segregation of school classes along the lines of ‘German’ or 
‘non-German’ language of origin, which tends to further marginalise non-ethnic German children.67 
Research Methodology  
This chapter is based on both desk research and empirical fieldwork. In terms of desk research we 
have collected the statistical data available, legal texts and policy documents, media articles and other 
relevant scholarly literature on the cases in question, and about Muslims in Germany and specifically 
in relation to public school education. The empirical data collection consisted of interviews with 
(Contd.)                                                                  
and some other communities are disadvantaged because of the differences in their structures and 
organisation. The larger Muslim umbrella organisations in Germany have sought acknowledgment from the 
state for several years, but have always been confronted with both the structure issue – Islam does not 
provide one hierarchically structured church as partner of the state – and with a lack of political will. When 
the big organisations finally succeeded in founding one common organisation in 2007, the Coordinating 
Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland - KRM) in order to provide a 
common partner for the state institutions, they were again rejected with the argument that they did not 
represent enough Muslim believers. As Muslims who use the facilities of a certain organisation do not 
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different actors involved in one of the two cases or both. Both the desk top research and the interviews 
aimed to create a critical discourse analysis of the two widely debated cases as well as to analyse 
connections between the two discourses and the larger discourse on Islam and Muslims in Germany. 
Most of the interviews were held in the central districts of the city of Berlin, itself a federal state, 
while one was held in the city of Hanover in the federal state of Lower Saxony.  
More specifically we conducted 18 semi-structured qualitative interviews in total. Of those seven were 
conducted with local politicians and members of Muslim and non-Muslim NGOs, seven with Muslim 
and non-Muslim teachers in Berlin, six of them in Berlin and one in Hanover. Four interviews were 
conducted with Muslim pupils, of whom three were male and one female (see Annex). In addition to 
the interviews held in early 2011 with politicians, representatives of religious organisations, teachers, 
pupils and other actors in the field, we held a roundtable discussion with experts in the field of Islam at 
German public schools in June 2011 in order to back up the findings of the draft chapter and gather 
additional data for our analysis. The first part of this group discussion was introduced by Werner 
Schiffauer who gave some input from his research about the situation of Muslims at German public 
schools and was followed by a discussion about individual experiences of the present school members 
and experts. The second part of the roundtable was introduced by three experts working in the 
educational field, who reported on their different experiences regarding Muslims at German public 
schools, and was again followed by an exchange of the experts present on both their theoretical 
considerations and practical experiences.  
 
Case 1: The question of state neutrality and tolerance of religious practices in schools 
In 2008 the Berlin administrative court decided in favour of a 16 year old Muslim pupil who had taken 
legal action against his school because he was prohibited from performing his Muslim prayer inside 
the school building. Among the most important of the school’s arguments was that its neutrality would 
be at stake if it allowed pupils to visibly perform their Muslim prayers and thus interfere with the other 
pupils’ right to negative religious freedom, meaning not being confronted with religious practices and 
symbols in school. 
The Senate Administration for Education in Berlin opposed this court decision and appealed against it. 
In 2010, the next higher court level, the Higher Administrative Court, followed the argumentation of 
the Senate Administration for Education and the school and allowed the school to prohibit Muslim 
prayers. The pupil’s legal representation lodged an appeal against this decision again and the Federal 
Administrative Court finally decided in the same way as the Higher Administrative Court, that the 
prayer could be forbidden in school. The latter court however pointed out, that this decision was only 
binding for this respective school and that the neutrality of the state could not be used as an argument 
to forbid prayer at school. There was no strict separation of church and state in Germany, why schools 
were no non-religious spaces (religionsfreie Räume). 
The necessity to maintain the neutrality of the state is used as an important argument not only in this 
case. In practice, the specific understanding of state neutrality is interpreted in different ways, 
especially in the area of education. The conflicting views of a more laic interpretation, where the state 
should refrain from supporting any kind of religious expression and an understanding of ‘positive 
neutrality’ as the German constitution describes it, where the state remains neutral towards the 
different affiliations while supporting religious expression in general, often clash in the school setting. 
The issue has also been dealt with in relation to the Christian religion, when crucifixes in schools were 
the focus of the conflict, but is most often dealt with in relation to Muslims and Muslim religious 
practice. The headscarf of Muslim teachers has been the most prominent focus of public debate in 
recent years. In contrast with conflicts over Christian religious practices, the issues concerning 
Muslims in the debate often touch upon both arguments of state neutrality and on issues of (in-) 
Nina Mühe 
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tolerance towards religious diversity. It was thus of great interest and importance to observe how the 
different actors apply the ideas of neutrality and secularism to this case and connect them with other 
cases where Muslim religious practice in schools may be judged to interfere with state neutrality either 
to support their arguments or to distinguish them from other cases where they apply neutrality 
differently.  
Discourses on concepts of state neutrality and tolerance 
Neutrality as equal support of different religions 
The first court level, the Administrative Court of Berlin (VG), did not accept the argumentation of the 
school that the principle of the neutrality of the state must be maintained within the state’s institutions, 
by arguing that the pupil had a right to demand his religious freedom under article 4 of the German 
constitution.  
 “This basic right does not only extend towards the inner freedom to believe or not to believe, but also 
to the outer freedom of expressing this belief. To this belongs – especially as the duty of prayer 
belongs to the five pillars of Islam – in particular prayer”68 (translation by the author)  
The school’s argument of the demonstrative and promotional effect of the Muslim prayer was 
countered by the court in saying that the school could organize a place somewhere on the school site 
where the boy could carry out his prayers without disturbance, which could not easily be seen by 
others. The endangering of the peace at school through conflicts between different religions and 
cultural backgrounds was not recognised by the court, which instead declared:  
“The peaceful coexistence at a non denominational school requires that the pupils learned to tolerate 
and respect the religious beliefs of others.”  
The court names tolerance in the same breath as respect, thus referring to what the political scientist 
Rainer Forst refers to as a Respektkonzeption (‘respect conception’) of tolerance, based on mutual 
respect and acceptance of different groups and individuals on the basis of a constitutional political 
community (Forst, 2003:42).  The Administrative Court positions this kind of tolerance as a major 
educational objective for all pupils in all schools.  
The understanding of state neutrality as an equal support of different religions is thus closely 
connected with an understanding of tolerance as respect conception. Tolerance in this sense is 
closer to respect and acceptance and might be seen as the individual virtue of citizens, where the 
concept of neutrality as the support for equal rights is the legal framework. 
Various interviewees, some teachers and one NGO representative referred to the equal treatment of 
religions when asked about their views on prayer rooms at schools. Particularly interesting however 
was the fact that the Muslim pupils interviewed in this research referred heavily to an understanding of 
equal treatment of the different religions before the law and demonstrated a considerable amount of 
trust in German legal institutions. 
One young Muslim man, who visited the same school as the claimant, said he would not have chosen 
the legal action as his schoolmate did. However, when asked about another way to resolve the 
problem, he said,  
“To be honest, you could only solve it that way. I could not have imagined it any other way. If he 
really wanted it, the teachers would have said ‘no’ for sure. They did say it in fact. They really said no 
and they would have insisted on it.” (L) 
                                                     
68
 Decision of the  3rd chamber of 10
th
 of March 2008 – VG 3 A 983.07 
Tolerance-Discourses in Germany 
How Muslims are constructed as national others 
 
43 
Interestingly, while the pupil did not trust in the help and support of the teachers, he obviously 
perceived going to court as a realistic possibility to achieve justice.  
A female Muslim pupil who attended another school in Berlin described the development around the 
prayer room at her school. Pupils were given a room by the headmaster, which was later taken away 
again after discussions started among the teachers. Although this room was withdrawn with the 
argument that it would be unfair towards other religions, the schoolmaster still solved the problem 
pragmatically by allowing the pupils to use any room they could find for their prayer. Concerning the 
court cases, the interviewee uttered a feeling of injustice,  
“In my opinion, it is should not be allowed to prohibit pupils from praying in school, because it does 
not actually disturb the (other) pupils, as most of them pray during the break when it is loud anyway.” 
(F) 
Later on when describing a case at another school where the Muslim pupils had been always 
prohibited from praying, she again expressed the view that this was not in line with the law. She then 
described the case of a young Muslim at her school, who had organized a collection of signatures in 
support of a prayer room, which had been ignored by the headmaster. She explained that the young 
man had later been called to the headmaster and accused of drawing a tree and later crossing it out, 
interpreted by the teacher as a crossed out Christmas tree and thus a sign of a fundamentalist attitude. 
The boy had been warned that he would have to leave the school if he did anything like this again. The 
interviewee quoted the young man as saying:  
“This is ridiculous, what they are doing to me…if I went to court, they would lose.” (F) 
Interestingly this boy shows the kind of behaviour, which could well be interpreted as civil resistance 
and stemming from a very democratic attitude, collecting signatures from supporters in his school, 
although they were not acknowledged by the headmaster. Nevertheless, the young man is still sure that 
if he took the last step possible and went to court, he would find justice there. He thus also expresses a 
strong trust in the German legal system, which he is sure would give justice to him, whether he 
belonged to a religious minority or not.  
The decision finally taken by the German courts about the possibility to pray at school might be 
important for further strengthening, or weakening, this trust of young Muslims in the German legal 
system offering justice for all citizens and also acknowledging religious freedom for minority religions 
too. 
Neutrality as the invisibility of religious practice 
The second court level, the Higher Administrative Court in Berlin (OVG), followed the argumentation 
of the pupil’s school however, judging the peace at school at risk due to an encounter of a  
“plurality of different religions and faiths”69, containing a “considerable potential for conflict” 
(translations by author).  
In the following judgement the court refers to conflicts, which arose at the school due to some Muslim 
pupils not following religious commands such fasting, praying and not eating pork. The OVG also 
refers to the other court’s argument of supporting tolerance and respect among the pupils and declares 
that educational means to support “mutual tolerance and respect” would not be enough for securing 
the peace at school, if  
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“religious cultic actions were allowed, that were – like the often collectively performed ritual of 
Islamic obligatory prayer – easily perceived from outside and thereby different from silent prayer, 
tolerated by the defendant.”  
The OVG ruled that the peace at school (Schulfrieden) was especially endangered by the allowance of 
outwardly perceivable religious practices in opposition to the calm prayer of an individual. Although 
both individual and group religious rights are equally protected by the German constitution, they are 
frequently differentiated in public discourse, generally acknowledging the former but often 
delegitimising the latter. Here both the group and the outwardly perceivable aspects of religion are 
touched upon.  
Interestingly the OVG explicitly differentiates between “often collectively performed” prayer and the 
“silent prayer” of the individual, which was tolerated by the school. While it rejects the ‘respect 
tolerance’ demanded by the VG as too weak a means to ensure peace at school, when talking about a 
silent prayer it refers to what Rainer Forst calls the allowance-conception of tolerance 
(Erlaubniskonzeption). This describes the relation between a powerful entity, in this case the school, 
and a less powerful minority or member of a minority, which is granted tolerance, but can also lose it 
at the will of the tolerant. (Forst, 2003) 
Similarly an interviewee from the Senate Administration for Education in Berlin, the institution, which 
initiated the appeal against the first court decision, also cited the silent versus the demonstrative 
character of different forms of prayer. While he explicitly emphasised that the Senate Administration 
naturally supported the religious freedom of pupils and was well aware that the secularism of 
Germany was a positive instead of a laic
70
 one in the French or Turkish sense, he limited this support 
of religious expression to the inner, silent form of prayer. He referred to an expert report that the 
Senate Administration had used in court, which distinguished between two forms of Muslim prayer, 
one being “important for the spirit and the inner ethical questions” while the other was “a 
demonstration of community.” He further quoted the expert report by saying that the ‘ritualistic 
prayer’ of Muslims had a missionary meaning, particularly in societies which were not yet, but 
“should become majority Muslim.” He thus implicitly connects the Muslim ritual prayer with an 
Islamist aim of making the majority of the population Muslims. Although the Senate representative 
confirms that missionary activity would be normal human behaviour, he demands its limitation by 
certain rules in order not to lead to strong conflicts.  
The visibility and audibility of religion by itself is perceived here as a sign of missionary activity and 
even contextualized with the aim of proselytizing the whole society. 
This trope of ‘Islamising’ the whole society is often found in rightwing populist debates71, especially 
in the movements against mosque building and generally anti-Muslim groups, but also enters 
mainstream political discourse through this kind of ascription of - assumedly intolerant - Muslims 
trying to undermine the society. 
After several years of controversial debates around its content, the Senate Administration for 
Education published the “Handreichung Islam und Schule” (Handout on Islam and School) in 2010, 
in order to help teachers in dealing with Muslim issues at school. The handout explains that only very 
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few Muslim children would want to pray at school. A judgment about the motivation of those few 
follows: 
“Some of them because here it becomes outwardly recognizable, if someone fulfils the religious 
norm,” (Senate Administration for Education, Science and Research, 2010: 8) 
The handout further argues that this can turn into moral pressure on other pupils who do not want to 
pray. In referring to the court case, only the arguments of the second court level (which argued against 
the right to pray at school) are cited and the focus is put on the religious neutrality of the school, and 
its role to ensure that pupils are protected from both pressure and missionary influence of the ritual of 
prayer. 
One of the female Muslim pupils interviewed also described these accusations of proselytising through 
the visibility of the prayer. Without prompting from the interviewer, she described how she saw the 
reason for the prohibition of prayer at school as the fear of missionary activity and directly tried to 
counter it:  
“But the others would realise that. We as Muslims are not just pulling people inside, saying‚ look 
here, we proselytize you now.’ Islam is not like that.” (F) 
 
The limits of tolerance 
The threat of missionary activity by Muslim individuals or organizations – although perfectly in line 
with the constitution – is very often referred to as the limit of tolerance, as the borderline, where the 
person or organization forfeits its right to be tolerated itself. For example, an interviewee working at a 
Berlin school said, in reference to tolerance towards religious minorities: “No tolerance towards the 
intolerant! Tolerance is a kind of respect, that other people are different. But, I am completely 
intolerant towards those that start proselytizing, that start calling their way of life the only true one, 
that attack others, because they do not think alike and are different. (…) And that played an important 
role within the discussion here at our school.” 
The danger of too much religion (particularly Islam) in public space, and the danger of ‘too much 
tolerance’ towards it is also referred to by Johannes Kandel from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The 
foundation is associated with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and is an important public actor 
concerning Islam within Berlin society, which also strongly influenced the “Handout on Islam and 
School” mentioned earlier. In his introductory speech to a public discussion about the prayer case 
(FES, Nr.38: 3) he states, that religions could only expect  
“respect, tolerance and acceptance by civil society and the state, if they accepted the fundamental 
principals of secularity, universal human rights, democracy, constitutional state and pluralism” 
(translation by the author).  
He also declared that not all religions were equally developed – especially concerning their dealing 
with other religions - and are thus challenging the dictum of equal treatment. He concludes, that the 
tolerance of intolerant attitudes and practices might contribute to the abolishment of tolerance in 
society. 
As the discussion that follows this introduction is primarily about the case of the young Muslim who 
wanted to pray at school, it becomes clear to which religion Kandel is mainly referring to in his 
presentation, and that the most important issue for him in the context of the possible prayer at school is 
the danger of tolerating intolerant practices and religions. 
The concept of tolerance is used here rather as an excluding than an including discourse. By naming 
the demand of toleration, namely “accepting fundamental human principles of secularity, human 
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rights, democracy and constitutional state pluralism”, the border with the other is drawn – in this case 
the religious Muslims – and he is both positioned outside of this part of society, which forms the ‘we-
group’, where the adherence to all these values is not even put in question. But this position of the one 
who is outside but tolerated is also put further into question by explicitly stating that even the 
tolerance – that already marks him as an outsider – will only be granted if certain values are 
subscribed to. By naming these values an idea of cohesiveness within the we-group is purported and at 
the same time it is generally doubted that the other – in this case the Muslim – easily subscribes to 
these values.  
 
The relation between the concepts of state neutrality and tolerance 
A general difference between the two court rulings can be seen in their perception of the role (and 
power) of an attitude of ‘tolerance and respect’ towards different religions and worldviews. While the 
first court saw it at the core of peace at the school, the second court perceived a too exclusive focus on 
tolerance as a threat to peace at the school, which could better be maintained with the religious 
differences kept as invisible as possible and thus the whole school (including teachers and pupils) as 
neutral as possible. Tolerance in the sense of accepting religious diversity in school is in this 
perception rather seen as a threat than a chance and the only religious practice tolerated by the school 
is the silent, individual and rather invisible one. 
The understanding of state neutrality as eliminating any visible and outwardly perceivable form 
of religious practice from the public sphere is thus in close connection to the understanding of 
tolerance as allowance-conception. Tolerance is rather portrayed as a threat than a virtue and 
mainly mentioned in connection to its limits, those being any kind of perceived intolerance of 
religion itself, primarily any attempt to proselytise. Tolerance is not understood as an individual 
virtue supporting the legal frame of equal rights, as in the case of the respect-conception of 
tolerance. Rather it is taken as some kind of bearing of the other, one who is not on equal power 
terms but always in danger of not being tolerated any longer. The non-tolerance is then applied 
to any perceivable kind of religious expression, especially when performed by groups. 
Possible solutions of the prayer conflict and further developments  
 ‘Room of silence’ as compromise between the different perspectives on neutrality 
Even those interviewees who generally opposed a room for Muslims to pray in school generally 
supported a ‘room of silence’ to be used by all religions, stressing the elements of silence (meaning 
silent prayers) and neutrality (meaning that no religious symbols should be shown in order to avoid 
opposing views which could lead to conflicts). The religiosity seemed to be neutralised well enough 
through the invisibility and inaudibility of the prayers and the problem of meeting the needs of all 
different religions and worldviews seemed to be solved as well. However, a headmaster who offered 
this solution to the problem explained that he would have been ‘laughed at’ if he had proposed this to 
the Senate Administration for Education.  
The interviewee from the Senate explained that he opposed this neutral ‘silent room’ because these 
requests were normally made by only a few, while the majority remained silent, and implied the 
danger of religious groups and communities taking the initiative and influencing the pupils from 
outside. He also referred to the unacceptable influence of other organisations beyond the religious 
ones, namely the political parties and other ideological groups and the danger that children could 
associate themselves with these groups out of mere opposition to their parents. 
He then said that education could only succeed if it did not work against the parental homes. 
Otherwise the child would be  
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“torn in different directions. And even the best child cannot stand this.” (Translation by the author) 
(N) 
This attitude of the Senate Administration for Education against even a common room for different 
religions was criticised by other interviewees and perceived as a sign of a general anti-religious 
attitude. 
Anti-religious attitudes as barriers to religious diversity 
At the public discussion at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung about the court case in Berlin, Astrid Reuter, a 
theologist and religious scientist, stated her opinion that for the large part there was not a big problem 
with intolerance stemming from religious communities in Germany, but more from the part of non 
religious people. According to her this originated in the difficulties to deal with the diverse meanings 
of religions, religious symbols and practices, which could be observed during the headscarf conflict. 
This insecurity often led to an intolerant attitude towards religions and religious needs and concerns. 
(FES, Nr.38: 8-9)  
This intolerance by non-religious people has also been perceived by different interviewees within the 
research. It was observed that Berlin was a traditionally secular and non religious city and that in 
particular the educational policies were advancing the view that religious expression should be kept 
out of the everyday school life as far as possible in order to keep a good and harmonious atmosphere. 
Two interviewees, a Muslim teacher and a Protestant educationalist, bemoaned the fact that religion 
was often only seen in a problematising manner and in connection with fears, rather than as a potential 
source of tolerant behaviour and mutual respect.  
Those fears were sometimes expressed by the interviewees when other interviewees talked about the 
missionary aspects of common prayers and the possible pressure which this can put on less religious 
pupils, but also when the danger of the religious communities behind the young pupil and his concerns 
are assumed and their possible influence in the schools is compared with that of political parties or 
scientology.  
Several Muslim pupils also described encounters with this fear of and even hostility towards Islam 
with some of their teachers. Two young Muslim men who went to the same school as the claimant 
portrayed the school as one where many teachers did not see religious practices favourably. They both 
also explained, that one of their teachers had openly said in class, that he had an anti-Muslim attitude 
and that he talked about Muslims and Islam in a hostile way, whenever the talk at school touched upon 
it. Additionally one of the interviewees described how the headmaster in Ramadan had once put a 
glass of water in front of him in order to make him break his fast. 
That the fear of extremism is never far away could be observed in the case of a young man at another 
Berlin school who crossed out a picture he drew of a tree, because it had been immediately been 
perceived as anti-Christian and thus Muslim extremism and even put him in danger of having to leave 
the school. 
 
Possible future developments of legal rulings regarding religion  
At a public discussion about the court case of the prayer in Berlin, Hans Michael Heinig, a professor 
for church law, explained that three alternatives were currently under discussion among experts 
concerning the further development of the Staatskirchenrecht (the law affecting the church and the 
state) in the future: 
Equal treatment before the constitutional law regarding religion (Religionsverfassungsrecht) 
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Hierarchisation through the privileging of the Christian denominations 
Laicisation of the religious legal order. 
Heinig explains, why in his view, the first option is by far the best option, also in terms of 
compatibility with EU law. However, the other two alternatives can be widely heard in public 
discussion concerning the treatment of religion in general and Islam in particular.  
Heinig further states that in his view the concept of tolerance should not feature in the legal debate. He 
argues that the toleration of people with a different faith would only be one step before religious 
freedom, which has already been secured by the law, but as an individual virtue of the citizens it 
would be no legal duty. He explains however, that an intelligent legal system on religion could support 
tolerant attitudes of citizens, while a non-intelligent one could hinder them. 
On the other hand he described the virtue of religious tolerance as an important tool in extrajudicial 
conflict-management. Here he defined the connection between tolerance and religious freedom as an 
object of legal protection:  
“The more intolerant a society is, the more important the effective enforcement of religious freedom 
becomes, but also the more precarious the claim towards enforcement of the law becomes within the 
society.” (FES, Nr.38: 6)  
These remarks can well be connected to the different perceptions and debates among the interviewees 
with regard to the court cases in Berlin.  
Various interviewees reported that the headmaster of the respective school in Berlin had a very 
antagonistic attitude towards Muslim prayer at school and it appears as if the young man and his father 
only went to court at the point at which prayer at school was made completely impossible. This would 
support the view described above, that the less tolerance a society (or sub-system in society) shows, 
the more important the effective enforcement of religious freedom becomes.  
On the other side tolerating the prayer at school is even seen as a possible way of handling the issue by 
many of the actors who generally opposed a prayer room. It could thus be perceived as the virtue of 
the citizens, and seen as necessary for extrajudicial conflict management in society. The moment 
however in which more than voluntary tolerance is demanded, namely the enforcement of a legal rule, 
this tolerance seems to become diminished.  
Concluding Remarks  
It can generally be concluded that the tolerance of religious practices such as prayer at school (taken as 
the pragmatic handling of this need of certain pupils) would be a good option for most people 
involved. Things change completely the moment the ‘tolerance’ goes from a personal decision which 
every school and teacher makes for themselves on whether and how to grant it, and to whom it should 
be granted, is transferred to a legal right, such as when the young Muslim and his father appealed to 
the court. The moment something becomes a legal right, which then must be granted by the 
administration even in cases when they would rather not grant it, the decision about ‘tolerance’ or 
‘non-tolerance’ is taken out of the control of the administration of the schools.  
Concerning religion and especially Islam this seems to become especially problematic as the doors of 
the school might be opened towards groups of people who should not be trusted and might infiltrate 
the pupils in a negative way. Religion is generally perceived as inciting rather than appeasing 
conflicts, which is why as much invisibility and inaudibility of religion is aimed for.  
This view takes its strongest position in the words of Kandel, that too much tolerance even for the 
intolerant religions could cause the society to lose its tolerance altogether.  
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Here (perceived) intolerance marks the border between those religions that are to be tolerated and 
accepted in society (because of their higher development) and those that are not – namely Islam, the 
one dealt with in this instance.  
In this discourse tolerance becomes a tool for making distinctions between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’, 
the one that is to be tolerated and the one that is, due to its own intolerance, not to be tolerated. 
Another understanding of the concept of tolerance, referred to by Forst as the respect conception of 
tolerance, sees the case of the space for prayer as a particular opportunity to learn tolerance and mutual 
respect in school. This conception of tolerance was used in the first court decision by the VG.  
The second court, the OVG, perceived this understanding of tolerance as not strong enough to ensure 
peace at school vis-à-vis the diversity of conflicting religions present – and would thus support the 
appeal, that too much tolerance – for the wrong people and religions – can be dangerous for the 
society. Here the way how tolerance as a concept is referred to rather belongs to what Forst calls the 
‘allowance conception’ of tolerance, which attributes one side the power to tolerate or not to tolerate.  
According to Wendy Brown this shifting of the debate from a ‘respect conception’ of tolerance 
towards an ‘allowance conception’ of tolerance could be an attempt to ‘depoliticise’ the discourse 
(Brown 2008). By changing a legally ensured right into an objective of tolerance, the debate is taken 
out of the realm of equal rights and into the realm of voluntarily attributed allowance, and from a more 
powerful towards to a less powerful entity. In fact, different interviewees have described the 
perception of a social power struggle ongoing in court. 
The interviews with diverse actors also suggest that the idea of a common ‘room of silence’, designed 
and organised by the various pupils together and thus support the learning of mutual ‘tolerance and 
respect’, would be a viable solution both for religious pupils of different faiths and for many atheist 
and Humanist actors in the field. 
A policy recommendation stemming from the analysis of different arguments and different actors 
within the debate about prayer rooms in public schools would ask the Senate Administration for 
Education in Berlin and headmasters of the different schools at the local level as well as the 
Kultusministerkonferenz (joint board of the cultural ministries of the federal states) on the national 
level to reconsider the provision of a small room at every school that can be used for spiritual purposes 
such as prayers or meditation. In order to avoid possible conflicts or fear of proselytizing, the room 
should be held religiously neutral without any religious symbols or pictures, so that members of 
different religious communities as well as non-religious people, who wish to withdraw for meditation, 
can use it. 
Another recommendation for national policy makers would be to consider the way how the religious 
neutrality of the state is understood and how it shall be understood in the future. Following the legal 
scientist Heinig the report also favours the understanding of state support of all religion equally before 
a laicisation of law and politics or even a hierarchisation in favour of the Christian denominations over 
others. Findings from the report give some evidence, that the first model of state support of all 
religions equally is the one, that is most strongly connected to a practice of tolerance and a view 
towards tolerance as mutual respect rather than as an unequal power-relation, where the one who 
tolerates is in the powerful social position and always has the right to not tolerate. The latter 
understanding of tolerance as allowance has rather been found with supporters of the laicisation of 
society. In this context also the equation of tolerance towards religious difference with danger of the 
social peace could be found. An open and diverse society, where all members are able to participate 
equally and where some way of mutual understanding and/or respect of different cultures and religious 
can be found could probably be supported by an understanding of state neutrality the supports all 
religions equally instead of keeping them away from the public sphere and forcing some of their 
members to suppress large parts of their identity in important parts of their social life. 
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Case 2: Experiences with Muslim religious education at state schools using the example of Berlin 
In 1980, long before state provision of Muslim religious education at state schools was nationally 
debated, the Muslim organisation ‘Islamische Föderation Berlin - IFB’ (Islamic Federation of Berlin) 
went to court in order to gain acknowledgment as a religious community and thus have the right to 
organize religious education at state schools. More than 20 years later, the organization won the case 
and started giving Islamic religious education for 55 children in two public elementary schools in 
Berlin.  
Article 7 of the German constitution states that religious education is a proper subject (ordentliches 
Lehrfach) for public schools and should be organised in cooperation with religious communities. The 
Bremer Klausel (the Bremen Clause) excludes Berlin, Bremen and Brandenburg from this basic law, 
meaning that public schools do not have to offer religious education as proper subject, but it can be 
offered by the religious communities only as an additional, elective subject. In Berlin, religious 
education is only organized if enough parents of a certain religion opt for it. The respective 
communities provide the religious education teachers and the Berlin Senate has no right to interfere in 
the religious content taught in those classes, as long as it meets the basic constitutional standards.  
From the beginning of the teaching in 2001 until today many criticisms towards this non-interference 
of the state and towards the IFB have been raised.  
Nevertheless, today the IFB has been teaching for ten years and could extend its sphere of work to 32 
elementary schools and over 5000 pupils, with instruction by 23 religious teachers. 
Development of the (non-) acceptance of the Islamic Federation  
Distrust towards the Islamic Federation in Berlin 
The IFB fought in court for nearly 20 years to be allowed to give Islamic religious education and was 
ultimately acknowledged by the courts as a religious community in the legal sense, giving it the 
possibility to give religious instruction at public schools in Berlin. Although the decision meant a legal 
acceptance of equal rights of the Muslim organization, in practice the acceptance of the organization 
and its teachers at public schools was one of forced tolerance rather than acceptance. For example, in 
August 2001 the financial paper Handelsblatt ran an article entitled “Allah comes into the classrooms” 
and bemoaned the fact, that: “The Senate Administration for Education is forced to provide rooms and 
pay for teachers that the federation is free to choose.” (Handelsblatt, 2001) (Translation by the author) 
The mistrust towards the organization became clear through quotations in press articles such as that on 
website about migration that cited a legal scholar describing the IFB as an association with  
“religious, political and cultural goals in the guise of a religious community” (Bundeszentrale für 
Politische Bildung, 2000) (translation by author).  
This trope of disguise directly refers to the public and political perception of the organization Milli 
Görüs, to which the IFB is said to have strong contacts. The Milli Görüs has been observed and 
criticised by the Verfassungsschutz (German intelligence services) for many years, and referred to as 
‘legalistic Islamist’. This category defined as organisations that are not connected to any kind of 
terrorism or violence, but are said to enforce Islamist positions through the “utilisation of legal 
instruments” (“…unter Ausnutzung rechtsstaatlicher Instrumentarien,”72 translation by author). 
Schiffauer has described this position towards the Milli Görüs and the IFB as a general attitude of 
suspicion which tends to turn every positive statement by members of the organization on the society 
and its constitution as an attempt to hide its true intentions (Schiffauer 2010).  
                                                     
72
 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz: Islamismus und islamistischer Terrorismus, 
http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af_islamismus/ 
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Media reports also described the “legal tricks” that the Senate Administration for Education used 
before the final court decision in order to keep the organization out of schools. The Berlin daily 
Tagesspiegel described an absurd correspondence between the Muslim organisation and the Senate 
Administration, which tried to delay the court case as long as possible. They quoted the representative 
of the IFB Kesici:  
“Suddenly the administration says that the language certificate of a teacher from the federation was 
not readable, then a health examination is supposedly missing or a police certificate, never previously 
mentioned as compulsory.” (Vieth-Entus, 2000b) 
An interviewee who used to represent a secular Turkish organization in Berlin described the Senate 
Administration for Education’s strategy of delaying the cases that it has been carrying out for years.  
“They file a petition and you do not hear anything. That’s how it starts. Because the Senate 
Administration thinks ’we can sit this out’. Then after three months they threaten to take an action to 
compel the performance of an act, or discreetly hint at it. Then comes the answer ‘we never received 
the petition’. Then it is filed again. Then silence. Then the Senate Administration said ‘you are – 
somehow - too narrow in your understanding of Islam’ or something like that. (…) It went constantly 
back and forth.” (B) 
However, the online version of the weekly Der Spiegel quoted the Senate Administration for 
Education acknowledging the fact that, in spite of supposed connections to the organization Milli 
Görüs (under surveillance by the Verfassungsschutz) the IFB itself had not presented any kind of 
programme rejecting the constitution. The Senate Administration instead criticized the education by 
the IFB that: 
“did not enable pupils to critically deal with their religion. Also the equality of man and woman could 
not be described as in line with the constitution.” (Ströbele, 2001).  
The website however also quoted the respective judge, saying it was not  
“the duty of religious education, to communicate doubts about the trueness of their faith to the pupils. 
If criticizing Islam for failing to support gender equality, the Catholic Church would also have to be 
attacked. (…) As long as the equal position of men and women in the German state are not denied 
within the teachings, there is no reason to intervene.” 
 
The beginning of Islamic religious education – ‘gritted teeth tolerance’ 
After the IFB had been given permission to teach at public schools, the scepticism towards them 
remained high. A representative of the IFB describes the attitude of ‘gritted-teeth tolerance’ towards 
the religious teachers in the beginning:  
“You have to imagine moving into a house where you are not wanted. And we were not wanted. You 
have entered through legal action. There were reservations. One did not want us. There also was no 
willingness to cooperate with us. But eventually one had to do it. Therefore in the beginning there 
were quite a lot of problems that we had to deal with. They were also partially… I don’t know if they 
were structural, or personal, if the individual people were deciding for themselves or if it was 
mandated by the Senate Administration. They did cooperated with us, but also gave us the feeling: 
actually we do not want you.” (C) 
The interviewee also explains that the Islamic education had begun at a most unfortunate point in time, 
because the terror attacks of 9/11 had triggered a negative debate about Islam and Muslims. 
“We were not judged by what we accomplished, but by what the had media said. I’ll give you an 
example: when teachers had been working there for some time, many headmasters said to them ‘We’re 
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glad that you’re here and not the others’ - meaning the other fundamentalists, so to say. I heard 
almost every teacher saying that and eventually asked during a teachers’ meeting: ‘Is there anybody 
who hasn’t heard this statement?’ Everybody had heard it.” (C) 
Shortly after the beginning of the religious education the Berlin daily Der Tagesspiegel quoted the IFB 
reporting that at one of the schools where they were about to teach, the Muslim teachers were not 
allowed to enter the classrooms. (Vieth-Entus 2001) 
As a vivid sign of distrust, the Senate Administration for Education has carried out individual 
examinations with its teachers concerning their loyalty towards the German constitution since the 
beginning of the IFB’s religious instruction at public schools performs.  
“We now have someone observing every term – unheralded. This means the headmasters come into 
the class, listen and complete a report. And they observe if you are against the constitution or not. (…) 
We have still five years in front of us. Following the code of practice for the instruction of religions 
and worldviews, a religious community that comes into a school can be monitored for 15 years. And 
after that there is a certain examination.” Asked, if this was a new regulation, the interviewee 
explained:  
“Only for us. That has been designed especially for us.” (C) 
 
After ten years of Islamic religious education – an ambivalent picture 
With regard to the situation of the teachers of the IFB at public schools today however the 
representative of the organization drew a much more positive picture:  
“The teachers at school realized that the Muslim teachers are normal human beings, that they deal 
with normal issues and most importantly, that they sometimes even cause something positive. If you 
somehow persuade children that violence and bad language, that mutual teasing are not good, and if 
you also talk about this in religious class, then they realize: ‘Hey, they do exactly what we want.’ And 
this was exactly the point, where we realized: It’s working better with the schools. When one got to 
know the other. And by now this is running by itself. And the schools cooperate really well and support 
us.”  (C) 
When asked if all schools cooperated in this way, he explained:  
“Except for one or two. But otherwise there are hardly any problems. There are no problems at all.” 
(C) 
However, when talking to individual teachers, both from the IFB and others, the situation does not 
seem to be as positive as described above.  
One female teacher of the IFB explained in an interview for this research how some of the teachers at 
the two schools where she taught would cooperate with her and use her as a connection to the Muslim 
pupils, while others completely ignored her.  
“They would not say hello to me. They take pupils out my class just after it starts. And if I send a pupil 
to bring him back, saying ‘No, he has Islamic education class now, he has to come here’, the pupil 
comes back and reports ‘Mrs X (the class teacher) said I don’t care what the Islam teacher says about 
that.’ Or another example: I do not get a room. And it is not only me, it’s the same for my colleagues. 
There is still one of us, (…) who is not allowed to enter the teachers’ room and make copies there or 
anything else. He does not have a key for the teachers’ room.” (O) 
Although she explains that the Islamic religious education is generally well received and no 
complaints have ever been heard, she describes, how they still are ‘forth class teachers’: “Second class 
are the contract teachers and the assistant teachers, which we partially have again, or the trainee 
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teachers. And third class are the religious teachers, and actually fourth class are the Islam teachers.” 
(O) 
Another interviewee, a teacher of ethics classes among others, quoted a representative of the 
Humanistischer Verband (Humanistic Association) who organizes ethics classes at public schools,  
from conversations with colleagues from the IFB:  
“outrageous stories, (…) existed there... until the religion colleague from the Islamic Federation 
noticed that he was being audio monitored in class, at a school in Neukölln (district of Berlin).” (D) 
Although the schools were entitled to monitor Muslim religious classes once a term and observe the 
content of the classes, this particular school obviously did not even trust that the teacher spoke openly 
when the headmaster was present. The effects of the discourse around the concealment of their true 
positions by Muslims and Muslim organizations, particularly those such as Milli Görüs or the Islamic 
Federation under surveillance by the Verfasssungsschutz, (‘what they say is not what they really 
think’), can well be observed in this need of the school to secretly – and illegally – audio monitor the 
IFB teacher. 
Another interviewee and teacher at public schools explained that generally among the teaching staff 
great reservations towards Islam and even anti-Muslim stereotypes existed that had different causes:  
“There is a Christian line of tradition, but there are also within enlightenment these anti-Islamic 
stereotypes, and among teachers they exist too. They are here rather part of the problem than part of 
the solution. (…) I believe that this has to do with the attitude of the majority society and teachers are 
just a part of it.” (D) 
Judging from the experiences of individual teachers the situation of the IFB teachers still seems to be 
quite tense at some schools, while at the same time they are appreciated as mediators in school 
conflicts concerning Muslims at others. The fact that the representatives of the IFB seem to stress the 
positive developments while largely downplaying the remaining problems might be interpreted as an 
attempt to further remove the tension from the situation in schools and in contact with the Senate 
Administration for Education and to further develop a situation of forced tolerance into one of 
acceptance and even respect at public schools.  
Even though the legal right to offer Islamic religious education at state schools was finally achieved in 
2001, it has caused a hardened atmosphere between Muslim organizations and educational institutions 
in Berlin, a situation which is comparable with the case of the Muslim pupil fighting for his right to 
pray in school at the court level. Concerning this case a headmaster stated:  
“If we have a court judgment that obliges us, we are forced to formally enact things, which heightens 
the rejection even further.” (E) 
Some interviewees also highlighted the fact that cases that are brought to court can turn into mere 
power struggles, where winning or losing the case tends to become more important than the actual 
content.   
Discourses on Islamic religious education at public schools 
Islamic religious education as an issue of equal treatment and recognition 
An interviewee who had worked in the field of integration for many years criticized that educational 
politics had not dealt with the issue of Islamic religious education a long time before the actual court 
case with the IFB started. 
“I can remember, when I was deputy chairman of the GEW (trade union for education), Hanna Renate 
Laurien from the Senate for Education was here. I had put through this Islamkunde (religious 
Nina Mühe 
54 
instruction without a denominational basis) within my atheist GEW, which has since been demanded 
by the TBB (Turkish Federation of Berlin Brandenburg) as a demand of the GEW. Laurien said that 
there is no need for action. In eighty-seven! If in 1987 in Berlin you say there is no need for action for 
Islamic religious education, then I don’t know!” 
(B) 
The interviewee explains that in the late 1980s even secular organizations such as the TBB and the 
GEW already supported some kind of Muslim religious instruction at public schools in Berlin. He 
further explains that the TBB, even in its foundational declaration in 1991 demanded,  
“that for reasons of equal rights, of equal treatment, the question of Islamic religious education 
should be resolved.” (B) 
He further refers to the basic right to religious education guaranteed in Article 7 of the German 
constitution.  
“So we need not – however we may think about religious education at school –debate it any longer. 
Therefore the question of equal treatment is the most important. If various Christian and other 
religions have this right, and this is also carried out in practice, it actually has to be accepted as a 
right for Muslim children. And then it must be considered how this can be realised, because there is no 
church in Islam.” (B) 
Also other interviewees, teachers and former teachers supported Islamic religious education for 
reasons of equal rights although personally opposing the idea of religious education at public school 
altogether.  
“As long as denominational religious education for Catholics and Protestants is offered, I will fight 
for it to be offered for Muslims as well. But generally I hold the opinion that religious education has 
no place in school.” (A) 
“Although I personally know many very engaged religious teachers, I actually hold the opinion that 
religion, no matter which form, has no place at all in a public school.(…) But when it is there, it has to 
serve everybody.” (J) 
A teacher of the IFB in Berlin explained in an interview that the fact that Islamic religious education 
was taught in public schools in Berlin today was an important sign of acceptance and recognition for 
many Muslim citizens. Especially as the general perception of migrants and Muslims in school and 
society as a whole was still one of foreigners than of equal citizens, even small contributions of 
Muslim pupils to the school culture would play an important role.  
“For 50 years they have been told that they could not become Germans. (…) For me all these children 
are German. We speak German in class.” (O) 
She described how many teachers do not perceive their pupils with migration history as Germans and 
as an equal part of society. In order to offer them another self-perception, one that conciliated being 
German with being Muslim, she tried to contribute to the general school culture with the Islamic class. 
The headmaster of one of her two schools supported her and allowed her class to present a Muslim 
song at a general school celebration.  
“The parents were enthusiastic. I received double the number of registrations after that. They were 
simply delighted that something that belonged to them had a place too. Three minutes in this half an 
hour school term celebration.(…) They felt accepted, they felt recognized, they felt welcome.” (O) 
She explained how these small symbolic moments could easily open doors and the hearts of the 
Muslim pupils and parents and the often difficult communication with teachers could quickly be 
established. 
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Other teachers also referred to the general necessity to increase a culture of recognition towards non 
ethnic German and/or Muslim children at public schools. One female teacher, who also works as a 
teacher trainer, said: 
“Everywhere where schools do good work for children with migration background regarding 
language education, an interplay of different factors is crucial. It is a good cooperation with parents, 
then a collaboration with institutions in the school context, migrant organizations, 
Quartiersmanagement (specific programme for socially deprived areas), and so on. And what is also 
important: to express a culture of recognition.” (A) 
 
Islamic religious education as an issue of state control over religious minority 
Looking at the national level, the public debate about Islamic religious education at public schools 
across Germany has also been brought forward by German public officials over recent years who 
strongly support the process of its implementation. The German Islam Conference (Deutsche 
Islamkonferenz – DIK), where German politicians and representatives of Muslim organisations as well 
as individuals with some kind of Muslim background have regularly met and discussed relevant issues 
since 2006, explicitly opted for the implementation of Islamic religious education at public schools 
and founded a specific working group within the DIK to implement this project. 
However, the interests of German public institutions in establishing Islamic religious education 
generally differ from those of most of the Muslim representatives. The Islamic studies scholars Kiefer 
and Mohr explained this difference in motivation between the two sides – the Muslim communities 
and the German state via the German Islam Conference DIK – as follows: The Muslim organizations 
were mainly “striving for the acceptance as a religious community by the state”, while the public 
actors  “… advocated an Islamic religious education mainly as an instrument of the prevention of 
extremism” (Kiefer & Mohr, 2009: 206; translated by the author).  
How this prevention of extremism is meant to be supported through Islamic religious education can be 
seen from an interview with a Muslim teacher in the federal state of Lower Saxony, who has been 
involved in the yearlong process of establishing Islamic religious education in Lower Saxony. She 
strongly criticised that the DIK tried to influence the content of the future Islamic religious education, 
despite the German constitution defining the authority over theological content of the religious 
education as lying with the religious communities themselves. One example the interviewee gave of 
the – in her view -  (mis-) use of Islamic religious education, was the demand the DIK made of the 
Muslim organizations to incorporate tolerance as an educational goal into the curriculum.  
“The Islam Conference 2008 for example tells us to educate the pupils towards a willingness to 
tolerate (toleranzbereit) and that they shall develop an attitude of tolerance. The Islamic education 
should do that.” (K) 
The interviewee does not focus on the fact that this demand indirectly proposes an actual intolerance 
of Muslim children and a specific need of Muslims to be educated towards tolerance, more than 
members of other religious communities. She rather criticizes a perceived inequality of the treatment 
vis-à-vis the Christian denominations.  
“If you look at the curricula of Catholic and Protestant [religious education], then you see that within 
the curriculum of the Catholics the expression tolerance does not even appear. Then you look at the 
guidelines of the bishops and you realize that the concept of tolerance is missing.(…) They have 
created wonderful guidelines, really good. (…) But tolerance does not play a role, only respect. You 
know…but respect towards the other. (K) 
In this statement, the discomfort of the interviewee with this selective political application of the 
concept of tolerance becomes evident and especially with tolerance being demanded of one religious 
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community exclusively. While ‘respect’ seems to be self-evident for her as a concept inherent to 
religious education in general, the public demand of education towards tolerance is interestingly 
perceived as going beyond respect. This is noteworthy, because tolerance is generally understood as 
‘less than respect’. If differing attitudes are tolerated, and, despite being disliked, not actively opposed, 
nor respected.
73
. Rainer Forst uses the word tolerance for both attitudes, defining one as an 
‘allowance-conception’ (Erlaubniskonzeption) of tolerance, where a different attitude or practice is 
permitted but not liked and can also be prohibited by the will of the more powerful party; and the other 
as ‘respect-conception’ (Respektkonzeption), which describes recognition of and respect towards 
different attitudes and practices
74
.  
The interviewee in the context of tolerance being demanded by the state as an outcome of Islamic 
religious education positions this tolerance in a very different way however, as more than respect, 
when she complains that the Christian churches ‘only’ talked about respect, but did not mention 
tolerance.  
Respect seems to be something clear, logical and (in the view of the interviewee) easily granted 
towards other religions whereas tolerance (especially the demand to be tolerant) may not be as clear 
and precisely definable. There is not one clear definition of tolerance and it can even be used to 
describe different and even antagonistic views. Indeed, it might be this vaguely defined, sometimes 
inconsistent and simultaneously moralistic character of the concept of tolerance that makes it 
attractive for use in public discourse by different actors and for different purposes. For example, 
the concept of tolerance can be used to demand openness to diversity, but also the adaptation by 
minorities to the majority society by defining the acceptance of values of the majority as a sign 
of tolerance, while adhering to different values and practices is swiftly labelled ‘intolerant’.75  
In this context of the DIK and the demand of tolerance as an educational goal of Islamic religious 
education, the vague usage of the concept of tolerance seems to fit the wider discourse about Islam in 
Germany. Within the dialogue between the public representatives and the Muslim communities and 
individuals (particularly the DIK), vague ideas and concepts have been criticised by Muslim members 
who have by and large been asked to subscribe to German values, without those values being clearly 
defined (Schiffauer 2010). The refusal to accept this proposal due the ill-definition of concepts was 
then presented to the German public as the unwillingness of Muslim organisations to subscribe to 
German values (Reimann, 2007), rather than the refusal to subscribe to ideas and concepts which are 
ill-defined and thus can be used for different and even inconsistent purposes.  
The application of the tolerance conception and the insistence on tolerance from one specific religious 
minority by a national political institution, the DIK, can in consequence be perceived as the drawing of 
political borders between those that belong to the trusted in-group, and those that do not. In this case 
the Christian denominations that self-evidently determine their curricula without interference are the 
in-group, while the Muslim representatives and Islamic religious education are the out-group, having 
to establish themselves and prove their trust-worthiness. Perceived tolerance or intolerance of the 
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respective group is itself the marker of the border between the in- and the out-groups. Obviously the 
Muslim pupils are perceived as being in special need of tolerance-education and Islamic religious 
education – especially when under the supervision of the state – is perceived as one goal towards this 
end.  
The interviewee particularly criticised the unequal treatment of Christian and Muslim religious groups 
in regard to the basic right to religious freedom: 
“(…) And I think, this is alright, if they perceive themselves in this way, because this is also religious 
freedom. But that shows, we as Muslims are told, what the content has to bring about this educational 
instruction (…). This religious freedom, that we are defining the content, is actually restricted. And so 
the religious education is actually exploited for solving integration problems. (…) That is exactly the 
problem, if one says ‘the willingness of Muslims to integrate grows, if they have Islamic religious 
education’ or ‘…it is a means of increasing the integration of Muslims in this society.” (K) 
The interviewee seems to be especially disturbed by the fact that Islamic religious education is 
perceived as a means towards integration, especially as she mentions it in the context of the 
constitutionally granted right of the community to define religious content without interference, which 
she sees as under threat. The perceived political attempt to interfere in religious instruction in order to 
make Muslims conform more is possibly seen as particularly problematic as it touches upon the very 
core of minority religious identity and their basic constitutional and human rights. 
The question of Islamic religious education at public schools is extremely relevant because issues of 
representation and participation are negotiated here. In recent years Muslim communities have been 
asking for this basic legal right granted by the constitution more self-consciously and have 
simultaneously aimed to get legal recognition as religious communities. As the legal regulations 
demand a cooperation between the public institutions and the respective religious communities, one of 
the biggest problems of the implementation of the religious classes was to find the appropriate Muslim 
organization or federation with whom to design the religious education in line with the constitution, as 
hardly any organization is legally acknowledged as a religious community. 
As described above, Berlin has legal exceptions from Article 7 in the German constitution, which 
enabled one Muslim organization, the IFB, to acquire the right to give religious education at public 
schools, after several years of court cases. The focus of the court cases was the question of whether the 
IFB could be acknowledged as a religious community in the legal sense, which then automatically 
enabled it to give religious education on their own authority in any public school in which enough 
pupils wanted to take part in the elective classes. The legal situation did not entail the state providing 
religious education at public schools, but guaranteed the financial provision of the classes and the 
teachers’ salaries. Despite its having different legal situation, Berlin’s extensive experience with 
Islamic religious education may offer an example for other regions and help avoid unnecessary 
mistakes and hardships. 
To date all the different models of religious education that have been developed in the various federal 
states have been, with the exception of Berlin, labelled as transitory stages or model tests because the 
central question of a (legally accepted) religious community as partner of the state has not been finally 
resolved. In some federal states, such as Lower Saxony and North Rhine Westphalia, advisory boards 
have been created to represent the Muslim communities for want of an officially recognised religious 
community. They are designed to ensure the possibility of starting Islamic religious education even 
before the question of representation has been resolved. However, the compositions of the advisory 
boards of different federal states are different. While in Lower Saxony representatives of the Schura (a 
coalition of different Sunni Muslim communities) and Ditib (closely connected to the Turkish state) 
form this board, in North Rhine Westphalia Islamic scholars are supposed to take part in the board in 
addition to the representatives of Muslim organizations. In both federal states the regular Islamic 
religious education at public schools in the whole state has been announced for 2012, for which the 
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final regulations of the representation are crucial. It is particularly the latter regulation of the board, 
which also concerns members from outside the Muslim organizations, that is causing a major concern 
among parts of the Muslim community that their basic constitutional right to religious self-
determination could be at stake. 
Concluding Remarks  
Concerning the Islamic religious education in Berlin it can generally be concluded that on the one 
hand the teachers and their classes are appreciated by a number of schools because they are able to 
both mediate in conflicts and specific issues concerning Muslims and have a positive influence on the 
Muslim pupils and their situation within the wider school context. On the other hand the deep-routed 
scepticism towards the organization and their teachers, and partially to Islam in general, can still be 
found in certain schools. 
The fear of influence or even indoctrination by certain Muslim organizations is quite strong in the 
educational landscape of Berlin. One headmaster even told the interviewer, who wore a headscarf, that 
wearing this kind of clothing bore the “danger of being misused as a ‘liberal figurehead’” by those 
who themselves continued to oppress women. He thus saw the headscarf as a sign of the oppression of 
Muslim women, and even if this might not have been applicable to the interviewer herself, he still 
imagined some kind of Muslim organisation behind the interviewer which could use her apparently 
liberal attitude and lack of oppression to disguise their own (conservative) attitudes and goals. This 
sphere of mistrust towards religious Muslim organisations could also be observed in the case of prayer 
at school, where many interviewees held the opinion that the driving force behind the pupil was not 
only his father but a dubious religious organisation trying to enforce its own agenda, even though 
nothing of this nature that had been mentioned in any newspaper article about the case.  
With the long public debate about the Islamic Federation of Berlin and their supposedly problematic 
background, in this case a concrete focus of scepticism and even hostility had been formed which 
seems to have subsided only very slowly. It coincides with a general scepticism towards Islam as a 
whole that is actually rising in German society and not excluded from the school setting. One non-
Muslim teacher in Berlin declared:  
“The Sarrazin debate76 has mobilised forces, mobilised attitudes, that has had a worsening effect, a 
disastrous worsening effect.” (A) 
Looking at other federal states, where the provision of Islamic religious education at public schools is 
currently being developed, the crucial question will be whether a real recognition and acceptance of 
the religious organisations and their right to define the religious content of the classes will be 
achieved. This will probably be an important prerequisite for Muslim parents in accepting the Islamic 
religious education for their children and in order for the Muslim parents and children to feel accepted 
and recognised in German public schools in general, with their religious particularities.  
The other challenge seems to be the reconciliation of the different intentions of the Muslim 
organisations and the public authorities, both trying to bring Islamic education at public schools 
forward.  
The concept of tolerance tended to have an excluding function when used by public officials, with 
demands that tolerance be taught to the Muslim children (with the implication that they are intolerant). 
Muslim teachers, organisations and other actors in civil society however mainly used the concepts of 
acceptance and recognition when referring to the negotiations with the public authorities, and to the 
necessity to develop an inclusive school culture. 
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Regarding possible policy recommendations on the local level in Berlin, the Berlin Senate for 
Education together with regular schoolteachers, headmasters and representatives and teachers from the 
IFB should consider organising possibilities for encounter between the teachers of Islamic religion and 
the regular schoolteachers. One interviewee working for a school project had described her experience 
with establishing this kind of contact at one school, where a schoolteacher had asked her to talk to the 
IFB teacher because she did not dare to herself. After getting into contact with him she appreciated the 
contact. This indicates that the contact at some schools might still be poor and that prejudice still 
prevails. 
Similarly the headmasters of the public schools that offer Islamic religious education should consider 
actively integrating the IFB teachers into the school teams. This would both offer them equal 
opportunities and rights and counter hierarchical thinking between different kinds of teachers, but also 
make better use of the specific skills of the IFB teachers, such as being able to mediate between 
(religious) Muslim pupils and parents and non-Muslim pupils and teachers in potential areas of 
conflict. 
At the national and state levels the political representatives together with the representatives of 
Muslim organisations should investigate all possible ways of acknowledging the Muslim organisations 
as Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts (corporations under public law). This is a basic prerequisite 
for close cooperation with the state, similar to that enjoyed by Christian churches, and would allow for 
Islamic religious education to be the responsibility of the Muslim communities as guaranteed by the 
constitution. It would assist with dealing with other issues of religious practice that have already arisen 
or may arise in the future.  
Conclusion 
The two cases presented in this chapter both concern issues of Islam, Muslims and Muslim religious 
practice within the setting of German public schools. They differ however in many aspects. While the 
case of the prayer room mainly concerns the question of visible and lived (Muslim) religiosity within 
the general setting of the public school, the case of Islamic religious education is located on the 
margins of the public school life. It is organised and carried out by a Muslim organisation that does 
not belong to the public school setting itself, but has a kind of guest role. 
The former case concerns the question of religious freedom of the individual, in this case the 
individual student, in relation to the school, its members and the school administration. The latter case 
is more relevant for the question of the rights religious groups, specifically the right of a specific 
religious minority community to carry out religious education at public schools. It also touches upon 
the wider question of recognition of Muslim communities by the German state and the question of 
close cooperation like that has traditionally linked the state and Christian churches. 
Both cases deal with conflicts, which had eventually been negotiated before going to court. While the 
court case concerning religious education had lasted nearly 20 years and was settled some years ago, 
the case of the prayer room is still ongoing. 
Another difference is the age and status of the people involved. The IFB is a Muslim organisation of 
adult persons, many of them former immigrants, who have some access to financial resources and 
legal advice within their organisation. The Muslim pupil and his father however are individuals, the 
pupil a minor, with limited access to legal advice and financial resources. The father of the boy, who 
was the one initiating the court case, has no immigrant background, but is a converted ethnic German. 
As both cases were taken to court they can both serve to illustrate conflicts regarding Muslim 
religiosity and public schools, that were not solved with good understanding, but represent strongly 
opposing views and attitudes of the individual cases but also towards the role of (minority) religion in 
public schools in general. 
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For this reason they are both illustrative of the how different actors deal with this opposition and how 
the concepts of tolerance, acceptance and respect are applied within the debates. As Islam and 
particularly Muslim practices in school have been widely debated in Germany within recent years, 
these two cases not only illustrate the way respective actors deal with those concepts, but also how 
they are applied nationally and in wider public discourse about Muslims and Islam, specifically in 
relation to school life. 
Tolerance is probably the concept, which is used the most often in the context of (religious) diversity, 
but can be rather vague and at times paradoxical. It is used in different ways by different actors and for 
different purposes.  
In the case of the prayer room, the first court (Verwaltungsgericht) used the concept of tolerance in 
connection to respect, saying that a common prayer room for all children at school could help them to 
learn mutual tolerance and respect. The court thus referred to an understanding of tolerance that might 
best be described by the ‘respect-conception’ of tolerance (Forst 2003). This sees tolerance as a virtue 
that is mutually given by different partners, but goes beyond mere forbearance of the other towards 
respect of the other’s views and attitudes. 
The second court level (Oberverwaltungsgericht) and the Berlin Senate Administration for Education 
framed tolerance in a different way by perceiving it as too weak an instrument for securing peace at a 
diverse school. This view sees tolerance as a practice that could even lead to increased incidence of 
conflict at school, if too much (different) religious expression is tolerated. The understanding of 
tolerance is here a rather exclusive one, close to the ‘allowance-conception’ of Forst. Here one party 
has the power to tolerate the other or not, and tolerance is granted (or not) in spite of inner rejection of 
the other or his or her practices and views.
77
  
It is within this ‘allowance-conception’ of tolerance that the representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-
Foundation talks about the question of the prayer room at a Berlin school and asserts the demand of 
‘no tolerance for intolerance’. With this slogan, widely heard in the public discourse about Islam in 
Germany today, the concept of tolerance is even perceived as a threat to peace and public order, 
especially if it is applied in relation to people and groups who are perceived as not tolerant themselves. 
As Islam and Muslims are often portrayed as having intolerant attitudes and practices, from 
homophobia to misogyny and rejection of other faiths and world views, the slogan ‘no tolerance for 
intolerance’, which had traditionally been used when rejecting rightwing extremism and violence, 
turns into an agent of and justification for restrictive and illiberal views and politics towards Muslims. 
This rather intolerant effect of the concept of tolerance conforms to a new ‘principled intolerance’ of 
liberalism (Dobbernack & Modood 2012, 18f), which has been analysed in a threefold manner: The 
first modality of this new liberal intolerance is concerned with the protection of the cohesion of a 
liberal society, the second is concerned with the liberal divide between public and private and the third 
with the creation of a particular type of ‘liberal people’, who lead responsible, autonomous lives. 
Concerning the issues of the prayer room and the Islamic religious education all three modalities of 
this ‘new intolerance’ can be found in arguments and actions of different actors. 
In the case of the Islamic religious education at state schools the concept of tolerance is explicitly 
referred to by one of the Muslim teachers who quotes the DIK, the German Islam Conference, setting 
tolerance education as one of the major goals of the religious education. 
The interviewee only criticises the interference of the state with the content of the religious education, 
for which there is no provision in the constitution. She is also uncomfortable with the concept of 
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tolerance as something demanded from Islamic education only, whereas texts by Christian institutions 
regarding religious education referred to respect towards other religions but not to tolerance. 
Although respect is usually perceived as the stronger form of acknowledgement of others than 
tolerance, it is the vague and often paradoxical character of the concept of tolerance that raises the 
concern of a broader form of interference of the state into the content of the religious education. In 
contrast the concept of respect raises fewer concerns, as it can be defined more easily.  
The application of the concept of tolerance, especially in the context of the DIK, thus implies what has 
been named above as the goal of ‘protection of the cohesion of a liberal society.’ It also touches upon 
another discussion, led in the context of the DIK, about the German values to which the Muslim 
organisation should subscribe (the Leitkultur), that ensure cultural homogeneity in the face of growing 
social and religious diversity. However, there is no clear definition of these values. This also directly 
links to the third modality of the ‘new liberal intolerance’ mentioned above, which is especially 
relevant in the field of public schools: the creation of a particular type of ‘liberal’ people, who lead 
responsible, autonomous lives. As Islam and Muslim religious practice is often seen as contrary to this 
aim, one of the interests of the public institutions in the field of Islamic religious education might be – 
at least as part of the concerns of the Muslim representatives - to reform religious Muslims. Religious 
Muslim practice, such as wearing headscarves or praying in public, seems to go against the liberal 
project and could be controlled in order that they better fit the accepted individualist and somehow 
‘privatised’ model of religion. 
Another aspect of the concept of tolerance, and the border of what is tolerated, is a certain power for 
drawing social borders between the respective discourses and practices. Both tolerance and intolerance 
of certain groups and practices invoke a degree of power inequality, because the tolerating entity (in 
this case the public institutions) can always withdraw this tolerance, as tolerance is not the granting of 
a legally confirmed right but a voluntary act of ‘allowance’. Especially the invocation of tolerance of a 
presumably less tolerant individual or group – in our analyses Muslim pupils, parents and 
organisations – is a strong means of drawing boundaries in society. As Wendy Brown puts it: “Its 
invocation draws spatial boundaries of dominion and relevance, as well as moral boundaries about 
what can and cannot be accommodated within this domain” (Brown 2006, 29). 
Following the logic of the slogan ‘no tolerance for intolerance,’ the individual or group labelled as 
intolerant is quickly excluded as the non-acceptable. The definition of who and what is tolerant or 
intolerant however strongly lies with the more powerful actors in the public debate, like political 
representatives and state institutions.  
In the case of prayer rooms at schools one of the non-Muslim teachers strongly defined any kind of 
proselytising attitude or behaviour as intolerant and thus beyond the border of the acceptable. While he 
did not see the prayer in school as an act of proselytism as such and could still tolerate it, the 
representative of the Berlin Senate Administration for Education cited an Islamic scholar in defining 
the Muslim ritual prayer as an act of proselytism per se, because it was highly visible due to defined 
bodily movements and often performed in groups. This definition was among the main arguments of 
the Senate and the respective school authorities to not grant a room for prayer in public schools. 
This excluding power of the tolerance concept and discourse may be one of the reasons why neither 
Muslim individuals nor organisations in either case referred to the ideas of tolerance when claiming 
religious freedom of individual pupils, (performing the prayer at school for example) or the rights of 
minority religions (giving religious education at public schools for example).  
Similar to the Muslim pupil and his supporters who referred to religious freedom as a basic principle 
of the constitution, the Muslim organisation IFB and the other Muslim organisations trying to 
implement Islamic religious education at public schools in other federal states referred to the right to 
religious education, guaranteed in Article 7 of the constitution. 
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The application of the concept of legal rights and the aversion to the invocation of tolerance by the 
DIK in the case of the Muslim teacher can be seen as an attempt to discuss these issues as a legitimate 
part of German society and not a tolerated outsider. 
Another important argument of the Senate Administration for Education and the respective school 
administration against the provision of a prayer room was the question of the religious neutrality of the 
state and its institutions. This neutrality of the state – that had already justified the headscarf bans for 
teachers at public schools in Berlin and other federal states – was interestingly perceived differently by 
the different courts. While the first court did not see the neutrality at stake through the provision of a 
prayer room, the higher court defined the state neutrality in a more laic sense and decided that the 
provision of a room for religious purposes would interfere with the strict neutrality of the state. As 
mentioned above, the understanding of the German constitution of religious neutrality of the state is 
quite different from laic states as such as France or Turkey, but allows for close cooperation by the 
state with religious institutions and for the support of religious activity as long as no religious 
community is favoured over others as any form of state religion. 
However, the debate about Islam over the last ten years has particularly supported a kind of 
‘laicisation’ of the understanding of state neutrality and can be seen as a means to limit the Islamic 
religious expression and practice at public schools and other public institutions, something generally 
perceived as alien to German culture and values.
78
 
At a public discussion about the court case of the prayer in Berlin, Hans Michael Heinig, a professor 
for church law, explained that there were actually three alternatives debated among experts concerning 
the further development of the Staatskirchenrecht (the law affecting the church and the state) in the 
future: 
Equal treatment before the constitutional law regarding religion (Religionsverfassungsrecht) 
Hierarchisation through the privileging of the Christian denominations 
Laicisation of the religious legal order. 
The privileging of Christian denominations (as seen in the debate about Leitkultur) and the laicisation 
of the religious legal order (with the changing perception of state neutrality towards religion as 
described above as an example) are widely heard in public debates about issues of religion in general 
and Islam in particular, Heinig explains. However, in his view the option of equal treatment before the 
Religionsverfassungsrecht is by far the best option, also in terms of compatibility with EU law. 
He further states that tolerance as a concept should not feature in the legal debate. The toleration of 
people with a different faith would be only a pre-stage to religious freedom, which has already been 
secured, and as an individual virtue of the citizens it is no legal duty. He also explains however that an 
intelligent legal framework on religion could support tolerant attitudes amongst citizens and a non-
intelligent could one hinder this tolerance. 
On the other hand he called religious tolerance as a virtue an important tool of extrajudicial conflict-
management. Here he situated the connection between tolerance and religious freedom as an object of 
legal protection:  
“The more intolerant a society is, the more important the effective enforcement of religious freedom 
becomes, but also the more precarious the claim towards enforcement of the law becomes within the 
society.” (FES, Nr.38: 6)  
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Concerning the prayer case, many interviewees explained that the headmaster of the school concerned 
in Berlin had a very antagonistic attitude towards Muslim prayer at school and that the young man had 
no other option in order to secure his perceived religious right to pray at school other than going to 
court. This would support the view cited above, that the less tolerance a society – or sub-system in 
society – shows, the more important the effective enforcement of religious freedom is.  
On the other side tolerance of the prayer at school is even seen as a possible way of handling the issue 
by many of the actors who generally opposed a prayer room. It could thus be perceived as the virtue of 
the citizens, and seen as necessary for extrajudicial conflict management in society. . The moment 
however in which more than voluntary tolerance is demanded, namely the enforcement of a legal rule, 
this tolerance seems to become diminished.  
Similarly with the introduction of the religious classes of the IFB, the legal process was a necessary 
step for the IFB to reach their goal and be granted the right to teach in public schools. Despite the 
intolerant attitude of the Berlin Senate Administration towards them, once they started working in the 
public schools, which had been legally forced to accept the organisation, the Muslim teachers felt the 
effect of a compulsory ‘gritted teeth tolerance’ of the teachers and the administration towards them, 
which made them feel like an unwanted guest in someone else’s house. The enforcement of the legal 
rule – and probably also its reporting by the media – seems to have further diminished the tolerance 
towards the Muslim teachers and their work at the public schools in Berlin, at least regarding the first 
years of work. 
This shows that the concepts of intolerance, tolerance, acceptance and respect are not always unilinear, 
one following the other in openness towards difference and diversity, and that even the virtue of 
(forbearing) tolerance can on the individual basis be an important factor for a peaceful living together. 
On the structural and legal level however tolerance is not an applicable concept to the debate about the 
acknowledgement of minority religions. As Heisig explained, as the toleration of people of a different 
religion and their practices it would only be a pre-stage to religious freedom, currently one of the basic 
pillars of the German constitution. 
The lesson learnt could thus be, that tolerance of other beliefs and practices as an individual virtue 
should be supported in society, while on the structural and legal level the equal treatment of all 
religious communities should be the only goal and concept of debates. 
However both are also mutually dependent, and the equal legal position of Christianity and non-
Christian religions, namely Islam might not be at all self-evident to many Germans. As the debates of 
recent years were led by leading public figures and often implicitly or even explicitly labelled Islam as 
an alien religion outside the German Leitkultur, they strongly influenced the attitude towards Islam 
and Muslims within German society as a whole.  
In consequence the attempts of Muslim individuals or even organisations to visibly introduce Islamic 
religious practices and teachings into public schools, the heart of the education of future society, has 
been received sceptically by many people involved. This then leads to unequal treatment, 
stigmatisation and even racism towards Muslim pupils and teachers within some public schools. 
The individual attitude is thus not to be completely distinguished from structural and legal 
circumstances and debates, and especially public figures like political representatives on the local, 
regional and national level should be aware of their strong responsibility not only for equal treatment 
of all citizens and communities before the law, but also for individual attitudes and the current rising 





Chapter 3: Extending the Limits of Intolerance – The Sarrazin-Debate and its Effect on 
Members of the targeted Minority 
Introduction  
In August 2010 Thilo Sarrazin, a prominent member of the SPD (Social Democratic Party) and then 
board member of the German Federal Bank, presented his book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” 
(Germany does away with itself) and incited a major public debate. In his book he laid out views and 
data about how immigrants, in particular Muslims, allegedly threatened the future of the country with 
their supposedly lower intelligence and higher birth-rate. While some considered these arguments as 
social Darwinist and outright racist, others perceived them as a form of liberation: the breaking of a 
public taboo that had been in place for too long. Sarrazin’s book and the debate that it incited 
influenced the discourse about integration, immigrants and Muslims in Germany so strongly that a 
time ‘before’ and a time ‘after Sarrazin’ can be discerned.  
Although Sarrazin’s book was presented as a milestone in the breaking of significant taboos, the issues 
it raised in public debate and the fears connected to these issues were not new and were not discussed 
for the first time. Shortly after the reform of German citizenship law in 2000, the conservative 
politician Friedrich Merz (CDU) initiated a debate about the ‘leading culture’ of Germany 
(Leitkulturdebatte) and demanded immigrants to adapt to this particular culture, if they wanted to stay 
in Germany for good. The concept of Leitkultur – which was introduced in opposition and as an 
alternative to the idea of multiculturalism – expresses certain fears about the loss of ethnic 
homogeneity and cultural hegemony in the newly declared ‘immigration country’ 
(Einwanderungsland). 
While the Leitkulturdebatte in 2000 had still focused on immigrants in general, the concentration on 
Muslims became stronger in the following years. The majority of immigrants to Germany had long 
been Turkish labour migrants and their children, whose major identity features became religion after 
9/11: what used to be ‘Turks’ turned into ‘Muslims’ in the public perception and the ‘significant other’ 
(Schiffauer forthcoming 2013, Triandafyllidou forthcoming 2013) in German society was more and 
more perceived in religious terms. While the significance of so-called cultural difference was still 
debated as an important issue, especially in the sense that it might keep immigrants from fully 
integrating into society, religious difference was added to it and strengthened the perceived difference 
between (mainly Muslim) post-immigrant groups and majority society. 
The appearance of the Leitkulturdebatte at the moment of a major reform of German citizenship law 
was not accidental. The legal changes that would eventually lead to a different understanding of 
society, one in which immigration would be an important characteristic and majority-minority 
relations would be in flux, were heavily contested. New discourses and political measures that 
questioned the social status of Muslims and their belonging can be viewed as attempts to construct a 
significant other and a national identity that would be defined in opposition towards what this ‘other’ 
represent (Triandafyllidou forthcoming 2013). 
Societies of modern nation states are heterogeneous with regard to values, worldviews and ways of 
life. The construction of a certain group as the ‘significant other’ and as completely apart from the rest 
of society allows for collective identification in opposition to this group. As Schiffauer explains, this 
construction of the ‘significant other’ is achieved by means of a double negation (Hoffmann 1997): 
The first step is the construction of a certain group as adhering to values and practices, which are seen 
to stand in total opposition to the values and practices of the nation. In a second step, the nation and its 
values are constructed as the complete opposite of what the stigmatized group represents. In the course 
of such constructions of significant others, clear boundaries between the dominant society and 
members of the ‘otherized’ group have to be drawn. Schiffauer (forthcoming 2013) shows that 
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questions of tolerance, intolerance and especially a prevailing discourse of ‘no tolerance to 
intolerance’ play an important role in drawing these boundaries in public discourse and in political 
practice. 
In an analysis of the debate about Sarrazin’s propositions this chapter focuses on the drawing of 
boundaries in public discourse as well as on the relevance of this debate for German political practice 
and for the social reality of the targeted group. For this purpose we analyse in a first step the role of 
the media in the debate about Sarrazin and his statements, focussing on the possible effect the debate 
had on the construction of Muslims as the significant other in German public discourse. The extent of 
tolerance or intolerance towards a certain group and its members and practices arises more urgently 
where the boundaries of what counts as (in-) tolerable are more clearly drawn and defended. The 
question of (in-) tolerance arises where minorities are perceived to be strongly deviating or even 
opposing values and practices of the majority (Schiffauer forthcoming 2013). This leads us to the 
question of whether stricter boundaries that are drawn around Muslim ‘difference’ in political 
discourse also lead to heightened intolerance towards this group both in society and in politics and 
eventually to different political measurements regarding multiculturalism, integration and diversity. 
The question is, what the social and political effects of the Sarrazin debate, if any, might have been. In 
the second step of the analysis we therefore focus mainly on members of the targeted minority, on how 
the debate was perceived by them and if it changed their way of political engagement both on a local 
level and within political parties in general. 
Political participation of migrants and/or Muslims in Germany 
Membership in political parties  
Before analysing the related debate, it is important to outline the contours of political participation of 
immigrants and their descendants in Germany so as to appreciate the specific context and timing of 
these debates. Germany had long upheld a predominantly ethnic conception of citizenship excluding 
not only migrants but also following generations from naturalisation. The German citizenship law has 
been notoriously reformed in 2000 opening up citizenship to the children if migrants and also relaxing 
requirements for citizenship acquisition for the first generation. Actually the most important outcome 
of the citizenship reform laws of 2000 was the possibility for children of immigrants to acquire 
German citizenship, if they were born in Germany. However, significant numbers among immigrant 
communities in Germany are still without German nationality; they remain excluded from national 
elections and many of them (ie. non EU-nationals) are also excluded from local elections. 
Since the 1990es partner- and sub-organisations were formed for migrants within the established 
German political parties, mainly along lines of nationality such as the German Turkish Forum 
(Deutsch-Türkisches Forum DTF) close to the CDU or the Liberal Turkish-German Union (Liberal 
Türkisch-Deutsche Union) close to the liberal party FDP (Hunger, 2004 quoted by Müller-Hofstede, 
2007). However full participation within the parties is limited to German citizens. Even politicians 
from post-immigration groups, who hold German citizenship, are confronted with unequal treatment 
within the established political parties (Schmitz/Preuß, 2009). This is one of the reasons, why in 2010 
the first party founded mainly by Muslims with immigrant background, BIG (Bündnis für Innovation 
und Gerechtigkeit – Alliance for Innovation and Justice) ran for office in elections in the state of North 
Rhine Westphalia and in 2011 in Berlin.  
Membership in organisations that are perceived as extremist or Islamist by the intelligence services 
can be another reason for exclusion from political participation. For example the membership in the 
Turkish Muslim organisation IGMG (Islamic Community Milli Görüs), has been a legal obstacle to 
naturalisation for a number of Muslim immigrants, which again prevents them from being a regular 
member of a German political party (Mühe 2007). 
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The main political debates 
Apart from the different migrant organisations mentioned above, a point of major debate is the 
question of representation of religious Muslim organisations vis-à-vis the German state. This question 
is of high importance in the current developments and negotiations regarding the introduction of 
Islamic religious education in public schools in different federal states, but is also vital for the 
establishment of Islamic theological chairs at German universities and many other issues. The 
question, who is entitled to speak for all Muslims in Germany or at least for the majority, is highly 
controversial. 
Although openly religious Muslims are very rare on the political stage, even decidedly non-religious 
politicians with Muslim affiliation or simply with a family background in Muslim countries can trigger 
severe disputes as soon as they come into higher power positions. One such debate started in 2010, 
when the first politician with Turkish immigrant background, Aygül Özkan, was appointed Minister in 
the German federal state of Lower Saxony. When Özkan stated in an interview that both Christian 
crucifixes and Muslim headscarves should be banned from public schools, this statement was not 
perceived as an expression of strongly secular views, but as a Muslim onslaught on Christian 
crucifixes and religiosity (Spiegel online, 25.04.2010). The Minister was also criticised for being 
intolerant, although her arguments regarding crucifixes in school were perfectly in line with what the 
constitutional court had ruled. The blame of intolerance, which called into question the “tolerant” act 
of appointing a Muslim woman as Minister, was clearly due to her religious background.
79
 As 
Schiffauer explains, this is a good example for the “standpoint epistemology” of the concept of 
tolerance. If a statement or a practice can be tolerated or not has a lot to do with who is the actor. “The 
significant other is met with distrust, because all he represents challenges our vested opinions about 
the world” (Schiffauer forthcoming 2013). 
As a general trend, anti-Muslim views and statements have become stronger in a range of political 
parties, first of all the traditional right-wing extremist parties. In September 2009, shortly before the 
federal elections the NPD (National Democratic Party Germany) sent seemingly official letters to all 
political representatives from post-immigration groups, asking them to prepare for their return journey 
to their ‘home countries’ (Stern.de 22.09.2009). During the electoral campaigns in the Land Berlin in 
August and September 2011, the NPD heavily employed anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim slogans, 
such as “GAS geben”, which means ‘accelerating’ but literally taken means “giving gas”, thus hinting 
at the murderous practices of the National Socialists. 
Apart from such overtly racist positions, new parties have been formed lately that use the fear of 
‘Islamisation’ as their major focus of politics, while resisting their description as racist or anti-
immigrant in general. Two newly founded parties, “Die Freiheit” (Freedom) and “Bürgerbewegung 
Pro Deutschland” (People’s Movement Pro Germany), have also been running for office in Berlin in 
2011. Among their slogans has been “Wählen gehen für Thilos Thesen” (voting for Thilo’s statements) 
before the background of a crossed out mosque. The latter referred to the debate about Thilo 
Sarrazin’s book mentioned above and was changed into “Wählen gehen für zensierte Thesen” (Voting 
for censored statements) after Sarrazin was granted an injunction against the use of his name by the 
right-wing populist party. 
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Boundary drawing in German politics: the role of the Sarrazin debate 
Overview of the two parts of the debate in 2009 and 2010 
The then board member of the German Federal Bank, Thilo Sarrazin, had often been quite provocative 
in his public statements, especially with pejorative utterances about immigrants but also about socially 
deprived people. In October 2009 he had given an interview to the newspaper Lettre International, in 
which he declared: 
“The Turks conquer Germany just as the Kosovars have conquered the Kosovo: By a higher birth 
rate. I would appreciate that, if it were Eastern European Jews with an IQ 15% above the one of the 
German population.” He further said: “I do not have to accept anyone, who lives on welfare money, 
rejects this state, does not reasonably care for the education for his children and continuously 
produces new little headscarf girls.”80 (N42.de 2009) 
After a great expression of public disgust about these statements the police investigated, if they 
qualified for prosecution under the criminal act of ‘incitement of the people’ (Volksverhetzung) and 
Sarrazin offered a public excuse, saying he had not wanted to discredit any specific community. One 
year later, however, he published his book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” (German does away with 
itself), where he further elaborated the above quoted ideas into a threatening scenario of the European 
future: 
“In every country of Europe the Muslim migrants, because of their low labour participation and high 
claiming of social benefits, cause more costs for the treasury than they bring in economic surplus. 
Culturally and regarding civilisation, the societal models and moral concepts, they represent, mean a 
step backwards. Demographically the enormous fertility of Muslim migrants constitutes a threat for 
the balance of culture and civilization within aging Europe.” (Spiegel 23.08.2010) 81  
After this publication the Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel criticised the author and his statements as 
“exceedingly offending and defamatory” (Spiegel-online 25.08.2010) 82, the Federal Bank did not 
want to keep Sarrazin as a board member and even the Federal President (Bundespräsident) Christian 
Wulff intervened until the author finally voluntarily resigned from this position. The book, however, 
sold about 800,000 copies and has considerably changed political life in Germany in a number of 
significant ways, some of which will be explained in the following analysis.  
Tolerance, Intolerance and Boundary Drawing 
These quotes from Sarrazin’s book provide examples for the articulation of public fears, which lie at 
the core of the process through which boundaries of tolerable and intolerable difference in society are 
drawn (Schiffauer forthcoming 2013). The anxieties and fears that are characteristic of such debates 
generally point to the future rather than the present, which could also be observed in Sarrazin’s 
rhetoric. It is less the present conditions of society but rather future scenarios of catastrophic collapse 
that are predicted. 
Schiffauer distinguishes between anxieties, fears and concerns regarding the ‘significant other’. 
Different from concerns and fears, in his view anxieties are “emotions, which are little grounded in 
empirical evidence but are strongly imaginative. They often result in moral panic and are hardly open 
to argument.” (Schiffauer forthcoming 2013). The dynamics of boundary definition in the case that we 
have studied here strongly draw on emotions rather than the rational evaluation of facts. For this 
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reason it seems that a rational or scientific refutation of Sarrazin’s ideas, statements and figures might 
not have the desired effect since their appeal is not primarily based on rational fact.
83
 
Processes of boundary drawing are strongly determined by the different types and strengths of those 
anxieties, fears and/or concerns. The less those discourses are open to rational argumentation and the 
more anxiety they produce, the more likely they are to produce strong and impenetrable boundaries. 
The result of such boundaries, which draw on anxieties about Muslims as biologically inferior and 
demographically dangerous ‘underachievers’, is a tendency to intolerant attitudes towards the group in 
question. 
Many of the character traits and vices attributed to this group represented the exact opposite of the 
ideal German citizen. This included portrayals of Muslims as essentially homophobic, anti-Semitic, 
misogynist, anti-democratic, backward, anti-modernist and drawn to violence and criminality. Such 
processes of demarcation could not be successfully challenged by a counter-discourse that would alert 
to the rising intolerance in German society. Rather the double negation process that Schiffauer 
describes was discernible in this case: Muslims were successfully constructed as the significant other 
to German society and, then, all the attributes that this society holds negative were projected onto 
them. At the same time, those that subscribe to this construction could also perceive themselves as 
being the opposite of what they attribute to the significant other: democratic, modern, peaceful and 
tolerant, rather than homophobic, anti-Semitic and misogynist. 
These ideas and debates are not specific to the German context but have been similarly developing in 
other European countries, which points to the same process of the construction of a European identity 
by the help of constructing a significant other. Especially at the peak time of European enlargement 
from the year 2000 onwards the question of the common identity of all the old and new European 
states arose strongly. Like on the national level also on the European level, the construction of Islam 
and Muslims as the significant other helped to construct a common European identity by defining its 
absolute other while at the same time playing on fear about this other ‘taking over’ by imposing itself 
on the majority societies. This feared development was widely referred to as Islamisation, a term 
rarely defined but prone to capture all kinds of collective fears. Thilo Sarrazin is only continuing on 
this line of thought, but he went further than demanding a ‘leading culture’, which had been called for 
earlier by different public officials. Sarrazin instead explained that Muslim immigrants were per se 
less intelligent and less productive than other social groups and even other immigrants. Thus, rather 
than demanding their integration, he denied not only their willingness but mainly their ability to 
integrate. He than touched upon the fear of a changing composition of the social body in general and 
Islamisation in particular by explaining, that (less intelligent) Muslims were very procreative while 
(more intelligent) educated ethnic Germans were not procreative enough in order to prevent the 
Muslims from future domination. Thus an anxiety is mobilized in which the other is seen as 
unchangeably and dangerously different. The question that arises and is explored in this chapter is 
whether and how this new anxiety is accompanied by a new quality of intolerance in practice. 
The case of Sarrazin’s book, together with parts of the following discourse, is one of heightened and 
wide-spread intolerance and even one that uses the concept of tolerance in an excluding manner by 
cautioning against a ‘wrong kind of tolerance’. Even the Federal Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who had 
criticized Sarrazin’s statements directly after the book was published, declared in October 2010 that  
‘Multukulti’ had failed (Spiegel.de 16.10.2010). She explained her view saying, that integration could 
be enabled through supporting and demanding (fördern und fordern), but the demanding had been too 
weak in the past. Some months later in February 2011 the British Premier David Cameron explicitly 
supported Merkel’s analysis of multiculturalism as having failed and explicitly named a wrong kind of 
                                                     
83
 The political scientist Dr. Naika Foroutan and members of her research project Heymat (Hybride europäisch-muslimische 
Identitätsmodelle) at the Humboldt-Universität Berlin has collected a lot of scientific evidence from different surveys in 
order to prove Sarrzin’s theses about Muslims in Germany wrong. This countering of his ideas on a scientific level has 
however not shown great response within the pubilc debate. (Foroutan 2010) 
Tolerance-Discourses in Germany 
How Muslims are constructed as national others 
 
69 
tolerance to be one of the main reasons for it. Tolerance in these debates is thus framed as the problem 
rather than the solution for increasing social diversity. 
As described above the notion of ‘no tolerance for intolerance’ emerged in Germany mainly after 
World War II and the Nazi era, where the tolerant weakness of the Weimar Republic towards its 
enemies was seen to have led to the worst case of intolerance ever imagined. Regarding the ability of a 
society to defend itself against the enemies of tolerance, the refusal to ‘tolerate intolerance’ is thus 
perceived as a logical and healthy attitude. However, as Schiffauer points out, a problem arises when 
the discourse changes from not accepting intolerance to not accepting the intolerant. This is when 
particular social groups or individuals are suspected of being essentially intolerant. Even if the group 
in question does not hold the intolerant view in reality or at the current moment it can still be 
suspected of potentially adopting in the future or of concealing its intolerance. The effect of such 
constructions is the growing tendency to draw the boundary between “us” and “them along lines of 
“tolerance” and “intolerance”. It is important to highlight how difficult it is to resist this stigma of 
intolerance; suspicions persist and can never be fully defeated, as even the public demonstration of 
tolerance cannot dispel anxieties about alleged views that are held privately or in secret. 
The Sarrazin debate thus seems to provide good examples for examining these processes of boundary 
drawing that are supported by, and strongly intertwined with, the discourse and practice of (in-) 
tolerance. Tolerance according to this logic is seen to constitute a danger to social peace and becomes 
necessary to safeguard peace, with the effect, that social and political practice tend toward stronger 
intolerance rather than tolerance towards specific groups in society. 
The main interests of the following analysis lie in the questions whether the Sarrazin debate and 
related debates have shifted German public discourse towards more or less tolerance of diversity, 
especially towards Muslims and how this affected members of the targeted minority. Has the overall 
effect of the debate been to make intolerance towards a specific minority more socially acceptable? 
And how does this changed acceptability of intolerance or intolerant speech affect the people 
involved? 
Methodology 
This study examines the development of the Sarrazin debate as well as the way in which members of 
the targeted minority have perceived it. Its analytical frame is the aforementioned interest in discursive 
mechanisms of boundary drawing and the construction of a significant other. The study seeks to 
collect insight into these mechanisms as well as their effects on changing (in-) tolerance towards 
Muslims in Germany and Europe. 
The analysis is split into two parts: Part 1 consists of a short discourse analysis of two major national 
newspapers that reflect two rather opposite sides within mainstream discourse: Die Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (SZ) is a daily newspaper, which is published in the south of Germany, but is one of the 
biggest national newspapers for its popularity and range of readers. The SZ is perceived as rather left 
liberal in its opinions, while Die Welt, a national daily belonging to the Axel Springer AG, is regarded 
as reflecting the conservative spectrum. The media analysis itself is again divided into the time after 
the publication of the interview with Sarrazin in the magazine Lettre International, that had already 
caused a debate about him and his views in 2009 and the time after the publication of his book 
“Deutschland schafft sich ab”, when a wide-ranging debate about integration, migration, Muslims and 
other topics started. The analysis encompasses 54 articles, published between the 30
th
 of September 
and the 20th of November 2009 and 74 articles, published between 23
rd
 of August and the 9
th
 of 
November 2009 and some later articles that were of relevance for the analysis. 
Part two of the analysis deals with the perception of an dealing with the aforementioned debate by 
members of the targeted minority groups and consists of 6 expert interviews and one group discussion 
with 6 further participants. The chosen experts were people who were active either in party politics or 
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in civil society organisations. In order to gather knowledge about the possible effects of the debate, we 
chose interview partners, that had significant contact with the Muslim community, such as Lydia 
Nofal, the project leader of a network against the discrimination of Muslims; or respondents that were 
active within local politics and/or dealt with the issues on an academic level, such as Yasemin 
Shooman, who works on anti-Muslim racism at the Centre for the research on anti-Semitism (Zentrum 
für Antisemitismus-forschung ZfA). Apart from one interviewee all were part of the Muslim 
community themselves. Some of them are mentioned by name and organisations; others wanted to 
stay anonymous and are thus mentioned with their major field of activity. 
The group discussion was held with a group of young Muslims, who had invited Thilo Sarrazin in 
order to meet the person behind the arguments and personally discuss his views. They were 
participants of a dialogue project at their school that was initiated by the Federal Agency for Political 
Education and the Bosch Foundation and aimed at raising political awareness, political participation 
and counter extremism with young Muslims. Within this course, with the support of two group 
leaders, the young people decided to invite the author after his first interview in the magazine Lettre 
International. The latter accepted the invitation and met the young Muslims at the peak time of the 
debate about his book. The group discussion was held with 5 young Muslims and one of the group 
leaders, while the other group leader was one of the individually interviewed experts. 
While the media analysis focuses on the public discourse around the publication of Sarrazin’s theses, 
the interviews were rather centred on how his positions were experienced, debated and perceived 
within the targeted community. While the former is analysed using the method of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (e.g. Ruth Wodak 2007), the latter were carried out as problem-centered interviews, a method 
of qualitative social science for gathering and analysing data of interviewees (e.g. Witzel 1982). This 
method mainly focuses on the interviewees’ common perceptions of a stated problem as well as on 
their different reactions to this problem. The interviews were conducted on the basis of a semi-
structured interview guideline, which helped to both focus on the specific topic/problem in question 
while leaving the process of the interview open for individual issues and thoughts of the different 
interviewees. 
Media-analysis of the Sarrazin debate and its role in the construction of the significant other 
The first phase of the debate after the interview in Lettre International in 2009 
Throughout his career the former Berlin Senator for Finances, Thilo Sarrazin, had often attracted 
attention with provocative statements towards vulnerable groups in society, among them mainly 
people depending on welfare and immigrants. In September 2009 he gave an interview to the 
magazine “Lettre International” titled “Klasse statt Masse. Von der Hauptstadt der Transferleistungen 
zur Metropole der Eliten.” (Not mass but class. From the capital of aid money to the metropolis of 
elites.) As the title suggests, this interview mainly turned around questions of economic capacity of 
citizens, among them also immigrants. One of the major quotes from the interview that was repeated 
in almost all newspapers was the following:  
 “I don’t have to accept anybody, who lives on state support, rejects this state, does not care for the 
education of his children adequately and continuously produces new little headscarf girls.”  
Less noted in the following media articles was the following sentence targeting poor Germans:  
“The same holds true for a part of the German underclass (…)”  
or the one, already pointing at his later ideas of reproduction and intelligence:  
“There is also the problem, that forty percent of all births are happing in the underclass.”  
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Sarrazin presents two major groups in society as possible others from the viewpoint of the white, 
prosperous middle and upper classes: People who are less economically productive, on the one hand, 
and immigrants/Muslims, on the other. The reason why the following discussion focuses on the latter, 
while the former is largely ignored, is the fact that the ideas about Muslims were built on already 
existing tropes and stereotypes regarding their position as the significant other in society. The same is 
not true for the statements about poor people, mainly because they generally belong to the “In-Group”. 
This is the case at least as long as they do not belong to a post-immigration group as well, which 
would then make them part of the “Out-Group” that is mainly defined by its (alleged) ethno-religious 
background. 
Schiffauer (2013 forthcoming) defines four major tropes within public discourses that belong to 
different political spheres, but all contribute to the construction of Muslims as the significant other in 
society, mainly through the anxieties that they help to raise. Since all of them could be found already 
within the first quoted statement of Sarrazin, they shall be shortly explained: 
The “master-in-your-own-house”-trope refers to the fear of demographic change that goes hand in 
hand with religious domination or “Islamisation”. Anxieties about higher birth rates of 
immigrants/Muslims and their religious practices, such as the visibility of mosques, contribute to this 
trope. 
The “social cohesion“-trope is concerned with the presence of “too much” difference, which is seen to 
eventually lead to social conflict. An important concept in German discourse is the idea of “parallel 
societies“ (Parallelgesellschaften), which are seen to undermine common values and the cohesion of 
society. 
The “regression“-trope refers to the danger of seemingly backward beliefs and practices that are 
associated with Islam and which are seen to endanger progress that has been achieved but is now 
turned back. One major field of this trope is the emancipation of women but also the very presence of 
deep religiosity in allegedly secular contexts. 
The “social responsibility“-trope deals with the idea that multiculturalism has been too blind towards 
problems with certain social groups, mainly the Muslim community, which leads to abuses of the 
rights of women or children within this group. To not tolerate certain practices is perceived as a social 
responsibility that is owed individuals within such groups.  
While the first two tropes are rather associated with the right-wing political discourse, the third and 
fourth trope are mainly used by leftwing groups in politics and civil society. The political demands 
derived from them are however often very similar. 
With the beginning of the sentence quoted above: “I don’t have to accept anybody, who…” Sarrazin 
frames the debate with a claim about the conditions of acceptance in German society. The “I” can be 
seen to refer to his own person but equally appears to represent the position of the majority in German 
society, mainly the white middle and upper classes, that are in the power to accept or not accept and 
which he harshly differentiates from two other groups in society – poor people and 
immigrants/Muslims – that don’t have the power to accept or reject and are in the inferior power 
position compared to the speaker. 
The conditions leading to non-acceptance are then listed in the quote (“…who lives on state support, 
rejects this state, does not care for the education of his children adequately and continuously produces 
new little headscarf girls”). They include living on welfare money, intolerant/undemocratic attitudes, 
lack of interest in and success within education, having too many children and being backward and/or 
visibly religious especially Muslims. With intolerant/undemocratic attitudes and the production of 
“headscarf girls” two different areas of “backwardness” regarding Muslims are pointed out. By stating 
that they reject the state, the logical conclusion of non-acceptance is already implied, following the 
idea of “no tolerance towards intolerance”. It draws on anxiety about a weak and overly tolerant 
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society that cannot defend itself and its values. It also raises the idea of backwardness, of 
undemocratic ideas, that bear the danger of destabilising German democracy and thus should not to be 
tolerated. The “headscarf girls”, especially for how they are “continuously produced”, dehumanises 
Muslim women and invokes their alleged lack of emancipation in relation to oppressive male 
counterparts. This draws on stereotypes that are frequently reiterated in the so-called ‘headscarf 
debates’ in which “educated, liberal, non-religious” modernists (even with Muslim background) are 
separated from “backward, un-educated, religious” traditionalists. Without even mentioning these 
debates, the reference is made through allusions, a widely used strategy to achieve agreement on an 
emotional level without referring to rational deliberations. This image however also refers to the 
“social responsibility”-trope and to the “liberation” of these girls and women from their oppressive 
cultural, religious and familiar surrounding, which has been a strong argument within the debate on 
Islam in Germany over the last several years. 
This single sentence thus illustrates the efficacy of tropes that are well known and have a considerable 
social resonance. Different people might associate different aspects with such speech acts and as such 
they not only avoid long and difficult rational arguments but also raise emotional reactions and allow 
for agreements on the basis of shared anxieties to be more easily achieved. 
First reactions to the publication of the interview were critical and many politicians rejected Sarrazin’s 
positions. Axel Weber, the president of the Federal Bank, where Sarrazin had a position on the 
executive board, distanced himself from “content and form of the discriminating statements” (Schulz 
2009).  The trade union ver.di demanded his dismissal from the Federal Bank, the local SPD 
association of the Berlin district Pankow initiated internal proceedings against him, the Berlin state 
attorney examined the interview with a view to a charge of incitement and the chairman of the Central 
Council of Jews accused Sarrazin of demagoguery and closeness to the National Socialism of Hitler 
(Sueddeutsche.de 09.10.2009). Sarrazin reacted to this criticism by stating that “not all the 
expressions in the interview had been well chosen.” His intention had been to describe problems of 
Berlin but not to discriminate against ethnic groups (welt-online, 01.10.2009). 
The Federal Bank finally decided to keep Sarrazin on the board but to take away some of his 
responsibilities. Following this decision first voices could be heard claiming that Sarrazin’s freedom of 
opinion had been infringed if he would need to fear for his position in the bank. Also both newspapers 
analysed in this study in the following days and weeks featured more and more voices of public 




“His choice of words (“Headscarf-Girls”; “Turkish warm rooms84) felt offensive not only for 
foreigners. Regarding the content hardly anybody contradicts him – And how could one?” (Clauß 
05.10.2009). Support of Sarrazin’s ideas is now more often linked to the criticism of ‘political 
correctness’ or ‘Gutmenschentum’ and expression for starry-eyed idealists not dealing with reality in 
the necessary way. In articles of SZ among others the author Ralph Giordano is quoted: “Sarrazin 
describes (…) reality how it is and not how it has been presented by political correctness for many 
years”. The minister for integration of North-Rhine Westphalia Armin Laschet also criticised 
Sarrazin’s choice of words but supported him in the content of the interview and took this debate as an 
opportunity to demand the establishment of a Federal Ministry for Integration, because it seemed 
obvious that many people were interested in the topic. (Sueddeutsche.de 14.10.2009) 
This frequent movement between half-supporting and half-rejecting Sarrazin’s ideas is a good 
example for how the debate was generally instrumentalized in order to acquire support for political 
demands or political power. It could be well observed throughout the Sarrazin debate. 
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 “Wärmestube” is an expression for warm rooms for homeless people, which Sarrazin used regarding Turkish elder men 
meeting in specific cafés. 
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On the other hand many articles provided counterexamples of Sarrazin’s characterisation of Muslims, 
Turks and their allegedly inferior educational and professional performance. Many voices could be 
heard from German-Turkish people, trying to show a ‘different picture’ by explaining that not all 
Turks were as Sarrazin described them: many were well integrated and well performing in society. 
This presentation of Turks and/or Muslims by both Turkish and German journalists however does not 
address the construction of Muslims as the significant other to German society. It remains within the 
same logic of boundary drawing and only tries to draw them somewhat differently, as the 
characteristics ascribed to the Muslim other are not questioned or even deconstructed. They are left 
untouched in principle and, in fact, another boundary is drawn between significant others and those 
Muslims that qualify as part of the in-group since their characteristics are sufficiently similar to those 
that the German majority ascribes to itself. It is essentially a differentiation between the “good” and 
the “bad” Muslim, which leaves the strong boundary towards the “bad ones” untouched. And even the 
status of the “good” others is fragile, as they remain others, not part of the dominant group, and are 
thus continue to face the risk of having tolerance withdrawn at a later point. 
The whole debate in the end has turned from a discussion about Sarrazin and if and how he should be 
dealt with (‘tolerated’) by the Federal Bank, the SPD and also by the state attorney, into one about 
integration and the perceived lack of willingness to integrate perceived with Muslim immigrants. In 
the following the possible political instruments against this lack of integration are discussed such as 
the creation of a Ministry for Integration, shortening of social money or further restriction of 
immigration. 
Already in the interview Sarrazin had stated, that “Integration is an achievement of the one who 
integrates” and clearly rejected the suggestion of the interviewer that politics should be held 
accountable for integration too. On the other hand he stated that certain groups, namely Turks and 
Arabs, were to a large extent not only not willing, but not able to integrate. This understanding of 
integration was in the following discussion more and more the basis for the discussion: rather as a duty 
of the immigrants themselves than as a duty of the state institutions to provide equal chances and 
counter discrimination. Although Sarrazin was blamed for discrimination and racism by several public 
figures and institutions, such as the German Institute for Human Rights or the trade union ver.di, in the 
following weeks the debate did not focus on these issues any more.  
This development of the debate is probably a result of how the aforementioned tropes further 
reinforced Muslims as the other. Sarrazin had touched upon these motifs and significant parts of the 
German population could connect with them at the time of the interview. The question of racism 
within German society  – following a representative EMNID survey about 51% of the population 
supported Sarrazin – is not yet widely debated.  
The second phase of the debate after the publication of the book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” in 2010 
Some months later, in late August 2010, Sarrazin published a whole book about the statements of his 
interview, entitled “Germany does away with itself.” With the help of a broad range of statistics and 
quotes of different researchers he took his former ideas even further and developed a future scenario of 
a German population not only being taken over by more reproductive immigrants but also becoming 
mentally poorer through this development, as the respective Muslim groups were hereditarily less 
intelligent. 
Both the weekly “Der Spiegel” and the tabloid “BILD” had published long passages of the book 
shortly before its actual publishing date without any accompanying comments. 
Similarly to the first part of the debate the main reaction in the first days was strong opposition to 
Sarrazin’s ideas and even disgust. The Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel was quoted with a criticism 
that was perceived as a strong official intervention stating that the book contained wording “that can 
only be offensive for many people in this country, that are defaming (…) and that are not at all helpful 
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with the big national task in this country to progress with integration.” (Kamann 26.08.2010). The 
chairman of the SPD, Sigmar Gabriel, suggested that Sarrazin should leave the party because his ideas 
were not in line with it any more, and announced a detailed analysis of the book, especially of whether 
Sarrazin assigned character traits to specific ethnic groups and thus could be accused of racism. 
Leading figures of the NPD, the rightwing extremist party of Germany, praised the book and signalled 
the wish to discuss possible cooperation with Sarrazin in the future. 
The Federal Bank this time decided to dismiss Sarrazin from the executive board, alleging that he had 
damaged the reputation of the institution. Similarly as in the previous year, right after the decision of 
the Federal Bank a wave of outrage was followed by a debate about freedom of expression and voices 
arose that portrayed the author more and more as a courageous breaker of taboos and a victim of the 
political correctness of the political elite. Interestingly his own strong elitism did not prevent him from 
becoming an idol for a broad range of German citizens feeling oppressed by a perceived elitist 
discourse of political correctness. The image of Sarrazin as the one who speaks for the people has been 
expressed by the media scientist Norbert Bolz in a TV talk show on the 5
th
 of September 2010: 
“The crucial point is that the people are no longer willing to be forbidden from speaking by the 




The fact that Sarrazin became the voice of the masses although he clearly favoured an elitist social 
model and the social exclusion of economically less productive people is a clear sign that the author 
and the debate fulfil a function that works quite independently from the actual content of the book. As 
pointed out above, the discourse of othering through the invocation of anxieties is highly irrational and 
hardly reached by rational deliberation. The function of this othering of Muslims for strengthening 
national German identity and defining its boundaries becomes clearer when we follow the 
development of the debate further. Many surveys have been conducted, that found a high support of 
Sarrazin’s ideas within the German population.86 Especially the question, who was accountable for the 
alleged failure of integration, was answered by a significant majority in the same way as by Sarrazin: 
migrants are responsible for their own integration (N24.de 01.09.2010)
87
. This attitude of the German 
majority was one of the major factors turning the debate and causing many politicians to show 
stronger understanding for the ideas of Sarrazin and especially for “the fears of the population”, a 
widely suggested reason for the strong support of Sarrazin in society. 
Also within ‘out-groups’ certain fears were raised by the Sarrazin-debate, namely the fears of 
increasing discrimination, racism and social exclusion. As these fears are not perceived as dangerous 
for the “we-group” they are hardly given voice in media and politics. This caused a group of Muslim 
intellectuals to write an open letter to the Federal President Christian Wulff on the 13
th
 of September 
2010 in which they described the fears of many Muslims and other people with immigration 
background. The letter included an account of everyday situation of discrimination, of having to deal 
with offensive attitudes and stereotypes about themselves such as in education and work, and the 
growing hostility of their co-citizens. They thus asked Wulff to “advocate and publicly promote the 
principles of an open democratic culture that is characterised by mutual respect.” (taz.de 13.09.2010) 
This letter might have been one of the reasons why the Federal President decided to deal with the 
issues of integration and social diversity in his speech on 3
rd
 October 2010, the day of German unity. 
He asked the population to reject offenses against people of foreign origin and, after focussing on 
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 An EMNID survey from the 1st and 2nd of September 2010 found, that 62% of the interviewees affirmed the question: 
“Does Thilo Sarrazin in your opinion give qualified food for thought with his utterances about migrants?”. 31% affirmed 
the question: “Do you share the view, that Germany will become more stupid by an uncontrolled immigration?”;   
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 An EMNID-survey of the 30th of August 2010 found, that 56% of 1000 interviewees held migrants responsible for their 
own integration, while only 11 % thought, that mainly Germans were responsible for the difficulties in integration.  
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Judeo-Christian history of the country, he added: “but Islam by now also belongs to Germany.” In the 
same speech Wulff also mentioned that belonging to Germany had to be conditional upon acceptance 
of the constitution and common rules. “Who does not do that, who despises our country and its values, 
has to count on a determined defence of everybody in our country.” (Focus-online 03.10.2010)  
Wulff’s quite unspectacular statement caused a huge wave of political objection. One of the strongest 
was the 7-point plan on integration issued by the CSU chairman and Minister-President of Bavaria 
Horst Seehofer, who directly connected his position to Sarrazin’s statements, demanding for example 
to add the criteria of “willingness and ability to integrate” as another prerequisite for immigration 
besides qualification and demanded strict sanctions for those who refuse integration. He stressed that 
Germany was “no immigration country”, although this political line of denial had finally and officially 
been abandoned about ten years earlier. He also demanded to stop immigration from “foreign cultural 
spheres” (welt-online 16.10.2010). The general secretary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany 
heavily criticised Seehofer and remarked that mainstream politicians clearly felt less and less 
inhibition to catch votes with Xenophobic statements. He argued that they were thereby endangering 
social peace. 
Angela Merkel (CDU) directly backed Seehofer when she publicly remarked that the efforts to 
construct a multicultural society had failed in Germany: “This approach has failed, absolutely failed.” 
She added that in the past society had demanded not enough from immigrants and further spoke about 
their lack of command of the German language, about forced marriages, the necessity for immigrant 
girls to participate in school trips and the necessity to quickly convict criminals. She however also 
supported the Federal President, in saying, “Islam is a part of Germany – This is not only to be 
observed in the footballer Özil” (Sueddeutsche.de 16.10.2010) 
It can be observed that after several weeks the debate about integration was now solidly connected to 
issues to do with Islam and Muslims and to the question of German “Leitkultur” (leading culture). 
This term was now increasingly also used by leftist politicians even though it had traditionally been a 
concept of conservative parties like the CDU. The Social Democrat chairman, Sigmar Gabriel, and 
others defined Leitkultur as the common values of the constitution, the rule of law and the inviolable 
dignity of human beings. Still the question remains why the chairman of the SPD, a party that had 
always rejected the concept of Leitkultur, now used a term that evokes a hierarchy of cultures in 
society. The answer might be found in the efficacy of discourses that constructed Muslims as the 
significant other and which generally drew the boundaries of toleration, the borders of in- and out-
groups, narrower. This would also be supported by the turn of Merkel who had shown utter disgust 
towards the statements of Sarrazin, but shortly afterwards declared multiculturalism to have failed. 
Also Sigmar Gabriel, SPD party leader, who had initially urged Sarrazin to quit the SPD because of 
his racist ideas, some weeks later in a long article in the German weekly “Die Zeit”, supported a 
number of major points that Sarrazin had made about integration before criticising “Sarrazin’s 
hopeless idea of man”: 
“There are parallel societies where Sharia is more important than the constitution. There are hate 
preachers and a significantly higher criminality. And there is also lack of education and refusal of 
education. (…) the highly visible problems don’t only originate from the failure of the German society 
and its politics to integrate, but also from considerable refusal by many migrants to integrate. 
Therefore there is no reason to criticise Thilo Sarrazin and others, when they denounce a lack of 
willingness to integrate.” (Gabriel 15.09.2010)88  
The statements about the so-called parallel societies did not need to be proven by evidence, since they 
touched upon deep-seated ideas about Muslims as the other in society and were thus not likely to be 
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 The original title of Sigmar Gabriel’s article “Welch hoffnungsloses Menschenbild” (What hopeless idea of man), had 
been “Anleitung zur Menschenzucht” (Guide for breeding of human beings), but was changed by the weekly “Die Zeit”, 
translation by author.  
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heavily criticised by Gabriel’s audience. His comments however both seemed to criticise the extreme 
ideas of Sarrazin and at the same time still helped to draw the boundaries towards the other and thus 
identify the “in-group” as reasonable, well educated and distant to criminality and violence. 
Like Gabriel, even those opposing Sarrazin often used their criticism to propose their own stereotypes 
about Muslims and immigrants. A frequent demand for more integration was made, postulating the 
lack of integration as the major cause of socio-political problems, an assessment that had caused 
Sarrazin to write his book. The major reasons for Sarrazin’s ideas were thus not seen in his social 
Darwinist mindset or racist attitudes, which he had proposed one year earlier in the widely debated 
interview in “Lettre International”, but in the lacking willingness of immigrants/Muslims to integrate 
into German society and the failure of national politics to not strictly demand integration and 
adaptation in the past.  
Another function of a clearly defined other in society and the negative stereotyping of this group can 
be observed here: Instead of questioning official political decisions and practices regarding the 
integration and inclusion of immigrants, the blaming of the other distracts from this political 
responsibility. One leading article in the Welt, after providing an exhaustive list of all the problems 
that Muslims caused, asked: “Is this not a good reason for displaying more than just disinterested 
tolerance towards immigrants?” (Held 09.09.2010) 
The author here uses a widely available trope of “too much tolerance” that was seen to have been 
practiced towards immigrants. Significant social problems are seen to result from the fact that 
immigrants had not been forced strongly enough to integrate and adapt to the values of their host 
country. The addition of “disinterested” tolerance addresses the alleged need for strict demands 
towards the ‘other’ that requires interested concern.  
What this alternative relationship with Muslims/immigrants (different from “disinterested tolerance”) 
could look like, is illustrated by Chancellor Merkel, as quoted in the Welt article “Kanzlerin fordert 
mehr Anstrengung bei der Integration” (Chancellor demands more effort with integration). Although 
Merkel refers to statements by Sarrazin as “nonsense” that she cannot “accept” because “whole groups 
in our society feel hurt by it”, she criticised that “in many Muslim families, women and girls still have 
to submit” and demanded from immigrants to “learn German and stick to the German laws” (welt-
online 04.09.2010). Using the (rather left-wing) trope of social responsibility towards members of the 
immigrant community, the Chancellor in this quote clearly draws the boundaries of toleration in 
relation to language learning and female emancipation. 
Although Merkel seems to protect immigrants from Sarrazin’s attacks, at the same time she reinforces 
widely held stereotypes about Muslim women, which she can even support by distinguishing them 
from Sarrazin’s more extreme views, making them seem less severe. By asking a whole group to 
comply with the law, she postulates a general criminal tendency among immigrants and supports an 
overall suspicion and higher caution towards this specific social group. While criticising Sarrazin’s 
generalisation and degradation of this social group, she does the same with different words. Within 
this quote the trope of backwardness of Muslims – especially in the submission of Muslim women - 
comes together with the “social-responsibility”-trope that aims at helping those oppressed ones. Both 
coincide with more restrictive boundaries that are drawn towards Muslim others and are reflected in 
political demands, such as the demand to integrate. 
The dichotomy between insiders and outsiders was hardly ever challenged in the whole debate. 
Indeed, it was reinforced by a growing conviction that immigrants were mainly culpable for various 
shortcomings and social problems. The concept of ‘integration’ was hardly ever challenged at all and 
mainly interpreted as ‘assimilation’: the idea that a minority, that is distinct from the majority, would 
need to adapt itself. This understanding corresponds to the process of ‘other’-construction and 
boundary drawing that we have identified above. If a group is understood as essentially different from 
the majority with regard to its norms and practices, it consequently has to be strongly differentiated 
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from the majority and its adaptation to the dominant values has to be closely monitored and enforced, 
if necessary, by applying political and social pressure. 
Analysis of the effects of the Sarrazin debate 
Extending the limits of (in-) tolerance 
After analysing the construction of Muslims as significant others within the Sarrazin debate, the 
question remains how pressures, that emerged as a result of more narrowly drawn boundaries towards 
a specific social group, were perceived by its members and how they dealt with this experience. 
Although we consider one particular debate, we can make some more general observations regarding 
the effects of the construction of significant others in society. 
For doing so we interviewed different experts, most of which had some type of Muslim background, 
and a political group of young Muslims who had invited Thilo Sarrrazin in order to personally discuss 
his views about them. In order to gather knowledge about the possible effects of the debate on 
members of the targeted community, we chose experts as interview partners who had significant levels 
of contact with the Muslim community, such as the project leader of a network against Islamophobia, 
or actors that were active within party politics and/or dealt with the issues on an academic level. 
One of the major outcomes of the analysis of the media discourse above has been that even most of 
Sarrazin’s critics supported many of his statements but mainly criticised the way he presented them. 
As the discourse had largely been presented as one of integration, rather than one of discrimination 
and racism, most public officials who countered his statements, also had to make sure that they were 
not seen as “starry-eyed” idealists and ignorant towards the problems of integration and migration. It 
seems that some actors sought to pre-empt this characterisation and thus often added some type of 
criticism towards immigrants and/or Muslims to their criticism of Sarrazin’s book. 
Accordingly, many of the interviewed experts and participants in the Muslim political youth group 
remarked that limits of what could legitimately be said about Muslims in public discourse had been 
shifted. Some explained, for example, that the tone of everyday encounters on the street had changed 
and that more and more people felt entitled to openly articulate their discontent with immigrants 
and/or Muslims or to comment upon visible aspects of their ‘otherness’. Lydia Nofal, leader of a 
network against Islamophobia in Berlin, spoke about the daily experiences of one of her colleagues 
with an Arabic background who had raised her children bilingually and sometimes talked to them in 
Arabic: 
“She tells me that now she is permanently addressed in the bus by elderly women who say ‘we were in 
Germany here’ and that she would have to talk German. Everybody feels entitled and even obliged to 
address her in the name of integration and to remind her that she would kindly have to talk German 
with her children.(…) This woman is surely much more educated than those who address her like 
that.”89 
One major effect of the construction of Muslims as the significant others in Germany can be observed 
within this quote. By speaking Arabic with her child, the woman – although well educated – is 
perceived as belonging to a ‘problematic’ population, which is largely defined for their lack of 
‘integration’. The image of this group of others has become so strong in society that nobody, elderly 
ladies or otherwise, doubts its truth and acts upon this belief, such as by reprimanding those that are 
visibly ‘outsiders’. Besides this defining power of the othering discourse we can also observe how it 
devalues those it targets: although meeting her for the first time and on a public bus, the elderly ladies 
                                                     
89
 Expert interview with Lydia Nofal 
Nina Mühe 
78 
perceive themselves as part of the “in-group” and thus as naturally entitled to tell others, defined as 
part of the “out-group” by her language, what to do. 
Yasemin Shooman, another interviewed expert and PHD candidate at the Centre for Research on anti-
Semitism, who observes anti-Muslim internet blogs, states that Sarrazin was perceived as a folk hero 
(Volksheld) within rightwing populist and anti-Muslim webpages that strongly refer to his ideas and 
statements. The newly founded political party “Die Freiheit” (Freedom) mobilized with reference to 
Sarrazin during their election campaign in Berlin: campaign adverts were titled “Wählen gehen für 
Thilos Thesen” (Go and vote for Thilo’s statements) and displayed underneath the image of a crossed-
out mosque. Yet not only populist movements but even neo-fascist groups like the rightwing extremist 
party NPD celebrated the author. It was stated that Sarrazin’s ideas about immigration were in line 
with NPD tenets and that he also had contributed towards making their ideas more popular and less 
assailable since he belonged to an established social democratic party.
90
 
While one of the experts thought that Sarrazin only shed light on resentments that existed in the 
population anyway, and thus enabled an honest examination of them, others suggested that Sarrazin’s 
positions voided taboos that had previously been upheld in public debate. One of the major topoi in the 
debate was the one of the courageous ‘breaking’ of taboos and that Sarrazin had dared to confront a 
‘politically correct’ establishment. A comment in Die Welt criticised the taboos allegedly imposed by 
so-called “do-gooders” (Gutmenschen), which hampered a serious analysis of social problems. 
Sarrazin however was portrayed as “honest and courageous” and as a person that “described the facts 
and problems […] without regard to any taboos”.91  
Shooman however explains, that taboos can indeed be useful within public discourse. Not only can 
they protect vulnerable minorities from humiliation and harm, but she suggests that resentments 
against a minority tend to be reinforced by a perceived agreement that is assumed to be held by the 
majority in society. Accordingly, anti-Semitism in Germany had been pushed aside and into what she 
called “Kommunikationslatenz”, a state of communicative latency that made it more difficult to 
express as social taboos became stronger in the course of German post-war history. Anti-Semitic ideas 
still existed in German society but anti-Semites could not count on broad acceptance of their ideas and 
would thus refrain from expressing them. 
What Shooman describes as the establishment of taboos is to a certain extent the opposite discursive 
movement to what is described here as the construction of the significant other. It sheds some light on 
the connection between this construction and racism, too. While the latter is still present in the form of 
racist and/or anti-Semitic ideas and attitudes, the development of a taboo that prevents a group from 
being actively constructed as the significant other makes these attitudes less acceptable and thus less 
likely to be expressed publically. In the case of the significant others, however, expressions of racism 
seem less severe – not even racist at all – and many more people feel legitimate and entitled to 
articulate them and thereby further push the discourse in the direction of intolerance. 
There is thus a striking difference between how anti-Semitic and the anti-Muslim discourses are 
considered in society. Shooman pointed to the example of the CDU-politician Martin Hohmann, who 
had been excluded from his party in 2003 because of anti-Semitic statements, and contrasted this 
example with the aborted procedure of excluding Sarrazin for his racist and anti-Muslim statements 
from the SPD. Another expert, a politically active woman, who had left the SPD because of the party’s 
handling of Sarrazin, expressed a similar perception of different standards: 
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 “Three (…) delegates of the SPD have been excluded from the party because they have been 
 critical towards Israel and not anti-Semitic (…). They have been excluded immediately. And 
 then there comes some random stupid idiot and expresses his inhuman ideas. I don’t care if it 
 is about Muslims, or about Jews, if it is about Turks, about Arabs or Greeks. It is just 
 inhumane, what he says. (…) And then they want to exclude him and suddenly all petitions that 
 existed in order to exclude him are withdrawn.”92 
Considering the observations of the different interviewees, it could be stated that the Sarrazin debate 
reinforced and extended intolerance towards Muslims as the significant other and as a group that is 
conceived in opposition to the imagined ‘in-group’. While other groups, like Jews or different 
immigrant groups, might not be perceived as part of the dominant “we”, they are not labelled by this 
specific discourse as being in opposition to society and as dangerous strangers that can be justifiably 
excluded. They are however still constructed as groups that are different, and changes in the discourse 
can quickly turn a group that is perceived to be integrated and acceptable into one that cannot be 
accepted and towards which intolerance can or even should be practiced. 
Reactions to the social division and exclusion as significant others 
Regarding the response of the Muslim community to the Sarrazin debate, the interviewed experts point 
in particular to withdrawal from political and social activity on the one hand and an attitude of ‘Now 
more than ever’ on the other. This could be observed in the context of political and social participation 
but also in how a sense of belonging was expressed more generally. 
One very active local SPD politician with Muslim affiliation explained that she had left the party after 
10 years of active work and good opportunities for a political career because Sarrazin had not been 
excluded and she felt like doing politics on the back of those Muslims who were, unlike her, mainly 
targeted by Sarrazin as poor or doing pity jobs: 
 “I cannot look in the mirror, if I support this kind of hypocrisy. (…) On the one hand I am 
 really supported [within the party] and could have made a career (…) I have withdrawn from 
 everything, I cannot do that on someone else’s back. (…) Only because I’m not a 
 greengrocer
93? Or because I don’t sell döner? No, that is not possible.” 
She explained, that about 10 colleagues of her immediate circle had left the party for the same reason. 
On the other hand, she recognised about the same amount of people who had the same opinion about 
Sarrazin and the SPD, but who remained inside the party explicitly in order to be able to counteract the 
tendencies that Sarrazin represented and to reform the party from within. 
Another Muslim expert, a woman who is strongly involved in party politics, explained that she had 
experienced a lot of frustration within the Muslim communities, which made it more difficult to 
motivate Muslims for activities in social projects and/or political participation after the Sarrazin 
debate:  
 “Many Muslims think: ‘no matter, what we do, in the end we are not welcome in this country’, 
 and have become more sceptical about the possible effects of projects. ‘Why should we 
 actually approach them? (…) At the end of the day, it will not have any effect.’”94 
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On the other hand, she knew many young Muslims, especially those that were already active in 
different social projects and had a good education that appeared quite resistant against the Sarrazin 
debate.  
 “Those people feel German and integrated and they insisted on being German; (…) 
 strengthening their German, but at the same time their Muslim identity; that they insist on not 
 being pushed into hiding their Muslim identity because of the debate. (…) They feel motivated 
 and think ‘Now more than ever!’ which is good because you have to reach young people in 
 particular.” 
Other stakeholders, like Nofal from the network against discrimination of Muslims, perceived the 
overall situation less optimistically. She observed, that Muslims felt “personally rejected, defamed 
and devalued” by the whole debate. One of the effects she noticed even among young people was the 
polarisation between “us” and “them”, which had become stronger.  
 “That has been a fundamental problem even before Sarrazin, that Germany has such an 
 image of itself, to which you cannot belong and cannot be a real German, if you have Turkish 
 roots, if you are Muslim (...) and this has intensified with Sarrazin.” 
We can observe here the strong effect of the boundary that is established towards Muslims who are 
defined as the significant other. This boundary between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ that Schiffauer has identified 
as an integral part of the construction of the significant other, is thus internalized by these young 
people who through the process of othering perceive themselves as part of the ‘out-group’ and have to 
find new types of identification. The construction of the self as ‘other’ is to a certain extent adopted 
and reinforced. Others however try to resist this exclusionary process and insist on their belonging to 
the ‘We’-group against the dominant discourse. 
These two major ways of reacting to the discursive exclusion and refusal of belonging could also be 
observed among the group of young Muslims that had invited Sarrazin for a discussion. They all 
expressed strong disappointment with how the former politician conducted himself during the 
meeting: 
 “It was just like a monologue. He just talked, we asked and he talked. I mean he did not even 
 let us finish our sentences. (…) He was not interested, he just sat there, very distant, with 
 folded arms (…) It was just like he erected a wall in front of us.”95 
They were disappointed in their wish to reach him personally and maybe make him change some of 
his perceptions. Although Sarrazin acknowledged that they were different from the average 
immigrants that he described, he just saw them as an exception from the rule. Especially the young 
girls wearing the hijab felt stigmatised and excluded by his ideas. One of the group leaders described 
what he called a key situation of the encounter, when a young woman with hijab confronted Sarrazin 
in the following way: 
 “I watch German TV, I read German newspapers, I speak German, I watch soccer, I support 
 the German soccer team (…), I do everything, that a German does. Am I now German?”  
They described the reaction of Sarrazin as follows:  
 “No, with the headscarf you will never be German. You will never be integrated with this 
 headscarf.” 
Like the headscarf, outwardly visible signs of religion have been strong markers of otherness in the 
debate about Islam and integration. As in this debate between young Muslims and Sarrazin, the 
visibility of religion is often perceived as marking the boundary between those – still tolerable – 
Muslims that are not visible as such and those who through clothing, beards or visible performance of 
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prayer are recognisably practicing Muslims. The latter cross the boundary not only between ‘the own’ 
and ‘the other’ but often – as in this case – between the tolerable, private performance of the religion 
and intolerable, publically visible religiosity. 
The question of private and public practice of religion plays a crucial part in the debate about 
(Muslim) religion in general. Considering religious expressions that can be defined as Muslim, we 
observe that certain practices, such as the ritual prayer, can be tolerated in private but rarely in public 
places, such as schools.
96
 Other practices, however, like the female headscarf, tend to mark otherness 
in every regard and, in the case of Sarrazin and his perspective, point to the inability to be ‘integrated’ 
and thus to the irreversible otherness. 
Another example where the crucial role of visibility became apparent in the experience of the 
interviewees was in the area of political participation. The Muslim woman, who had left the SPD 
because of Sarrazin, explained the barriers of outwardly identifiable Muslims within political parties: 
 “If you don’t immediately identify as Muslim, you don’t have these problems. I was spoilt, (…) 
 they knew I was a Muslim, but I was not perceived as Muslim (…). My  Muslim background 
 was never in the foreground. But, if a lady with headscarf would appear there and would like 
 to be active there, then she would have problems. And  those [problems] she would have – 
 and of this I can assure you – in every party, also with the Greens.”97 
The interviewee thus explains that outwardly recognisable signs of Muslim religious affiliation are 
perceived as markers of otherness. The signifier of otherness is so strong, especially with the hijab that 
parties of all different political colours partake in its interpretation as beyond the boundary of tolerable 
‘difference’.  
The young Muslims from the group interview also reported that the opinions of Sarrazin, like in this 
case the exclusion of women with the hijab, even extended into the realm of education: 
 “We had an English teacher (…), who always confronted us with it, he repeated most of it and 
 showed ‘Yes, that’s how Germans think.’ (…) so typical things like with headscarf you can 
 never be German and similar things. And then he said (…) ‘This is how the majority of 
 Germans think’.” 
Asked whether the teacher did or did not perceive them as German, they answered: 
 “As long as we are wearing the hijab we cannot be Germans for Sarrazin and neither for our 
 teacher.” 
In the group discussion, however, the young people seemed to deal with these experiences in a 
proactive way, trying to express their Muslim identity self-consciously and to combine it with their 
German identity as good as it was possible for them in these particular surroundings.  
 “Generally I see myself reassured in that I wear my hijab more confidently now and also show 
 that I am Muslim.”  
Young people thus described how persistent questioning and attacks made them turn towards their 
religion, which in turn made them more knowledgeable and self-confident. 
They also expressed that through being good persons and teaching other young Muslims to be decent 
human beings as well they could change the perception of Muslims in society in the long run. One 
young male was less optimistic about his chances of equal belonging both due to his Turkish 
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background and his religion. He pointed the idea of economic success as the only way of finding a 
way in society and of proving stigmatizations wrong. This is an interesting reaction as it directly 
responds to Sarrazin’s demands for economic performance and achievement. Although Sarrazin is 
convinced that Muslims were generally less successful and less educated as a direct result of their 
cultural and ethnic heritage, the young people referred precisely to these ideas and this respondent 
tried to prove Sarrazin wrong and thus to possibly undo the hurt of social exclusion. 
Although the young people tried to create their own way beyond stigmatising and racialising labels 
that are ascribed, they remain caught up in the same type of argumentation that dominates the Sarrazin 
discourse: they refer the question of ‘integration’ to themselves and agree to carry the main 
responsibility for other people’s stereotypes and racist views about them. They often claim to possess 
the power to change them by just ‘behaving in the right way’. 
Ways of dealing with the challenge 
However, the possibilities of rejecting and circumventing exclusion appear to be limited. Considering 
the experiences of the different Muslim interviewees, it seems that certain types of political activity, 
such as for example involvement in projects for empowerment of Muslims and engagement with party 
politics, might provide one way of responding to social stigmas. 
Good examples for such efforts of empowerment are the mentioned group of young Muslims that had 
been part of a pilot project called “Youth culture, religion and democracy98” and also the Berlin 
project JUMA
99
, that aims to empower young religious Muslims and to motivate them for participation 
in political life by making them encounter high-level politicians. In the case of the invitation of 
Sarrazin, the encounter seemed to disappoint the young Muslims that were involved. Yet Jochen 
Müller, one of the leaders of the group and an expert interviewed for this chapter, explained that 
already the involvement with and discussion of the ideas of Sarrazin had helped the young people out 
of sense of passive frustration and hurt and motivated them to actively deal with both author and his 
arguments. It thus gave them the feeling of self-confidence and power to affect change. 
The political participation of (religious) Muslims in general was mentioned as a means of countering 
the construction and stigmatisation of Muslims as the significant other in society. However, some 
interviewees also mentioned different barriers that had to be overcome in this respect. The Muslim 
woman, who had ended her political career in the SPD because of Sarrazin mentioned that, besides the 
headscarf as a strong barrier to participation in political parties, that it would also in other respects be 
hard for Muslims to integrate into party politics in Germany, such as for their praying five times a day, 
refusing alcohol or the hugging of a member of the opposite sex. Those barriers were however 
generally not described as conscious exclusions
100
, but rather as informed by a habitus among 
established party members where the common visit in the pub and other customs that are at odds with 
Muslim religiosity were an important part of party-political rituals: 
One Muslim SPD member explained:  
 “I don’t see a conscious discrimination of Muslims there but structurally things have to 
 change. The SPD has now introduced something like quota.”101  
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The introduction of a 15% quota for immigrants or people with an immigrant background in leading 
positions of the party has been one of the reactions of the SPD to the contested decision not to remove 
Sarrazin from the party. Since then, some activists with Turkish background have climbed the career 
ladder within the party both nationally and locally.
102
 Most of the interviewees were quite sceptical 
about the quota but acknowledged its necessity in order to change power structures and the 
homogenous culture within the political arena.  
None of the interviewed experts, even the one that had left the SPD because of Sarrazin, favoured the 
establishment of an immigrant or a specifically Muslim party. All supported the idea of migrants and 
Muslims claiming their space within the established parties and reforming them from within. 
Concluding Remarks 
Although the debate about Sarrazin and his book in many ways reflects German particularities, it 
closely corresponds with related debates about Muslims and integration in other European countries. 
The reason for the international prevalence of such debates seem to lie in features that we have 
explored in this report and in the construction of a group as the significant other in society and in the 
importance this other has for the construction of national identities. 
The specific anti-Muslim discourse in Germany, of which Sarrazin is a spokesperson, has an important 
function for the construction of a national identity especially in times of fundamental changes in which 
Germany is turning into an immigration country and witnesses the steady growth of cultural, ethnic 
and religious diversity. This growing diversity is accompanied by a countermovement that is driven by 
certain social groups, mainly from within the well-established middle classes that try to maintain older 
social, political and power structures. The construction of a certain group – in this case: Muslims – as 
the socially significant other serves different aims of different political parties at the same time. 
Immigrants and/or Muslims and their apparent cultural or religious difference is perceived as the 
absolute ‘other’ of German society through the creation of a contrast with negative aspects that 
German society wants to distance itself from, at least in theory: from homophobia to anti-Semitism 
and misogyny. Following this projection of negative attributes and values the group is then quite 
justifiably positioned outside the borders of ‘what can still be tolerated’ within German society. This 
process of exclusion becomes stronger with the degree of public fears that are raised. The more a 
future scenario is constructed as negative or apocalyptic, in which the significant other becomes the 
dangerous other and takes over important parts of society, the more irrational the public fears become. 
One of the factors of Sarrazin’s success was the existence of anti-Muslim debates in other European 
countries and especially the growing strength of populist parties that warn European citizens of the 
alleged Islamisation of their societies. Public figures like Geert Wilders in the Netherlands or Heinz-
Christian Strache in Austria have been cautioning against a ‘foreign infiltration’ of immigrants, 
especially Muslims, and draw on a common European fear of the Muslim other – a fear that is, similar 
to the Sarrazin discourse, quite untouched by rational deliberation. This significant other assumes a 
role on the European level that corresponds to the various national levels. It helps to define Europe 
through its perceived borders that run along the faultlines of the ‘clash of civilizations’ and thus 
supports the unification process of the diverse European countries. 
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Looking at issues of tolerance and intolerance the Sarrazin debate reflects many of those arguments 
that turn around the ‘limits of tolerance’ towards the marked minority. 
On the one side the borders of intolerance can be observed to have extended towards discriminatory 
and even racist discourse by Sarrazin, as one of the effects of the debate was an opening of the field of 
what can be openly said in society, that was directly followed by ordinary people on the streets feeling 
obliged to rebuke persons, they perceived as Muslims. On the other side also the racism of Sarrazin 
and in general anti-Muslim racism has been named more explicitly after the publishing of Sarrazin’s 
book, and a debate started, if what he said, was still tolerable. The Federal Bank, where he was a 
member of the board, broke up with him after the book was published and his party, the SPD thought 
about excluding him. While many perceived his ideas as non-tolerable, others thought they were 
protected by the freedom of speech and therefore had to be tolerated. The topos of the ‘limits of 
tolerance’ is an interesting figure as it helps observing, who thinks, what has to be tolerated by whom 
in society. In the case of Muslims it is on the one hand mainly the visibility of religion through 
mosque buildings, headscarves or prayers that is negotiated as a limit of tolerance while on the other 
hand anti-Muslim statements and actions like the book of Sarrazin or on the international level the 
comics of Kurt Westergaard are possible limits of tolerance. The respective other side is generally 
claiming liberalism, either the freedom of speech or the freedom of religious expression. (In-) 
tolerance and its limits is thus an interesting concept to observe, as it can either promote in- or 
exclusion, depending on who uses it and in which context. 
Regarding the specific case of the Sarrazin debate and the general construction of Muslims as the 
significant other and its effects on the Muslim minority, it can be stated, that it caused detrimental 
social divisions by enforcing the perception of many members of the targeted minority not to be 
welcome in German society. Some young Muslims obviously reacted with drawing back into their 
smaller communities and looking for other possible identity concepts than the German one, even if 
they were German citizens. 
Especially young people, who had already been active in civil society organisations and projects 
however managed to empower themselves and strengthen their self-confidence by learning more about 
both their own religion and German politics and how to handle both and engage into critical debates 
and even social activism. 
One of the political conclusions would be to carefully consider taboos in the case of dehumanising 
speech, no matter which social group is targeted. Experience from anti-Semitism has shown, that those 
taboos do not abolish respective attitudes in society, but they hinder people in uttering them and 
receiving support from like-minded thinkers. They probably do so through preventing a certain group 
from being constructed as the significant other, towards whom intolerance seems to be a justifiable 
attitude, because he symbolises all that is rejected in terms of practices, attitudes and values. Therefore 
taboos could protect vulnerable groups from hurt and degradation and thus help prevent deep divisions 
in diverse contemporary societies. 
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This report has given detailed insight into the dealing with religious difference, notably Islam and 
Muslims in Germany and into the role that the concept of tolerance and its different understandings 
play within the process of accommodating or excluding religious difference within important social 
fields like education and politics and within the overall public discourse. In this context, especially the 
excluding effect of tolerance discourse has been examined as well as its power to draw borders 
towards specific groups in society, that are constructed as completely different from the rest of society 
through those discourses. Regarding these excluding effects of the debates and the construction of 
Muslims as the significant other, the report further examined the effects this construction not only has 
on the members of the thus targeted minority but also on the self-understanding of the German 
majority and the construction of the national identity. As these debates and processes of constructing a 
national other are not exclusive to Germany, the report also draws some parallels of the German 
debate to the overall European debates about Islam and Muslims and the role those debates also play 
for the construction of a common European identity. 
In the beginning in chapter 1 the report gives an overview of the historical development of German 
national identity as well as the developments of discourses and politics towards ethno-religious groups 
in society throughout the last three decades since 1980 and finally touches upon important debates and 
concepts like multiculturalism, leading culture, integration and tolerance. 
Chapter 2 then deeply examines two real life cases from the realm of education, in particular public 
schools and the way how religious difference of Muslims is accommodated or not accommodated in 
this field. By speaking to many actors and experts in the field of education as well as looking at 
important court decisions the issue is analysed through taking into account very different viewpoints 
on the specific practical conflicts with religious difference as well as on general concepts like the 
religious neutrality of the state and tolerance versus acceptance or respect towards (visible) religious 
practice in the public sphere.  
Coming from the debates and practices towards religious difference in school life chapter 3 then 
analyses the general political debate about religious difference of Islam and Muslims in Germany and 
its effects on the self-identification of Muslims and their participation in society in politics. Looking at 
the Sarrazin debate as the most outstanding debate of intolerance towards Muslims in the last years in 
Germany also gives the opportunity to look at the reasons for it and the general anti-Muslim debates in 
parts of the majority society. It is particularly the construction of a significant other in society and the 
role this other plays for the national identity, which is examined in this part of the report. 
Dealing with difference always touches upon the understanding of ones own identity, be it an 
individual or a group. On a national level therefore the acceptance, tolerance or respect towards 
diversity very much touches upon the national self-understanding. In order to pose the question, how 
the dealing with diversity is conditioned by the self-understanding of German citizens and the nation 
as a whole, it is necessary to have a look at the historical development of this national identity.  
The German history has for a very long time seen a very ethnic and even biologist understanding of 
national identity, which has often led to an exclusive attitude towards inhabitants with a different 
ethnic and/or religious background. While Germany is not the only country to link ethnic origin to its 
understanding of nationality, some historians argue that this tie has been especially strong here. 
Among the reasons given is the historical importance placed on local or regional identity over national 
German identity that can still be observed in the importance of the Länder, the individual federal states 
vis-à-vis the national level. These strong regional identities have then led to an even stronger emphasis 
on a constructed common German national identity, almost overcompensating to keep the fragmented 
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territory together and build one nation. In the process, other nations were constructed as inferior in 
relation to the German one and a specifically German idea of the Volk was developed, which lays 
particular emphasis on a common bloodline of all the members of the nation. This was far more 
ideological than the concept of ethnicity, and strongly linked ideology and (perceived) biological 
factors. Together with the devaluation of other nations and ethnic groups this concept of the Volk 
ultimately led to the National Socialists’ idea of a superior German ‘race’, which had to govern all 
other ‘races’ and even extinguish other groups and nations. 
Although the National Socialist regime and its ideas have long been overcome and certain thinkers, 
like Jürgen Habermas, have argued that the only possible patriotism in Germany today could be 
patriotism towards the constitution, the idea of the Volk has not been completely jettisoned. As a 
result, German citizenship has, until recently, been closely tied to ethnic origin. The citizenship reform 
of 2000 has partially changed this and enabled immigrants and their descendants to become German 
citizens under certain circumstances.  
This national self-understanding has affected different ethno-religious groups in different ways 
throughout the last three decades in Germany. While the time after WW2 has still been dominated by 
the economic uprising of the country and the necessity of foreign workers to help build up the 
destroyed country, the economic boom ended in the late 1970es and beginning 1980es and with it the 
political will to host foreign workers, especially as also growing refugee-immigration from war-torn 
countries and inner-German migration from East to West changed the attitude in society towards the 
immigrants and thus political measures were taken to encourage them to return to their home 
countries. Although many of the recruited workers from Turkey and other countries stayed in 
Germany, the de facto status as an immigration country had been negated by German politics until the 
year 2000. In 1989, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, member of the Green party, initiated with the support of his 
party the Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten (Agency for Multicultural Affairs) in 
Frankfurt/Main that aimed to mediate between immigrants and the broader German society and mark 
the beginning of a change in immigrant politics. Supporters of the concept of multiculturalism at this 
time criticised the Federal Government for its negation of the actual reality of Germany having 
become an immigration country through the recruitment of labour migrants. With the memory of 
World War II and the racist ideology of the National Socialists having led to mass killings of Jews and 
Roma and other ethnic, religious and political groups, the supporters of the multicultural idea wanted 
to prevent any form of hostility or even pressure towards assimilation directed towards immigrants. 
After the break down of the inner German border, the subsequent high proportion of inner-German 
migration, immigration of ethnic German resettlers and the growing immigration of refugees from 
war-torn countries the public opinion towards immigrants and ethno-religious others in general 
strongly deteriorated. The 1990es saw some terrible outbreaks of violence against asylum seekers and 
other immigrants, which was followed by a restriction of the right to asylum by the political 
representatives.  
The acknowledgement of the status as immigration country and respective political measurements for 
the inclusion or integration of immigrants lasted until the citizenship reform of the year 2000. 
Together with the far-reaching decisions in the citizenship law, that enabled children of immigrants to 
become German citizens under certain circumstances, the political debate of a common German 
leading culture (Leitkultur) came up. The idea that, especially in the face of immigrants being able to 
become German citizens, all Germans had to be united by a dominating culture, gained considerable 
support and was especially used to counter the idea of multiculturalism. Although no explicit referral 
to ethnicity was made any more, the idea of a common Leitkultur in opposition to multiculturalism 
tried to uphold the idea of a superior German culture, that had to be taken over by the immigrants. 
Although the following political debate mainly turned around integration of immigrants, the idea of a 
leading culture behind it rather led to and understanding of assimilation in practice. 
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In the light of these developments of national identity, the anti-Muslim debates following the attacks 
of  9/11 are to be seen also in this context of trying to uphold a common national identity, that is also 
constructed in opposition to the immigrant groups. Due to the European and global negative debates 
about Muslims and Islam this group has become the ideal candidate for the creation of this national 
other against whom a positive common German identity can be constructed.  
It is exactly this construction of the national other that makes particular use of the concept of 
tolerance. While tolerance as a normative concept is generally understood as the opposite of 
discrimination and racism, it can be observed in current public discourses that the concept of tolerance 
is also increasingly used to draw borders between those who are to be tolerated and those who are not, 
while the non-tolerance towards a specific group or individual is often legitimised with its own 
(perceived) intolerance towards others. Whereas ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims’ were largely perceived as the 
victims of intolerance during the violent attacks in the early 1990s, more and more, they have come to 
be portrayed as ‘intolerant’ themselves, whether towards Jews, homosexuals or liberal societies in 
general. By portraying – especially religious – Muslims in this way, they are labelled as foreigners 
with incompatible values and beliefs to whom too much tolerance would be a detrimental attitude.  
Looking at tolerance in this way as a political discourse that marks insiders and outsiders of the 
society reveals a rather excluding power of tolerance talk and at the same time one that sheds light 
upon the unequal power relations between the subjects and objects of (in-) tolerance. The widely heard 
slogan of “no tolerance for intolerance” had been traditionally used to counter right-wing extremism 
but is mainly used for Muslims and Islam in current debates. It therefore not only draws borders 
towards a group of religious others by not granting tolerance towards certain attitudes and practices 
but also by implicitly positioning the members of this groups outside and beneath the national “we”. 
The thus labelled outsiders do not enjoy equal rights like the right of religious freedom, based in the 
constitution, but depend on the tolerance of the powerful majority to grant them these rights or not. 
With Wendy Brown we can call this way of using the tolerance concept a discourse of 
depoliticization, in which “tolerance can function as a substitute for or as a supplement to formal 
liberal equality or liberty; it can also overtly block the pursuit of substantive equality and freedom” 
(Brown, 2006:9). How far and in which ways the tolerance talk and related concepts are able to block 
the pursuit of equality and freedom, is examined in detail in regard to religious freedom of Muslims 
both in national debates and in practice in the question of (religious) conflicts at German public 
schools and in political life. 
The two practical cases out of the realm of education at public German schools, that we examined 
were both taken to court and thus serve to illustrate conflicts regarding Muslim religiosity and public 
schools, that were not solved with good understanding, but represent strongly opposing views and 
attitudes of the individual cases but also towards the role of (minority) religion in public schools in 
general. The major concept analysed in these cases and the relating debates were the concept of 
tolerance and the concept of religious neutrality of the state. Especially the first case of a young 
Muslim boy, who fought for the right to perform his ritual prayer within the public school building, 
gave very rich data for analysing the role of religious neutrality of the state and the discourses around 
it. As soon as the religious practice of Muslim individuals, be it students or teachers, at public schools 
is debated, the question of religious neutrality of the state appears, generally as an argument to reject 
the right to visibly performed religious practice. This has been extensively debated in regard to the 
headscarves of Muslim teachers – and eventually led to the headscarf bans for teachers at public 
schools in Berlin and other federal states – and has again become a public issue in the case of the 
prayer of the Muslim boy. Through analyses of the court rulings as well as lines of argumentation of 
the different actors involved, we found two major way of interpretation of state neutrality that can be 
distinguished and that lead to very different and even opposing views towards the accommodation of 




The two different interpretations of neutrality of the state were even presented by the different courts 
that were trying the prayer case in Berlin. While the first court did not see the neutrality at stake 
through the provision of a prayer room and obliged the school to enable the prayer of the boy, the 
higher court defined the state neutrality in a more laic sense and decided that the provision of a room 
for religious purposes would interfere with the neutrality of the school as a state institution, which 
even outweighed the right to religious freedom of the Muslim boy. 
The first court strongly supported the idea of the positive religious neutrality of the state that did not 
aim at excluding religious practice from the public sphere but rather obliged the state to treat, and even 
support, all religions equally without favouring one specific religion before others. This idea of state 
neutrality can thus be described as ‘equal support of different religions’. 
The second court level however rather referred to an understanding of neutrality that can be 
described as ‘invisibility of religious practice’. This view on state neutrality was also held by the 
respective school, that forbid the boy to perform his prayer in the school corridor because the school 
had to respect the religious neutrality of the state. Instead of the school being obliged to be neutral 
towards the students, the neutrality is extended here towards the students that have to be religiously 
neutral within the school building. 
The findings of the analysis of the Berlin cases mainly represent two of the three options that the 
professor for church law Hans Michael Heinig had mentioned as the possible ways, how the German 
Staatskirchenrecht (the law affecting the church and the state) could develop in the future: 
1. Equal treatment before the constitutional law regarding religion (Religionsverfassungsrecht) 
2. Hierarchisation through the privileging of the Christian denominations 
3. Laicisation of the religious legal order. 
Although the privileging of Christian denominations can be widely perceived in the national debate 
about Leitkultur it had hardly been mentioned in the cases analysed, which might be due to a rather 
non-religious political sphere in Berlin. However a certain laicisation of the understanding of religious 
legal order can definitely be stated for the Berlin cases and many of the actors involved in the debate. 
Heinig clearly opted for the equal treatment before the Religionsverfassungsrecht, which he though to 
be by far the best option, also in terms of compatibility with EU law.  
Apart from distinguishing the two fundamentally different ways of understanding state neutrality, we 
found a connection between the positions regarding neutrality and the view towards tolerance. 
The first court that had an understanding of state neutrality as equal support of different religions used 
the concept of tolerance in connection to respect, saying that a common prayer room for all children at 
school could help them to learn mutual tolerance and respect. The concept of tolerance that the court 
referred to might best be described by the ‘respect-conception’ of tolerance (Forst 2003). This sees 
tolerance as a virtue that is mutually given by different partners, but goes beyond mere forbearance of 
the other towards respect of the other’s views and attitudes. 
The second court level and other actors in the field framed tolerance in a different way by perceiving it 
as too weak an instrument for securing peace at a diverse school. This view sees tolerance as a practice 
that could even lead to increased incidences of conflict at school, if too much (different) religious 
expression was tolerated. The concept of tolerance used here is a rather exclusive one, rather close to 
an ‘allowance-conception’ (Forst 2003). In this concept one party has the power to tolerate the other or 
not, and tolerance is granted (or not) in spite of inner rejection of the other or his or her practices and 
views.  
Combining the concepts of religious neutrality of the state and tolerance we found that the 
understanding of state neutrality as an equal support of different religions is closely connected 
with an understanding of tolerance as respect. Tolerance in this sense is closer to respect and 
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acceptance and might be seen as the individual virtue of citizens, where the concept of neutrality 
as the support for equal rights is the legal framework. 
On the other hand we can state that the understanding of state neutrality as eliminating any 
outwardly perceivable form of religious practice from the public sphere is in close connection to 
the understanding of tolerance as allowance. Tolerance is rather portrayed as a threat than a 
virtue and mainly mentioned in connection to its limits, those being any kind of perceived 
intolerance of religion itself, primarily any attempt to proselytise. Tolerance is not understood as 
an individual virtue supporting the legal frame of equal rights, but rather it is taken as some 
kind of bearing of the other, one who is not on equal power terms but always in danger of not 
being tolerated any longer. The non-tolerance is then applied to any perceivable kind of religious 
expression, especially when performed by groups. 
As Heinig explains tolerance as a concept should not feature in the legal debate at all. The toleration of 
people with a different faith would be only a pre-stage to religious freedom, which has already been 
secured, and as an individual virtue of the citizens it is no legal duty. There has however been a 
remarkable shift within public debates from a ‘respect-conception’ of tolerance towards an 
‘allowance-conception’ within the last years. With Wendy Brown we could state that by changing a 
legally ensured right (in our case the freedom of religious expression) into an objective of tolerance, 
the debate is taken out of the realm of equal rights and into the realm of voluntarily attributed 
allowance, and from a more powerful towards to a less powerful entity.  
The issue of unequal power relations being mirrored in the tolerance talk had also been touched upon 
within the other case we examined, the Islamic religious education at public schools. One of the 
mentioned goals of the Federal Government to establish Islamic religious classes at state schools 
throughout the country is the education of Muslim children towards tolerance. One the one hand this 
raises the scepticism of Muslim representatives whether the non-interference of the state into the 
content of the religious education would be secured and on the other hand the concept of tolerance 
here tends to have an excluding function when used by public officials, with demands that tolerance be 
taught to Muslim children with the implication that they are intolerant. 
This perception of the intolerant Muslims seems to be deeply rooted within the public discourse. Islam 
and Muslims are often portrayed as having intolerant attitudes and practices, from homophobia to 
misogyny and rejection of other faiths and worldviews. Subsequently the concept of tolerance is more 
and more perceived as a threat to peace and public order, if it is applied in relation to people and 
groups who are perceived as not tolerant themselves. The slogan ‘no tolerance for intolerance’, which 
had traditionally been used when rejecting rightwing extremism and violence, has lately turned into a 
defender of the liberal society against visible Muslim religious practices, from headscarves to mosques 
and public prayers. Through this turn it has however also become an agent of and justification for 
restrictive and illiberal views and politics towards Muslims. 
How this view on Muslims as intolerant and illiberal can justify a very intolerant and even racist view 
and debate about them has most vividly been displayed by the national debate about the book 
“Deutschland schafft sich ab” (Germany does away with itself) of the social democrat Thilo Sarrazin. 
Even if the way how Sarrazin attacked Muslims in general as unintelligent and unable to integrate has 
been new in its quality, especially as coming from a rather left wing politician, it could draw on a 
broad preceding discourse about Muslims and Islam. This debate had already constructed this social 
group and portrayed it as standing in opposition to widely held national values and had thus made it 
widely justifiable to disrespectfully talk about the respective group and its members. The broad 
acceptance of Sarrazin’s ideas in the population showed, that he had only been a spokesperson for an 
attitude towards Muslims that had long been built up by public debates. Intolerance towards Muslims 
already seemed to be appropriate for a large part of the population by the time the debate about his 
book started. However the open utterances of even racist views can also be perceived as having further 
enhanced those attitudes.  
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The Sarrazin debate also allows us to look at (in-) tolerance towards religious minority and different 
religious practice, in particular those of Muslims, from a broader angel. The fact, that the book so 
heavily resonated with already existing attitudes in the German population showed, that the discussion 
about the ‘other’ also tells a lot about the ‘self’, respectively the national self-identification. Due to a 
specifically ethnic understanding of national identity in Germany, it has never been easy for people 
with some kind of migration history to self-identify as German, especially because of the exclusion 
experienced by others. The debate about Muslims has however reached another quality in regard to 
exclusion of others during the last years. Similarly to other European countries Muslims have more 
and more been constructed as the significant other in society, as a group, whose members are in an 
essentialising way all defined as having similar values, customs, practices and even character traits. 
Those characteristics have not only been constructed as different from the rest of society but also as 
opposing and inferior to those of the majority groups.  
It is exactly this perceived value difference, that turns Muslims into the significant other and thus into 
a negative mirror, that helps the majority groups to positively self-identify with attributes like 
tolerance, gender emancipation or liberalism by distancing themselves from the group of significant 
others, who all represent the opposite of those values. Those others are justifiably positioned outside 
the borders of ‘what can still be tolerated’ within German society.  
The significant other fulfils two very important functions with the modern nation state: By mirroring 
all the negative attributes, that might be associated with the national identity, like anti-Semitism or 
intolerance in the case of Germany, it lifts the burden of those negative qualities from the majority 
groups by transferring them unto the minority and thus helps to create a positive national identity. At 
the same time this positive common identity also unifies the otherwise strongly and rapidly 
diversifying population. The price of the positive self-identification and unifying power of the 
otherising process is however the exclusion and de-valorisation of a whole minority group. This 
process of exclusion becomes stronger with the degree of public fears that are raised. In the case of 
Sarrazins’s book the fears he tried to raise were the loss of intelligence and even the complete 
abolishment of the German culture and nation in the future, when all girls had to wear headscarves and 
the call of the Muezzin could be heard in every street. The more a future scenario is constructed as 
negative or apocalyptic, in which the significant other becomes the dangerous other and takes over 
important parts of society, the more irrational the public fears become. This was also well exemplified 
by the Sarrazin debate, when the validity of his data did not seem to play an important role for his 
support. Although renowned scholars had countered many of his statistics and conclusions, those data 
did not change the general national debate about his statements. 
It is however also this irrationality of the discourse, that makes it especially dangerous for those 
people, that are targeted by it. Intolerant behaviour towards them seems less and less problematic 
extended and discriminatory and even racist behaviour is often not perceived as such. The Sarrazin 
debate can be said to have extended the limits of intolerance by opening the field of what can be 
openly said in society that was directly followed by ordinary people on the streets feeling obliged to 
rebuke persons, they perceived as Muslims. 
The general construction of Muslims as the others and the specific debate about Sarrazin’s book in 
turn enforced the perception of many members of the targeted minority not to be welcome and not to 
belong to Germany and caused detrimental social divisions in society. Some young Muslims obviously 
reacted with drawing back into their smaller communities and looking for other possible identity 
concepts than the German one, even if they were German citizens. 
Especially young people, who had already been active in civil society organisations and projects 
however managed to empower themselves and strengthen their self-confidence by learning more about 
both their own religion and German society and politics and how to handle both and engage into 
critical debates and even social and political activism. 
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One of the political conclusions would be to carefully consider taboos in the case of dehumanising 
speech, no matter which social group is targeted. Experience from anti-Semitism has shown, that those 
taboos do not abolish respective attitudes in society, but they hinder people in uttering them and 
receiving support from like-minded thinkers. They probably do so through preventing a certain group 
from being constructed as the significant other, towards whom intolerance seems to be a justifiable 
attitude, because he symbolises all that is rejected in terms of practices, attitudes and values. Therefore 
taboos could protect vulnerable groups from hurt and degradation and thus help prevent deep divisions 
in diverse contemporary societies. 
Solutions to the exclusion of Muslims and other groups and the development of hate speech and even 
racist acts should also be looked for on a European level. The process of constructing Muslims as the 
significant other is not only happening in Germany but in many European members states and can 
even be perceived as having an important effect for the unification of the quickly diversifying 
European Union. As such it is also not a new process and can draw on historical events and debates, 
that long constructed the ‘Orient’ as the significant other to Europe and as its negative mirror in values 
and norms. Even if those values and norms, that Europe holds dear have changed to a considerable 
extent (like liberalism having replaced strict Victorian norms) the mirroring effect of the Orient has 
remained and has through the discourses of the last decade also included Muslims within European 
countries and thus started to draw strict borders of what can be tolerated or not even within the own 
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Guidelines for interviews of chapter 2 
 
Example: Senate representative: 
 
 Case 1 – Prayer at public school  
 
 Mr P, after the Administrative Court had decided that the Muslim pupil who had gone to court 
should be permitted to perform his prayer once a day in school, the Senate Administration for 
Education reacted negatively and appealed against the decision. Could you please explain 
shortly the reasons for this decision? 
 The Administrative Court ruled that the neutrality of the school was not endangered by the 
prayer of the student. The Berlin Senator for Education viewed this differently. Could you 
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please explain shortly the difference between these two perspectives and especially the view 
of the Senate regarding the issue of neutrality? 
 The media quoted among others, that “the Muslim prayer in school had a demonstrative and 
missionary character” and had thus to be rejected. Could this have been avoided by a separate 
room for the prayer? 
 During the first hearing there was the argument that one would soon be confronted with entire 
gyms full of praying students, which would overburden the schools. At the second hearing one 
main argument was, that the pupil had not used the room often enough. Is there not a 
contradiction within the argumentation? 
 One media article reported: “The representatives of the Senate Administration for Education 
pointed to the fact, that at the Diesterweg Gymnasium 29 nationalities and all kinds of 
religions were present. By tolerating the midday prayer of a student, additional conflicts 
would be created.” Do you think it is a long-term solution to keep the diversity of the students 
out of the schools, or should we not look for possibilities for talking about them and find 
common solutions? 
 According to you, what could an amicable solution that would have avoided the court case, 
have looked like? Do you think the setting up of a common ‘room of silence’ would be an 
option? 
 
 Case2 – Islamic religious education 
 
 The Senate Administration for Education was against the religious education at Berlin schools, 
held by the Islamic Federation. Could you please explain shortly, why, and if the preception 
has changed until today? 
 How are the experiences of the schools with the resepctive teachers and with the instruction? 
 Which kind of solutions for (or against) the Islamic religious education would have been 
favoured by the Senate Administration for Education? 
 Some years ago there were plans to introduce Islamkunde (instruction about Islam, which is 
not confessional) instead of the confessional education by the Islamic Federation. What 




Every representative of an NGO or a public institution was asked specific questions in relation to what 




Example: Non-Muslim female teacher, teacher trainer at public schools and co-author of a 




 Did you follow the prayer case closely through ist media reporting? 
 Did you hear discussion among teachers and school stuff about this issue? If so, which views 
were prevailing among the teachers? 
 Do you think the public discontent after the first court decision was really widely spread 
within the public schools or was it a media event? 
 Which kind of solutions are found for these problems or can be found? 
 How do you think this problem should be dealt with? 
 Is this case in any way symptomatic for dealing with religious minorities or Muslims in 
particular? 
 On a continuum of “tolerance – acceptance – recognition/respect” towards religious minorities 
– where would you position this case? And can it be positioned there at all? And what would 
you think would be a solution, that would belong to the area of acceptance or respect? 
 Do you have any experiences with the instruction of the Islamic Federation, or did you hear 
about experiences of any of your colleagues? 
 Has the initially bad perception of the Islamic Federation and ist teachers changed? 
 Do you know anything about the material they use? Do they use your book too? In which 
other federal states/ cities your book is being used? 
 
Other teachers:  
Every Muslim or non-Muslim teacher was asked some specific question regarding his or her specific 





 What are the most important issues in school? 
 Have you heard about the court case regarding the prayer at school? 
 What do you think about it? 
 Is the prayer an issue at your school? How does the school administration and how do the 
teachers deal with it? 
 Is it an issue for you personally? 
 How do you think this issue should be solved? 
 Are there other things concerning your religious expression, that have become an issue at 
school? 
 Do you feel accepted with your religion at your school? If not, why not? 
 How do the non-religious students think about the way the school deals with Islamic 
practices? How do they perceive the issue of prayer at school? Are there any conflicts? 
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Guidelines for interviews for chapter 3 
 
 
Interview with Lydia Nofal, project leader of “Network against Discrimination of Muslims” of the 




1. Has the debate about the book of Thilo Sarrazin „Deutschland schafft sich ab“ changed 
anything for you personally within your direct surroundings?  
2. Has the debate changed anything within your professional field? Do you notice any 
differences in the debate about Muslims before and after the book? 
3. Do you notice any kind of change in the media discussions since then?  
4. How has the debate and the following debate about integration affected those Muslims, with 
whom you talk about discrimination in the mosques (referring to awareness campaigns that 
the network carries out)? Have those people, who have made experiences of discrimination or 
others ever mentioned Sarrazin and the debate about him?  
5. How do you perceive the political participation of Muslims in Germany? Are there any 
barriers to full participation?  
6. How have you perceived the failed attempt to exclude Sarrazin from the SPD? 
7. Leading politicians of the SPD have promised changes in their politics towards migrants after 
the decision not to exclude Sarrazin. Especially the political participation shall be improved by 
introducing a quota. What do you think about it and what would have to be done differently in 
order to raise the participation of migrants/Muslims in politics? 




Interview with Yasemin Shooman, PHD candidate at the Zentrum für Antismeitismusforschung 
(Centre for the Research about Anti-Semitism), 20.01.2011  
 
1. You work about anti-Muslim discourses within your research. Has the Sarrazin debate caused 
any kind of caesura and if so, in which way? What can still be felt today, and which kind of 
changes regarding the general debate about Muslims and Islam would you state?  
2. Are there any changes for you personally within your direct surroundings?  
3. You also work voluntarily within the field of anti-Muslim racism, especially in the field of 
education, you are active in the GEW (trade union for education) and you are creating school 
materials about this issue. How do you think the Sarrazin debate and the following debates 
about integration have affected the area of education? How do teachers and (Muslim) pupils to 
your experience deal with it? 
4. How do you perceive the political participation of Muslims in Germany? Are there any 
barriers to full participation?  
5. How have your experienced the failed attempt to exclude Sarrazin from the SPD? 
6. Leading politicians of the SPD have promised changes in their politics towards migrants after 
the decision not to exclude Sarrazin. Especially the political participation shall be improved by 
introducing a quota. What do you think about it and what would have to be done differently in 
order to raise the participation of migrants/Muslims in politics? 
7. Is there anything important, that you would like to add?  
 
 
The other guidelines for the Expert interviews have been similar like these two with slight changes due 






Interview with young Muslim participants of the discussion with Sarrazin, 01.02.2012 
 
1. Could you please describe shortly, what you are generally doing in the „Dialoggruppe“ 
(dialogue group)? Why were you interesting in taking part in it in the beginning? What are the 
aims of this group? Have your expectations been met? 
2. How did the idea to invite Thilo Sarrazin come up? 
3. Have you read the interview with him in Lettre International together? What emotions and 
thoughts came up when reading it? Have you known such kind of arguments before or did it 
have a new quality for you? 
4. Have you also read his book? How were your reactions to it? Do you have the impression that 
he is targeting Muslims in particular or are there also other social groups, that he speaks about 
in a negative way? 
5. What were your hopes regarding the meeting? 
6. What kind of questions have you created fort he meeting with him and how? 
7. Has he answered them and were you satisfied with those answers? 
8. Did you have the impression, that he really engaged with you and maybe even changed his 
mind? 
9. Do you think, that many people in Germany think like Sarrazin? 
10. Have you heard of other people, you know, that they agree with him? If so, how does this 
make you feel? How do you react to it? 
11. Has anything changed in Germany – to the positive or to the negative - since Sarrazin 
12. Has the debate about Sarrazin and similar debates discouraged you? Has it changed anything 
for you regarding your self-identification as Muslim Germans, as part of the society? 
13. What can you do in order to change these kinds of debates/ to engage yourselves within them? 
14. Do you have the impression, that you can change anything in society with your dialogue 
work? Are there other projects/ideas that might change something? 
15. Has your interest in politics changed through the dialogue group and maybe through the 
meeting with Sarrazin? 
16. What has to be changed in order for Muslims to participate more actively in German politics? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
